reason that the Merciful One writes: “You may not eat” (Deuteronomy 12:17), to establish the consumption of second-tithe produce outside Jerusalem as a prohibition.

The Gemara challenges: But still, it is a general prohibition, as all three types of second tithe are included in a single command. The Gemara explains: If so, that one receives only one set of lashes, let the verse say: You may not eat them within your gates, as a previous verse already stated “your tithes” (Deuteronomy 12:11). Why do I need the verse to specify: “The tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil”? This serves to designate a prohibition and the punishment of lashes for the consumption of each and every type of produce.

§ Rabbi Yitzḥak says: One who eats bread, parched grain, and fresh stalks before the omer offering has been sacrificed is flogged with three sets of lashes, as it states: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh stalks until this day itself, until you have brought the offering of your God; it is a statute forever throughout your generations in all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:14). The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one is not flogged for transgressing a general prohibition. The Gemara answers: It is different here, as the verses are superfluous; the verse did not need to specify these three types of grain products.

The Gemara tries to ascertain which terms are superfluous. Let the verse say “bread,” and we will derive the halakha of parched grain and fresh stalks from that of bread. The Gemara questions this suggestion: This derivation can be refuted: What is unique about bread? It is unique in that it has an increased obligation with regard to ḥalla, which is separated only from the dough of bread, not from parched grain and fresh stalks not made into dough.

The Gemara further suggests: Let the verse write only “parched grain,” and let it not write bread or fresh stalks, and we will derive the halakha of bread and fresh stalks from that of parched grain. The Gemara responds: The halakha of bread cannot be derived from that of parched grain due to the fact that parched grain is in its unadulterated form, whereas bread is not in its unadulterated form, i.e., it has been fully processed, and therefore it can be maintained that only produce that has not been changed is prohibited before the omer. Likewise, the halakha of fresh stalks cannot be derived from that of parched grain due to the fact that parched grain has an increased obligation with regard to meal offerings, as the omer meal offering is of parched grain, whereas fresh stalks do not have an increased obligation with regard to meal offerings.

The Gemara further suggests: Let the verse write only “fresh stalks,” and we will derive the halakha of bread and parched grain from that of fresh stalks. The Gemara responds: This derivation can be refuted: What is unique about fresh stalks? They are unique in that they have not changed from their original state at all. The Gemara states: Clearly, the halakha of two of these types cannot be derived from the halakha of any one of the others. But let us derive the halakha of one of them from the halakha of the other two.

The Gemara elaborates: Let the verse not write bread, and let us derive its halakha from that of parched grain and fresh stalks. The Gemara responds: This derivation can be refuted: What is unique about parched grain and fresh stalks? They are unique in that relative to bread, which has been fully processed, they are in their unadulterated form. The Gemara suggests: Let the verse not write fresh stalks, and let us derive its halakha from the halakha of bread and parched grain. The Gemara responds: This derivation can be refuted: What is unique about bread and parched grain? They are unique in that they have an increased obligation with regard to meal offerings.

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yitzḥak could say to you: Let the verse not write parched grain, and let us derive its halakha from the halakha of bread and fresh stalks. What would you say to refute this? If you refute it by saying: What is unique about bread? It is unique in that it has an increased obligation with regard to ḥalla, the example of fresh stalks will prove that this is not a decisive factor, as the obligation of ḥalla does not apply to it and yet it is prohibited before the omer. And if you would refute the derivation due to the fact that fresh stalks differ from parched grain, as they have not changed from their original state, the case of bread will prove that this is not the key factor, as it has changed from its original state and yet it is prohibited. Therefore, one is flogged for each type, as the verse is superfluous.

The Gemara objects: But why not say that for the consumption of parched grain, whose mention is superfluous, one is separately liable to receive one set of lashes, whereas for eating all the rest of them, i.e., bread and fresh stalks, one is liable to be flogged with only one set of lashes, as they are prohibited by a general prohibition? The Gemara explains: If so, and the halakha of parched grain is unique, let the verse write: Bread, fresh stalks, and parched grain; alternatively, let it write: Parched grain, bread, and fresh stalks. Why does it write the example of parched grain in between the others? This is what the verse is saying: One who eats bread is liable to receive the punishment given for eating parched grain, and likewise one who eats fresh stalks is liable to receive the punishment given for eating parched grain.

§ Rabbi Yannai says: A verbal analogy should never be lightly regarded in your eyes, as the fact that one is punished with karet for consuming meat of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [piggul] is one of the fundamental principles of the Torah, and the verse taught it only through a verbal analogy.

The Gemara explains that this is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Zavda bar Levi teaches: It is stated there, with regard to meat of an offering left over after the appointed time for its consumption [notar]: “But everyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8), and it is stated here, with regard to intent to consume an offering after its appointed time: “And the soul that eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). Just as there the punishment for eating notar is karet, so too here, the punishment for eating piggul is karet.

Rabbi Simai says: A verbal analogy should never be lightly regarded in your eyes, as the fact that one is punished with karet for consuming notar, from which it is derived that one is punished with karet for partaking of piggul, is one of the fundamental principles of the Torah, and the verse taught it only through a verbal analogy.

What is this verbal analogy? One derives by verbal analogy of the word “sacred” in Leviticus and the word “sacred” in Exodus that the verse: “But everyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity,” is discussing notar. This verse states: “But everyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred thing of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and it is written: “You shall burn the leftovers [notar] in fire; they are not to be eaten, for they are sacred” (Exodus 29:34). Just as the verse in Exodus is referring to notar, the same is true of the verse in Leviticus.

Abaye says: A verbal analogy should never be lightly regarded in your eyes, as the fact that one is punished with karet for engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter born from the woman he raped is one of the fundamental principles of the Torah, and the verse taught it only through a verbal analogy.

Abaye elaborates: This is as Rava says: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me that this halakha is derived by a verbal analogy between the unusual form “they [henna]” and “they [henna],” written with regard to the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s daughter born from the woman he raped. As it is written: “The nakedness of a woman and her daughter…you shall not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness: They [henna] are near kinswomen” (Leviticus 18:17). And it is stated: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter; for they [henna] are your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10). This latter verse is interpreted as referring to one’s granddaughter from the woman he raped (see Yevamot 97a). The verbal analogy teaches that although one’s daughter from the woman he raped is not mentioned in the verse, she too is included with one’s granddaughter, just as a daughter and a granddaughter are equated in Leviticus 18:17.

Furthermore, the punishment for this transgression of intercourse with one’s daughter from the woman he raped is derived from a verbal analogy between: “It is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17), which is written with regard to engaging in intercourse with both a woman and her daughter, and the same term “lewdness” that appears elsewhere, which teaches that the transgressor is liable to be put to death by burning. As it is stated: “And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is lewdness; they shall be burnt with fire, both he and they” (Leviticus 20:14). This teaches that death by burning is the punishment for engaging in intercourse with both a woman and her daughter, and the same applies to intercourse with one’s daughter from the woman he raped, due to the verbal analogy of henna and henna linking the two cases.

Rav Ashi says: A verbal analogy should not be lightly regarded in your eyes, as the list of those who are liable to be put to death by stoning is one of the fundamental principles of the Torah, and the verse taught it only through a verbal analogy.

This is as it is taught in a baraita that it is stated here, with regard to engaging in intercourse with specific relatives: “Their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:11–16), and it is stated with regard to a necromancer and a sorcerer: “Their blood shall be upon them” (Leviticus 20:27). Just as there, the verse specifies that a necromancer and a sorcerer are executed by stoning, so too here, with regard to one who engages in intercourse with those relatives, they are executed by stoning.

§ The mishna’s list of prohibitions for whose unwitting violation one must bring a sin offering includes one who blends the anointing oil according to the specifications of the oil prepared by Moses in the wilderness (see Exodus 30:22–33). The Sages taught in a baraita: One who blends the anointing oil to learn how it was prepared or to transfer it to the community for them to use in the Temple is exempt. But if he blends the anointing oil in order to apply it to his body he is liable. And one who applies to his body the oil prepared by another is exempt, because he is liable for applying the oil to his body only if he uses the anointing oil that was prepared by Moses alone, in accordance with the verse: “Or whoever puts any of it upon a stranger” (Exodus 30:33), which is referring to that specific oil.

The Master said earlier: One who blends the anointing oil to learn how it was prepared or in order to transfer it to the community for them to use in the Temple is exempt. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara answers: This is derived via a verbal analogy from the term: “Its composition” (Exodus 30:32), written with regard to the oil and the term: “According to its composition” (Exodus 30:37), written with regard to the incense. And it is written with regard to the incense in that verse: “You shall not prepare for yourselves,” from which it is inferred that it is incense prepared for yourselves that is prohibited, but if one prepares it to transfer it to the community he is exempt. With regard to the anointing oil as well, one who blends it to transfer it to the community is exempt.

The Gemara objects: But in light of this verbal analogy, let the case of incense return and let us derive it from that of the anointing oil: Just as with regard to the anointing oil, when one blends it in halves, i.e., not all the specified amount at once, he is exempt, so too, with regard to the incense, when one blends it in halves he should be exempt. Why, then, does Rava say: In the case of incense that one blended in halves, he is liable, whereas with regard to anointing oil that one blended in halves, he is exempt?

The Gemara answers that Rava could say to you: With regard to the anointing oil it is written: “Neither shall you prepare any like it according to its composition” (Exodus 30:32), which indicates that it is oil prepared precisely like it that is prohibited, but with regard to preparing half of it, one may well do so. By contrast, with regard to incense, as it is written: “And the incense that you shall prepare, according to its composition you shall not prepare for yourselves” (Exodus 30:37), which teaches that any act of preparing of this incense is prohibited, as it is possible to burn a portion, half of the maneh that must be prepared, in the morning, and a portion in the afternoon.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The anointing oil contains pure myrrh weighing 500 shekels, cassia of 500 shekels, aromatic cinnamon of 500 shekels, and aromatic calamus of 250 shekels. It is found that all of them together amount to 1,750 shekels.

The Gemara expresses surprise at the statement of the baraita: Does the tanna come to teach us the tally? Why is it necessary for the baraita to state the sum of the amounts? The Gemara answers that this is difficult for the tanna: Since the verse states: “And of aromatic cinnamon half so much, two hundred and fifty, and of aromatic calamus two hundred and fifty” (Exodus 30:23), one might say that the weight of aromatic calamus is like that of aromatic cinnamon: Just as half of the amount of aromatic cinnamon is two hundred and fifty, so too, the verse means that half of the amount of aromatic calamus is two hundred and fifty, which would mean that the sum total is two thousand.

The Gemara asks: But why not say that it is indeed so, that the total weight of calamus is five hundred? The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse write: And of aromatic cinnamon and of aromatic calamus half so much and half so much, two hundred and fifty. The fact that the verse employs the term “half so much” only with regard to cinnamon indicates that their weights were different.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: When one weighs these substances, does he weigh the ingredients with a slight surplus, so that they tip the scales, or does he weigh the ingredients with precision? Abaye said to him that the Merciful One writes: “Of each there shall be a like weight” (Exodus 30:34), which indicates a precise measure, and you say it is possible that one weighs the ingredients with a surplus? The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda say: The Holy One, Blessed be He, knows the amount of surpluses that should be added. Evidently, there is a surplus involved in these measures.

Rather, one certainly weighs with a surplus, and this is what Rav Yehuda says: With regard to aromatic cinnamon, why does one bring half of its total of five hundred, i.e., two hundred and fifty at one time, and two hundred and fifty at one time? Since its entire amount is five hundred, let him bring five hundred all at once. Conclude from the fact that one brings aromatic cinnamon at two separate times that there is a surplus involved in this measure, i.e., one must add a little each time he weighs the cinnamon, and the Holy One, Blessed be He, knows the amount of surpluses.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rav Yehuda’s opinion, what is the meaning of the phrase: “Of each there shall be a like weight”? Ravina said: It means that one should not place a weight of one ingredient against the weight of another ingredient and weigh in this manner. In other words, after weighing one of the ingredients one may not weigh another ingredient against that one; rather, each ingredient must be weighed independently against the scales.

The Sages taught in a baraita: How did they prepare the anointing oil that Moses prepared in the wilderness? They would cook the roots of the spices in it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei said to him: But that amount of oil is not sufficient even to apply to the roots, as they would absorb the oil; how, then, could the roots be cooked in it? Instead, how did they act? They brought the roots and boiled them in water and the fragrant substance would rise to the top, and one poured the anointing oil on the water, and the oil would absorb the fragrance and retain it, and later he removed the oil [vekipeḥo] from off the top and place it in its flask. This is how the anointing oil was prepared.

Rabbi Yehuda said to Rabbi Yosei: