Rabbi Yannai says: I heard an answer with regard to the boundary, i.e., the stage, beyond which it is prohibited, but I have forgotten what it is; and the members of the group of Sages were inclined to say that its descent to the rough, dried-up stream, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it prohibited.

Rav Hamnuna said: From where do I say that the prohibition takes effect when the animal is alive? I say it from that which we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 81b): With regard to one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck is broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon exempts one who slaughters them from receiving lashes for violating the prohibition of the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, if the mother was slaughtered on that same day; and the Rabbis deem him liable.

Rav Hamnuna explains his proof: Granted, according to my opinion, that I say the prohibition takes effect from the time when the animal is alive, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this matter, as Rabbi Shimon holds: Slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter. The slaughter of the heifer does not render it fit for consumption, as it was already prohibited to derive benefit from the animal while it is alive. Therefore, he does not violate the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring.

Rav Hamnuna continues: And the Rabbis say: Slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is considered slaughter, and therefore he is liable for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring. But if you say that the prohibition does not take effect until after the breaking of the neck of the heifer, why does Rabbi Shimon exempt him; it is a slaughter that renders the animal fit for consumption?

And if you would say the reason is that Rabbi Shimon holds that one who performs the breaking of the neck of the heifer by slaughter has performed the mitzva in a fit manner, and consequently that slaughter rendered the heifer prohibited with regard to deriving benefit from it and it is therefore unfit for consumption, that suggestion cannot be correct. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ḥullin 23b): That which is fit in a red heifer is unfit in a heifer whose neck is broken; that which is fit in a heifer whose neck is broken is unfit in a red heifer. How so? With regard to the red heifer, it is fit with slaughter; it is unfit with breaking the neck. With regard to the heifer whose neck is to be broken, it is fit with breaking the neck; it is unfit with slaughter.

Rava, who holds that the prohibition takes effect only from when the heifer’s neck is broken, was silent, as he had no immediate answer. After Rav Hamnuna left the study hall, Rava said: What is the reason I did not say to him that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the ruling of that mishna and holds that a heifer whose neck is to be broken is fit even if it is killed by slaughtering?

The Gemara notes: But if Rava had given that answer, Rav Hamnuna could have said to you in response to that claim: The mishna would not have left out the opinion of the tanna who teaches us that a heifer whose neck is to be broken is fit if it is killed by slaughtering. In other words, there should be some source for this opinion, and in the absence of a source, there is no basis for saying that this is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

Rava said: From where do I say that the prohibition takes effect when the animal’s neck is broken? I say it from that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of a heifer whose neck is broken, that is not so; if the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated, like all other animals. And if you say that the prohibition takes effect from the time when the animal is alive, why does it go out and graze among the flock? Wasn’t the animal prohibited already from when it was alive?

The Gemara rejects this proof: One should teach the mishna as follows: If the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer was fit for having its neck broken, i.e., before it descended to a rough, dried-up stream, it shall go out and graze among the flock, but after that time it is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal. Rava raises a further difficulty: Say the latter clause of the mishna: But if the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place. This indicates that the prohibition takes effect only after the heifer’s neck is broken. The Gemara rejects this proof in a similar manner: Teach that the mishna says: If the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer was fit for having its neck broken it shall be buried.

Rava continues to ask: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: The reason for this halakha is that from the outset, the heifer whose neck is broken comes to atone for a situation of uncertainty. If its neck was broken before the identity of the murderer was revealed, its mitzva was fulfilled, as it atoned for its uncertainty and that uncertainty is gone. And if the mishna is discussing a case where the animal is alive, the heifer has still not atoned for its uncertainty. Rather, it is clear from the last clause of the mishna that the prohibition takes effect when the heifer’s neck is broken.

The Gemara explains: Although it is evident that the mishna rules that the prohibition takes effect when the heifer’s neck is broken, this matter is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna: It is stated in the Torah that there are offerings that enable one to partake of sacrificial foods, e.g., the guilt offering of a leper, and there are offerings that atone, e.g., a sin offering or guilt offering, all of which are brought inside the Temple. And it is also stated in the Torah that there are offerings that enable one to partake of sacrificial foods, e.g., the birds of a leper’s purification ritual, and offerings that atone, e.g., the heifer whose neck is broken, that are brought outside the Temple.

The baraita continues: Therefore, the offerings brought outside the Temple are compared to those offered inside: Just as with regard to the offerings that enable or atone which are stated in the Torah that are sacrificed inside the Temple, the Torah made the offering that enables like the offering that atones, as even the former has portions of it that are burned on the altar, so too, with regard to offerings that enable or atone which are stated in the Torah that are sacrificed outside the Temple, the Torah made the offering that enables, e.g., the birds of a leper, like the offering that atones, e.g., the heifer whose neck is broken, in that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from either while they are still alive. According to this baraita, the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive.

MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses, even if there is no uncertainty as to whether he sinned, and this type of offering was called the guilt offering of the pious, as they brought it due to their constant concern that they might have sinned. They said about Bava ben Buta that he would volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day except for one day after Yom Kippur, when he would not bring the offering.

Bava ben Buta said: I take an oath by this abode of the Divine Presence that if they would have allowed me, I would have brought a guilt offering even on that day. But they would say to me: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty. And the Rabbis say: One brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case where there is uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin for whose intentional performance one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin offering.

Those liable to bring sin offerings and definite guilt offerings for whom Yom Kippur has passed are liable to bring them after Yom Kippur.By contrast, those liable to bring provisional guilt offerings are exempt from bringing them after Yom Kippur. With regard to one who encountered uncertainty as to whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.

A woman upon whom it is incumbent to bring a bird sin offering due to uncertainty, e.g., uncertainty with regard to whether or not her miscarriage obligated her to bring the sin offering of a woman who gave birth, for whom Yom Kippur has passed, is liable to bring it after Yom Kippur. This is because the offering does not come as atonement for a sin; rather, it renders her eligible to partake of the meat of offerings. With regard to this bird sin offering that is brought due to uncertainty, if it became known to her that she was exempt from bringing the offering after the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched, the bird must be buried.

GEMARA: What is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day and at any time that he chooses? If it enters your mind that a provisional guilt offering is obligatory, then why does he bring a sin offering when it becomes known to him that he sinned? In that case, he has already fulfilled his obligation by sacrificing a provisional guilt offering. Rather, conclude from this inference that a provisional guilt offering is a gift offering.

And the Rabbis would respond: It is a burnt offering and a peace offering that come as a vow and gift offering, but a sin offering and a guilt offering, including a provisional guilt offering, are obligatory. And as for a provisional guilt offering, this is the reason that he brings it before his sin is known to him: It is not to achieve atonement, but to protect him from suffering until his sin is known to him, as the Torah spared the bodies of the Jewish people by commanding them to bring this offering.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, one can suggest that perhaps a provisional guilt offering is like a burnt offering and a peace offering: Just as a burnt offering and a peace offering sometimes come as obligatory offerings, e.g., the Festival peace offering and the burnt offering of appearance brought on the pilgrimage Festivals, and they sometimes come as gift offerings, likewise, a provisional guilt offering also sometimes comes as an obligatory offering and sometimes comes as a gift offering as well.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: A burnt offering and a peace offering are primarily written, i.e., discussed, in the context of a gift offering, and they are brought as obligatory offerings only in specific cases mentioned explicitly in the Torah. By contrast, a provisional guilt offering is primarily written in the context of an obligatory offering, similar to a sin offering and a guilt offering.

Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches before Rava: