this partition was established by a person and is therefore fit.

§ The Master said in the baraita that in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they said: Nor may one write bills of divorce on it. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly thing in her; that he write her a scroll [sefer] of severance and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1); from the word scroll, I have derived only that a scroll is fit. From where do I derive to include all objects as fit materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The verse states: “That he write her,” in any case, i.e., any surface upon which the formula can be written.

If so, what is the meaning of that which the verse states: Scroll? It is to tell you that a bill of divorce must be written on a surface like a scroll: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor is it food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. That is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living being.

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: If the verse had written: That he write for her in the scroll [basefer], it would be as you said, that the bill of divorce may be written only on a scroll. Now that it is written simply: That he write her a sefer, it comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [sefirat devarim] is required. There are no restrictions with regard to the surface on which that account may be written.

The Gemara continues: And what do the Rabbis derive from the phrase: “That he write her”? The Gemara answers: That phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only by means of writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced by means of money. It might have entered your mind to say: Since in the verse, leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, is juxtaposed to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, then just as becoming married is effected with money, so too, leaving marriage may be effected with money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: “That he write her,” indicating that divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning that a woman cannot be divorced with money? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase: “A scroll of severance,” which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband, and nothing else severs her from him.

The Gemara continues: And the other tanna, i.e., the Rabbis, requires that verse to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her. As it is taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will never drink wine, or on the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not severance; the divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition for the duration of thirty days, or any other limited period of time, that is severance, and the divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.

The Gemara continues: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, derives that a condition without a termination point invalidates the divorce from the fact that instead of using the term karet, the verse uses the more expanded term keritut. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches two things: Divorce can be effected only by means of writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance. And the other tanna, the Rabbis, does not derive anything from the expansion of karet to keritut, because the Rabbis do not see this as a significant deviation from the standard language of the verse.

MISHNA: In the case of one who establishes his sukka between the trees, and the trees serve as walls for it, the sukka is fit.

GEMARA: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Any partition that is not able to stand in a typical wind, but rather is blown to and fro, is not a partition.

The Gemara asks the following question based on that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of one who establishes his sukka between the trees, and the trees serve as walls for it, the sukka is fit. The Gemara asks: But don’t the trees sway back and forth in the wind? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? The mishna is referring to older trees that are thick and hard and do not sway in the wind.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the issue of its foliage, which certainly sways in the wind? If it constitutes part of the wall of the sukka, the sukka should be unfit. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where it is a fit wall due to the fact that he established the wall by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves to tighten it to prevent it from swaying in the wind. And the Gemara says: If it is so that the tree is tied and cannot sway, what purpose is there to state this halakha? It is obvious that it is a fit wall. The Gemara answers: It is lest you say: Let us issue a decree prohibiting its use lest one come to use the tree on Shabbat. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not a concern.

Come and hear a different proof that a partition that is blown to and fro in the wind is a fit partition. The halakha is that double boards positioned in the four corners of an area surrounding a well render the area a private domain in which it is permitted to draw water from the well on Shabbat. If there was a tree there, one cubit thick on each side of one of the corners, or a square stone fence that measures one square cubit, or a partition of reeds, its legal status is assessed like that of a double board positioned at the corners of the area surrounding a well, and serve as a partition for two of the sides. Apparently, a partition that moves in the wind, like the partition of reeds, is considered a full-fledged partition. The Gemara refutes this proof: There, too, it is only considered a full-fledged partition due to the fact that he established the partition by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves.

The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a tree whose foliage is broad and its branches reach down and cover the ground, if its foliage is not three handbreadths high off the ground it creates a space similar to a round room; therefore, one may carry beneath it, as it is a full-fledged private domain. Why is the foliage of the tree a fit partition? Doesn’t it sway back and forth in the wind? The Gemara answers: There, too, it is due to the fact that he established the partition by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves.

The Gemara asks: If so that it is a case where one established the foliage as a complete partition, let him move objects in the entire area beneath the tree, since it is a private domain. Why, then, did Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, say: One may carry beneath this tree