If one slaughtered an animal and its daughter’s daughter and afterward slaughtered the original animal’s daughter, he incurs the forty lashes for transgressing the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day (see Leviticus 22:28). Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the third animal, as its mother and its daughter had already been slaughtered on that day. This indicates that Sumakhos also maintains that when a person commits a single act and thereby commits two transgressions that are derived from a single verse, he is liable to receive punishment for both violations.

Rava said: Perhaps it is not so, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri would not agree with the ruling of Sumakhos. It is possible that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings only here, in the case of one who engaged in intercourse with his mother-in-law, only due to the differentiated names of the prohibitions, as she is called his mother-in-law, and she is called his mother-in-law’s mother, and she is called his father-in-law’s mother, and the Torah prohibits each of these relationships separately.

But with regard to the case of slaughtering a mother and its offspring in a single day, where all of the permutations are called: A mother and its offspring, as there are no differentiated names given in the Torah for slaughtering a mother animal and then its offspring or for slaughtering the offspring and subsequently its mother, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri might maintain that one is not liable to receive multiple sets of lashes.

By contrast, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Perhaps Sumakhos says that one is liable to receive two sets of lashes only with regard to the case of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, as there are differentiated bodies. Although he violated the same prohibition twice, he did so by slaughtering three different animals.

But here, with regard to a mother-in-law, where there are not several differentiated bodies, as the man engaged in intercourse with only one woman, one might say that Sumakhos holds in accordance with the statement that Rabbi Abbahu says in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse that introduces the prohibitions against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law, one’s mother-in-law’s mother, and one’s father-in-law’s mother concludes with the phrase: “They are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). This teaches that although these are different relationships, the verse rendered them all one single prohibition of lewdness, for which only a single sin offering is brought.

MISHNA: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market [itlis] in Emmaus, where they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of the son of Rabban Gamliel: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, during one lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for all three prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the prohibitions?

They said to Rabbi Akiva: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: One who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, during one lapse of awareness, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them. And it appears to me that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If he is liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with five menstruating women, who are forbidden by one prohibition, he should certainly be liable to bring separate sin offerings for having engaged in intercourse with his sister, the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, who are forbidden by three separate prohibitions.

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabbi Akiva’s question: What are the circumstances about which Rabbi Akiva inquired? If we say that the circumstances are precisely as the mishna teaches them, that one unwittingly engaged in intercourse with his sister, and the sister of his father, and the sister of his mother, then for what purpose did Rabbi Akiva raise this dilemma before Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua? Aren’t they differentiated names of prohibitions and aren’t they also differentiated bodies? Since the man engaged in intercourse with three women, who are forbidden by three distinct prohibitions, it is obvious that he is obligated to bring three separate sin offerings.

Rather, it must be that this is what the mishna is teaching: Rabbi Akiva asked: In the case of one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with his sister who is also the sister of his father and who is also the sister of his mother, is he liable to bring only one sin offering for violating all of those prohibitions, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one? What is the halakha? Do we say that they are differentiated names of prohibitions, and since he violated distinct prohibitions, he is liable to bring separate sin offerings? Or perhaps we say: It is not a case of differentiated bodies; since he engaged in intercourse with only one woman, he is liable to bring only a single sin offering.

And in response, they said to him: We did not hear a ruling from our teachers about that case, but we heard the following ruling: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with each of his five wives while they are menstruating, at the same time, i.e., during one lapse of awareness, which is five instances of violating one category of prohibition, we heard that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of them, due to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman.

And it appears to us that these matters can be derived from an a fortiori inference: If one who engages in intercourse with his five wives while they are menstruating, at the same time, which is only one name of a prohibition, is nevertheless liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them, then in the case of one who engages in intercourse with his sister who is also the sister of his father and the sister of his mother, which are three separate prohibition names, is it not logical that he should be liable for each and every one of them?

The Gemara raises an objection: This line of reasoning can be refuted, as follows: What is notable about the case of five menstruating women that would render one liable to bring a separate sin offering for having intercourse with each one of them? It is notable in that they are differentiated bodies, which is not the case with regard to one’s sister who is also the sister of his father and the sister of his mother, as she is a single person.

Rather, the reason one is liable to bring three separate sin offerings for engaging in intercourse with his sister who is also the sister of his mother and the sister of his father is that the verse states: “And if a man takes his sister…and they shall be cut off [venikhretu] in the sight of the children of their people; he has uncovered his sister’s nakedness” (Leviticus 20:17). The final clause in this verse serves to render him liable to receive three separate penalties of karet for intentional intercourse, or to bring three separate sin offerings for unwitting intercourse, with his sister who is also the sister of his father and who is the sister of his mother.

The Gemara explains how there could be a case where one’s sister is also the sister of his father and the sister of his mother: Rav Adda bar Ahava says: You find it in the case of a wicked man, the son of a wicked man. The case applies if a man engaged in intercourse with his mother and fathered two daughters, and then engaged in intercourse with one of those daughters and fathered a son, and his son engaged in intercourse with his mother’s sister who is also his own sister, because they share a father, and who is also his father’s sister. This individual is a wicked man, the son of a wicked man, as both he and his father engaged in incestuous relationships.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: If one unwittingly engages in intercourse with a woman who is forbidden to him under the penalty of excision from the World-to-Come [karet], and then again engages in intercourse with her, and then yet again engages in intercourse with her, all during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the acts of intercourse with her. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. But the Rabbis say: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who engages in intercourse with his five wives while they are menstruating, where the prohibition was violated unwittingly by both the man and the woman, at the same time, i.e., during one lapse of awareness, that he is liable for each and every one of them, since he caused each of them to be liable to bring a sin offering.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Do we really say that since he caused each of them to be liable to bring a sin offering, he himself is liable to bring five separate sin offerings? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one unwittingly engages in intercourse five times with a woman who is forbidden to him, and he does so during one lapse of awareness, without realizing over the course of that time period that the act is forbidden, but she does so during five lapses of awareness, as she repeatedly became aware of the prohibition and then forgot it before the next transgression, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, but she is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the five transgressions? In this case, although he caused her to bring several sin offerings, he himself brings only one sin offering.

Rather, one must say that this is the reason he brings five sin offerings for engaging in intercourse with his five wives while they were each menstruating, during one lapse of awareness: It is because they are differentiated bodies.

The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one who repeatedly engages in intercourse with a woman who is forbidden to him is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of intercourse, even if this all occurred in a single lapse of awareness. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one reaped a fig-bulk of grain on Shabbat, which is the measure for which one is liable to bring a sin offering, and then reaped another fig-bulk, in a single lapse of awareness, what would Rabbi Eliezer say?

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer there, with regard to forbidden relations, that the sinner performed two separate prohibited acts, and therefore Rabbi Eliezer says he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the acts? If so, here too, where he performed two separate acts of reaping, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act.

Or, perhaps the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer there, in the case of forbidden relations, is that it is impossible for the sinner to combine the acts of intercourse with one another, and therefore Rabbi Eliezer says that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of the acts of intercourse. But if one reaped a fig-bulk of grain, and then reaped another fig-bulk, in a single lapse of awareness, since it is possible for him to combine the two fig-bulks of grain together and reap them at the same time, he would be liable to bring only one sin offering. What is the correct explanation for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling?

Rabba said: The reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer there, in the case of forbidden relations, is that the sinner performed two separate prohibited acts; and here too, he has performed two separate acts of reaping and is liable to bring two sin offerings. And Rav Yosef said: The reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer there, in the case of forbidden relations, is that it is impossible for him to combine the two transgressions into a single act; but if it is possible for him to combine them, e.g., by reaping two fig-bulks of grain, he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from a baraita: Each type of labor prohibited on Shabbat comprises acts that are primary categories of that labor and acts that are subcategories of that labor, both prohibited by Torah law. Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable to bring separate sin offerings for the performance of subcategories of prohibited labor on Shabbat in a situation where he also performed the corresponding primary categories of prohibited labor during the same lapse of awareness. For example, if one planted grain on Shabbat and then watered the field, which is a subcategory of the prohibited labor of planting, he is liable to bring two sin offerings.

It may be inferred from this statement that: But if one performed a primary category of labor and then performed the same primary category at the same time, i.e., during the same lapse of awareness, he is exempt from bringing a second sin offering. But if you say that the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of one who engages in repeated acts of intercourse with a woman forbidden to him is because the sinner performed two separate prohibited acts, then why is one exempt from bringing a second sin offering for repeatedly performing a primary category of prohibited labor on Shabbat, when he too has performed distinct prohibited acts?

Mar, son of the Sages, said: Rav Naḥumi bar Zekharya and I interpreted the baraita as follows: What are we dealing with here, in the case where one is liable to bring two sin offerings for performing a primary category of prohibited labor and its subcategory?

It is a case of a climbing grapevine that is trellised over a fig tree, and he cut them both, the grapevine and the figs, at the same time, during one lapse of awareness. Detaching the figs is one of the primary categories of the prohibited labor of harvesting, while pruning the vine in order to use it as fuel for a fire is a subcategory of harvesting. Due to that reason Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring two sin offerings, since it is a case of differentiated names of prohibitions, as he violated both the primary category of the labor and a subcategory, and it is also a case of differentiated physical entities, as he detached figs and part of a grapevine.

In the corresponding situation, where one reaped a fig-bulk of grain on Shabbat and then reaped another fig-bulk in a single lapse of awareness, how can you find circumstances in which he is exempt from bringing a second sin offering? You find this in a situation where he reaped two fig-bulks simultaneously, in which case he performed only a single prohibited act. But if one reaped a fig-bulk of grain and then reaped another fig-bulk, he is liable to bring two sin offerings, as he performed two separate acts.

MISHNA: And furthermore, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus: What is the status of a dangling limb of an animal? Does it impart ritual impurity like a severed limb? They said to Rabbi Akiva: We have not heard a ruling from our teachers in that specific case, but we have heard with regard to a dangling limb of a person that it is ritually pure. And in this manner would