and find a way to explain that halakha, neither from that statement of Rav Dimi, who derived it from the verse: “And from their transgressions, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:16), nor from that statement of Abaye, who derived it from the verse: “For all their transgressions, for all their sins” (Leviticus 16:21).

Rather, it is derived from that which Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to Yom Kippur the verse states: “From all your sins before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). This indicates that Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, i.e., an uncertain sin for which one brings a provisional guilt offering. And from that statement it is derived that it is only for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware that Yom Kippur atones, but it does not atone for a sin about which the sinner is aware.

And Rav Taḥlifa, father of Rav Huna, further says in the name of Rava: Those liable to receive lashes for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to receive those lashes after Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? What is the difference between this case and the case of those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings, who must bring them after Yom Kippur?

The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say: There, where the liability to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings is financial in nature, Yom Kippur does not exempt one from financial obligations. But here, where the liability to incur lashes applies to one’s body, one might say that he is not flogged after Yom Kippur. Therefore, Rav Taḥlifa teaches us that this is not so.

The Gemara asks: How can Rava say that Yom Kippur does not exempt one from the liability to incur lashes? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shevuot 2b): For other prohibitions that are stated in the Torah, apart from those delineated in that mishna, whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them until after Yom Kippur, whether they are positive mitzvot or prohibitions, Yom Kippur atones for them. This is the halakha despite the fact that one who transgresses a prohibition is liable to incur lashes.

The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. This statement of Rava is referring to a transgression about which witnesses warned him, and therefore he is liable to incur lashes, and Yom Kippur does not completely atone for him. That mishna is referring to a transgression about which they did not warn him, and he is not liable to incur lashes, and therefore Yom Kippur provides full atonement.

The Gemara now analyzes the above statement: Those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur because Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware. Before beginning its discussion, which consists of a series of queries starting with the phrase: If that is so, the Gemara provides a mnemonic device for the topics it will address: A woman who gave birth; a leper; a nazirite; a sota; in a heifer.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, that Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, a woman who gave birth who is uncertain whether her miscarriage obligated her to bring a sin offering should not bring her sin offering after Yom Kippur has passed, due to the fact that Yom Kippur atoned for her. As this is a case of a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, since God alone knows the nature of her miscarriage. Rav Hoshaya said: With regard to Yom Kippur the verse states: “For all their sins” (Leviticus 16:21), indicating that Yom Kippur atones for all their sins but not for all their impurity. A woman who gives birth does not bring a sin offering for atonement, but rather in order to purify her and thereby enable her to consume sacrificial meat.

The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says: A woman who gave birth is a sinner, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, when a woman who gave birth brings an offering, she brings it in order to permit her to eat sacrificial food, which is the final stage in her process of purification; but she does not bring the offering for atonement. Therefore, she must bring her offering after Yom Kippur, as Yom Kippur effects atonement but not purification.

Rav Ashi said that we learn in the mishna (25a) as well: A woman upon whom it is incumbent to bring a bird sin offering due to uncertainty, e.g., uncertainty as to whether her miscarriage obligated her to bring the sin offering of a woman who gave birth, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, is liable to bring it after Yom Kippur. This is because the offering does not come as atonement for a sin. Rather, it renders her eligible to partake of the meat of offerings.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then an uncertain leper who is obligated to bring an offering for purification for whom Yom Kippur has passed should not bring his offering, due to the fact that Yom Kippur has passed for him, as this is a case of a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, since God knows if he is impure. Rabbi Oshaya said that the verse states: “For all their sins” (Leviticus 16:21), but not for all their impurity, and this offering is also brought for purification.

The Gemara objects: But doesn’t Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Leprous marks come due to seven matters, i.e., there are seven sins that are the possible causes of leprosy. The Gemara cites a mnemonic for these seven sins: Gimmel, gimmel, gimmel, shin, shin, lamed, tzadi. This stands for gilui arayot, forbidden sexual intercourse; gasut haruaḥ, arrogance; gezel, robbery; shefikhut dammim, bloodshed; shevuat shav, an oath taken in vain; lashon hara, slander; and tzarut ha’ayin, stinginess (see Arakhin 16a). Since leprosy develops because of some sin, this means that the leper’s offerings are also brought because of sin. The Gemara explains: Even so, when a leper brings an offering, he does not bring the offering for atonement. Rather, it is brought in order to permit him to eat sacrificial food. Therefore, he must bring his offering after Yom Kippur.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, that Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, then in a case of an uncertain nazirite, i.e., when it is uncertain if the nazirite became impure through contact with the dead, which would obligate him to bring an offering for purification, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, he should not bring an offering, due to the fact that Yom Kippur atoned for him, as this too is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware. Once again, Rabbi Oshaya said that the verse states that Yom Kippur atones “for all their sins,” but not for all their impurity.

The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben HaKappar, who says: A nazirite is a sinner, as he has caused himself to suffer by abstaining from wine, what is there to say? The Gemara answers similarly: Even so, when a nazirite brings an offering, he does not bring the offering for atonement. Rather, he brings it in order to permit him to eat sacrificial food. Consequently, he must bring his offering after Yom Kippur.

The Gemara continues to object: If that is so, an uncertain sota, i.e., a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful who then secludes herself with another man, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, should not bring an offering, due to the fact that Yom Kippur has atoned for her, as this is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware. Rabbi Oshaya said that the verse states: “For all their sins,” but not for all their impurity, and the actions of a sota are referred to as rendering her impure (see Numbers 5:13).

Abaye said a different answer: This is not a case of a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, because the paramour, i.e., the man suspected of having had intercourse with her, knows about her sin. Rava said that the case of a sota is not difficult: When a sota brings an offering, she brings it in order to clarify the existence of iniquity, but not for atonement.

The Gemara raises another difficulty in the same format as above: If that is so, in the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, with regard to which Yom Kippur has passed, the heifer should not be brought, as this is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, since the identity of the murderer is unknown. Abaye said: The murderer himself knows that he is the guilty party. Rava said that the verse states: “And no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him who shed it” (Numbers 35:33).This indicates that atonement for murder can be achieved only by means of the heifer whose neck is broken or capital punishment for the murderer, not by Yom Kippur.

Rav Pappa said another answer: The verse states that the priests at the ceremony of the heifer whose neck is broken should recite the following sentence: “Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel, whom You have redeemed” (Deuteronomy 21:8). The verse indicates that this atonement, which is achieved through the heifer whose neck is broken, is also fit to atone retroactively for those who left Egypt, i.e., every case of unknown murder that occurred since the Jews left Egypt. It can be inferred from here that Yom Kippur of previous years have not atoned for those past murders.

§ The Gemara raises a difficulty: Now that you said that Yom Kippur atones for a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, one can say that when his sin becomes known to him after Yom Kippur as well, he should not bring a sin offering. Rabbi Zeira said that you cannot say this, as a term of knowing is written in a verse three times (see Leviticus 4:14, 23, 28): With regard to an individual’s sin offering and with regard to the sin offering of a Nasi, and with regard to a communal sin offering. Since it was not necessary to repeat an expression of knowing in all three instances, this teaches that anyone who knows about his sin must bring a sin offering, even if he became aware after Yom Kippur.

The Gemara rejects this derivation: All three instances of a term of knowing are necessary to teach that each sin offering is brought only for a known sin and not for an uncertain sin, and therefore no instance of the term is superfluous. The Gemara elaborates: As, if the verse had stated a term of knowing with regard to the sin offering of an individual, I would say that the halakhot of all sin offerings, i.e., of a Nasi and the community, cannot be derived from the sin offering of an individual, as this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the sin offering of an individual? It is unique in that all of his sin offerings are female, either a ewe or a female goat, whereas a Nasi brings a male goat, and the sin offering of the community is a bull.

The Gemara continues: And if you would say: Let the verse write a term of knowing with regard to the sin offering of a Nasi, and let these, the sin offerings of an individual and the community, be derived from that of a Nasi, this derivation can likewise be rejected.

The Gemara elaborates: The sin offering of an individual cannot be derived from that of a Nasi, as this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the sin offering of a Nasi? It is unique and more lenient than the sin offering of an individual in that a Nasi, i.e., a king, is not included in the obligation of a sin offering for hearing a voice, i.e., taking a false oath that one did not witness an event (see Leviticus 5:1), as a king may not testify. Can you say the same with regard to an individual, who is included in the obligation of a sin offering for hearing a voice?

And furthermore, the halakha of a communal sin offering cannot be derived from that of a Nasi, as this suggestion can likewise be refuted: What is unique about the sin offering of a Nasi? It is unique in that there is in his types of offering a case of a female offering, for an unintentional sin of idol worship, whereas a communal sin offering is always male.

The Gemara continues: And if you would say: Let the verse write a term of knowing with regard to the sin offering of the community, and let the sin offerings of an individual and a Nasi be derived from it, this derivation can likewise be refuted, as follows: What is unique about the sin offering of the community? It is unique and more lenient in that there is a sin offering only for an unwitting communal sin due to a mistaken ruling of the Sanhedrin accompanied by unwitting action of the community following their ruling, which is not the case with regard to the sin offerings of an individual and a Nasi.

The Gemara suggests: Granted that two instances of a term of knowing cannot be derived from one instance of a term of knowing. Nevertheless, let one instance of a term of knowing be derived from the other two, as follows: Let the Torah not write a term of knowing with regard to the sin offering of an individual, and let it be derived from the sin offering of a Nasi and that of the community.

The Gemara explains that this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the sin offerings of a Nasi and the community, in which both share a leniency? They are unique in that they are not included in the obligation of a sin offering for hearing a voice. Can you say the same with regard to an individual, who is included in the obligation of a sin offering for hearing a voice?

The Gemara further suggests: Let the verse not write a term of knowing with regard to the sin offering of the community, and let it be derived from the instances of a term of knowing that are written with regard to the sin offerings of an individual and a Nasi. The Gemara again explains that this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the sin offerings of an individual and a Nasi? They are unique in that there is a case of a female offering brought by them. Can you say the same with regard to the sin offering of the community, where there is no case of a female offering brought by a community?

The Gemara continues to suggest: Let the Torah not write a term of knowing with regard to the sin offering of a Nasi, and let it be derived from the instances of a term of knowing that are written with regard to the sin offerings of an individual and the community. What can you say to refute this suggestion? If you refute this due to the fact that a communal sin offering is more lenient, as it is not included in the obligation of a sin offering for hearing a voice, the sin offering of an individual, which is included in the obligation of a sin offering for hearing a voice, proves that this is not the decisive consideration.

And if you refute this suggestion due to the fact that an individual sin offering is more lenient because all his sin offerings are female, the sin offering of the community, where there is no case of a female offering, proves that this is not the key factor. Since for both of these categories of sin offering there is no obligation to bring a sin offering until there is knowledge of the sin, why do I need a term of knowing that is written with regard to the sin offering of a Nasi?

The Gemara concludes: If this term of knowing is not necessary for the matter of the sin offering of a Nasi itself, as it is already derived from the cases of an individual and the community, apply it to the matter of a case where his sin becomes known to him only after Yom Kippur, i.e., that in such an instance he brings a sin offering.

Abaye said: If the Torah had not stated a term of knowing with regard to a Nasi, it could not have been derived from the cases of an individual and the community, because this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the sin offerings of an individual and the community? They are unique in that both are set offerings that are not apt to change. Can you say