the dates that grow there plentifully, which gave them strength and allowed them to engage in Torah study. The Gemara records a related incident: Ulla visited Pumbedita, and his hosts brought him a basket [tirina] of dates. He said to them: How many baskets of dates like these can one purchase for a zuz? They said to him: One can purchase three for a zuz. He said: How can it be that it is possible to purchase a basketful of date honey for just a single zuz, and yet the Babylonians do not engage in Torah study more extensively? Since the cost of food is so low and they do not need to work hard to support themselves, the Babylonians should be more extensively engaged in Torah study.

That night, the dates he ate afflicted him and he suffered from indigestion. In light of this, Ulla retracted his original assessment of the Babylonians and instead praised them and said: A basketful of lethal poison, i.e., the dates that cause indigestion, sells for a zuz in Babylonia, and despite the fact that they suffer its effects the Babylonians still engage in Torah study.

The Gemara returns to its discussion of prophecies of consolation that are related to those in the book of Hosea. And Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And many peoples shall go and say: Go and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us of His ways, and we will walk in His paths” (Isaiah 2:3)? The Gemara notes that Jacob is the only Patriarch mentioned and asks: Is He the God of Jacob and not the God of Abraham and Isaac?

Rather, the verse specifically mentions Jacob to allude to the fact that the Temple will ultimately be described in the same way that Jacob referred to it. It will not be referred to as it was referred to by Abraham. It is written of him that when he prayed at the location of the Temple mountain, he called it mount, as it is stated: “As it is said on this day: On the mount where the Lord is seen” (Genesis 22:14). And it will not be referred to as it was referred to by Isaac. It is written of him that he called the location of the Temple field when he prayed there, as it is stated: “And Isaac went out to meditate in the field” (Genesis 24:63). Rather, it will be described as it was referred to by Jacob, who called it house, as it is stated: “And he called the name of that place Beth-El” (Genesis 28:19), which means house of God.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The day of the ingathering of exiles is as great as the day on which heaven and earth were created. This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word day in these two contexts, as it is stated concerning the ingathering of exiles: “And the children of Judea and the children of Israel shall be gathered together, and they shall appoint themselves one head, and shall go up out of the land; for great shall be the day of Jezreel” (Hosea 2:2), and it is written in the narrative of Creation: “And there was evening and there was morning, one day” (Genesis 1:5).

We learned in the mishna: In the case of an orphan with multiple guardians, if each of his guardians slaughtered a Paschal lamb on his behalf, he may eat in whichever place he wishes. The Gemara suggests: You can learn from it that there is retroactive clarification, and one’s ultimate decision as to which group he wishes to be part of retroactively indicates that from the outset he was registered in that group. This is problematic, as no halakhic conclusion has been reached in the matter of retroactive clarification. The Gemara therefore rejects this suggestion: Rabbi Zeira said: The halakha in the mishna is not based on retroactive clarification, but rather on the following principle: The verse states: “They shall take to them every man a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household” (Exodus 12:3), indicating that a minor’s membership in the household is sufficient for him to be registered in the household’s Paschal lamb in any case, even without his agreement.

The Sages taught in a baraita: A lamb for a household teaches that a person brings and slaughters a Paschal lamb on behalf of his minor son and daughter and on behalf of his Canaanite slave and maidservant, whether with their consent or without their consent. Since they do not have a legal identity independent of their household membership, their membership is sufficient to include them, even without their consent. However, one may not slaughter the Paschal lamb on behalf of his adult son or daughter, or on behalf of his Hebrew slave and maidservant, or on behalf of his wife unless he has their consent. Since they have legal identities independent of their household membership, their inclusion can be achieved only through their consent.

It was taught in another baraita: A person may not slaughter a Paschal lamb on behalf of his adult son or daughter, or on behalf of his Hebrew slave and maidservant, or on behalf of his wife unless he has their consent. However, he may slaughter on behalf of his son or daughter who are minors, or on behalf of his Canaanite slave or maidservant, both with their consent or without their consent. And if any of them who slaughtered a Paschal lamb for themselves, and their master, i.e., the father or owner, also slaughtered on their behalf, they can fulfill their obligation only with the Paschal lamb of their master, and they do not fulfill their obligation with their own.

The baraita concludes that this is the halakha except with regard to the wife, who is able to protest to her husband and say: I choose not to be supported by you and will therefore not grant you the proceeds of my labor. She therefore retains the ability to slaughter her own Paschal lamb, despite the fact that her husband slaughtered one on her behalf.

The fact that the conclusion of the baraita specifically mentions a wife implies she is the only exception, but adult children or Hebrew slaves would perforce be included in their father’s and master’s Paschal lamb, even if they slaughtered one for themselves. The Gemara challenges this: What is different about a wife; how is her status any different from that of adult children or Hebrew slaves? Rava said: The conclusion of the baraita is not limited to a wife, rather, it is referring to a wife and all who are similar to her, including adult children and Hebrew slaves. Since they all enjoy legal identities independent of their master, they may slaughter a Paschal lamb for themselves despite the master’s intention to include them in his. However, minor children and Canaanite slaves lack any legally independent identity, and so their master’s intention for them to be included in his Paschal lamb precludes their ability to offer their own.

The Gemara notes that this matter itself is difficult. You said in the conclusion of the baraita: Except for a wife, who is able to protest. She may therefore slaughter her own Paschal lamb, despite the fact that her husband slaughtered one on her behalf. The baraita states that the reason she can slaughter her own Paschal lamb is that she protests, which implies that if she does not protest, she must fulfill her obligation with her husband’s Paschal lamb. But doesn’t the first clause of that same baraita teach that a man slaughters a Paschal lamb on behalf of his adult children, Hebrew slaves, and his wife only with their consent, from which one can infer that in an indeterminate case, where the woman did not explicitly give her consent, she does not fulfill her obligation with her husband’s lamb?

The Gemara resolves this difficulty: What does the first clause mean when it teaches that one may slaughter the Paschal lamb only with their consent? It is not referring to a case where they explicitly said yes, thereby clarifying their intent; rather, it is referring to an indeterminate case where they did not explicitly agree, but their implicit consent is presumed. The ruling of the baraita comes to exclude only the case where they explicitly said no, clearly excluding themselves from their master’s Paschal lamb.

The Gemara challenges this reading of the first clause. But wasn’t it taught in the baraita: Any of them, i.e., minor children and Canaanite slaves, who slaughtered a Paschal lamb and their master also slaughtered a Paschal lamb on their behalf, fulfills his obligation only with the lamb of their master, which is an indeterminate case, and the baraita teaches: This is the halakha, except for the wife, because she is able to protest, and except for adult children and Hebrew slaves, who share her independent status, as explained previously in the Gemara? Apparently, a person is included in his master’s sacrifice, unless he explicitly indicates intent to the contrary.

Rava resolved this difficulty and said: Since they slaughtered their own Paschal lambs, you do not have a protest greater than this. The act of slaughtering their own Paschal lambs clearly demonstrates they intend to partake of their own lambs and do not intend to be included in the master’s group.

We learned in the mishna: A slave jointly owned by two partners may not eat from the lamb of either of them unless it was stipulated beforehand from whose lamb he will partake. Rav Eina the Elder raised a contradiction before Rav Naḥman. We learned in the mishna: A slave jointly owned by two partners may not eat from the lamb of either of them. But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If he wanted to, he may eat from this one, and if he wanted to, he may eat from that one?

Rav Naḥman said to him: Eina the Elder, and some say that he called him black pot [patya], a term of endearment for a scholar who works hard studying Torah: From me and from you, clarification of this halakha will be concluded. The mishna is referring to a case where the partners are exacting with each other. Therefore, presumably, neither partner will allow his half of the slave to partake from his partner’s Paschal lamb. The baraita is referring to a case where they are not exacting with each other. In that case, the slave may eat from the Paschal lamb of whichever partner he chooses.

We learned in the mishna: One who is half slave and half free man may not eat from his master’s Paschal lamb. It is specifically from his master’s lamb that he may not eat; however, from his own lamb he may eat. But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: He may eat neither from his own nor from his master’s Paschal lamb?

The Gemara answers that this is not difficult: Here, the baraita that rules that the half slave may partake neither of his own nor of his master’s lamb, is in accordance with the original version of the mishna, which cites Beit Hillel’s opinion that the master retains his rights to the half slave. There, the mishna that allows the half slave to partake of his own lamb, is in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna, which cites Beit Hillel’s revised opinion, according to which the status of the half slave is altered such that he is considered like a free man as pertains to his inclusion in a group for the Paschal lamb. As we learned in a mishna: One who is half slave and half free man serves his master one day and himself one day; this is the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: