There is a practical difference with regard to disqualifying the widow, through his ḥalitza, from entering into levirate marriage in a case where there are other brothers. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that this individual is certainly a eunuch whose condition is caused naturally, his ḥalitza is of no effect whatsoever, and therefore she may enter into levirate marriage with one of the other brothers. Conversely, according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, since it is possible that he is not a eunuch and his ḥalitza is valid, she is forbidden to the other brothers as their brother’s wife.

And there is also a practical difference between their opinions with regard to performing ḥalitza with the widow in a case where there are no brothers other than this tumtum. According to Rabbi Yehuda, ḥalitza is not necessary in this case, as she requires ḥalitza only if her late husband had brothers who are obligated to perform levirate marriage, and this individual is definitely a eunuch whose condition is caused naturally. By contrast, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, maintains that he must perform ḥalitza with her, in case he is a male and not a eunuch.

MISHNA: Concerning these blemishes which were taught with regard to an animal, whether they are permanent or transient, they also disqualify in the case of a person, i.e., they disqualify a priest from performing the Temple service. And in addition to those blemishes, there are other blemishes that apply only to a priest: One whose head is pointed, narrow above and wide below; and one whose head is turnip-like, wide above and narrow below; and one whose head is hammer-like, with his forehead protruding; and one whose head has an indentation; and one wherein the back of his head protrudes.

And with regard to those with humped backs, Rabbi Yehuda deems them fit for service and the Rabbis deem them disqualified. The kere’aḥ is disqualified from performing the Temple service. What is a kere’aḥ? It is anyone who does not have a row of hair encircling his head from ear to ear. If he has a row of hair from ear to ear, that person is fit for service.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna say that all the blemishes that disqualify an animal disqualify a priest as well? But there is the blemish of a wart, which is not written in the Torah with regard to a person but is written with regard to an animal (see Leviticus 22:22). And furthermore, there are also the blemishes of a cataract and a tevallul, which appear in the Torah with regard to a person but are not written in the Torah with regard to an animal (see Leviticus 21:20). Why, then, does the mishna on 38a teach that such blemishes disqualify an animal?

The Gemara responds: These blemishes are derived from one another, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a person, i.e., a priest, it is not stated of him that a wart disqualifies him from Temple service, and in the case of an animal, it is not stated that a cataract or a tevallul disqualify it from being sacrificed. From where is it derived that one applies that which is said of this case to that case, and that which is said of this case to that case? The verse states: “Scabbed” and “scabbed,” “scurvy” and “scurvy,” both with regard to a person and an animal (Leviticus 21:20; 22:22), which serves to draw a verbal analogy from the verses.

The Gemara notes: These verses must be free, i.e., they are superfluous and are stated only for the purpose of the verbal analogy. This means that the verbal analogy cannot be refuted by logical reasoning, whereas if the verses are not free one can refute the analogy if there is a significant difference between the two cases. As, if they are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted as follows: One cannot derive the disqualifications of a person for performing the Temple service from those of an animal, as the case of an animal can be considered more stringent because the animal itself is sacrificed upon the altar. Similarly, one cannot derive the disqualifications of an animal from those of a person, as one can claim that the halakha with regard to a person should be more stringent, since a person was included in the performance of mitzvot.

Indeed, the terms are free. Accordingly, since these disqualifications are derived from a verbal analogy they must be accepted as though they were written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara proves these verses are free: Let the Merciful One write that scurvy disqualifies a person and an animal, and it would be unnecessary for the Merciful One to write that a scab disqualifies them, as I would say: And if scurvy, which is not repulsive, is considered a disqualifying blemish, then in the case of a scab, which is repulsive, is it not all the more so a disqualifying blemish? If so, then with regard to “scabbed” and “scabbed,” which the Merciful One writes with regard to a person and an animal, why do I need them? Evidently, they are to be considered free for the verbal analogy.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if animals and priests are disqualified by the same blemishes, let the Merciful One write all the disqualifying blemishes with regard to one of them, either a person or an animal, and let the Merciful One write that a scab and scurvy disqualify both here and here, for the purpose of the verbal analogy, and let all the other blemishes be derived in one case from the other one, through the verbal analogy.

The Gemara responds: To which is this referring, i.e., in which case should the Merciful One write all the blemishes? If the Merciful One had written all of them with regard to a person then I would say: All blemishes that disqualify in the case of a person likewise disqualify in the case of an animal. If so, then with regard to closed hooves and damaged gums, which are not written with regard to a person as they are not relevant because a person has no hooves and his gums are covered with teeth, I would say: In the case of an animal as well they should not disqualify.

And if you would say: Let the Merciful One write all the blemishes with regard to an animal, I would say: All blemishes that disqualify in the case of an animal likewise disqualify in the case of a person. Accordingly, with regard to a gibben, one with blemished eyebrows, or a ḥarum, one with a sunken nose, which are not written with regard to an animal as such blemishes do not occur among animals, I would say: In the case of a person as well they should not disqualify. Therefore, the Torah delineates all the disqualifying blemishes with regard to both an animal and a person in order to state the blemishes that are unique to animals and the blemishes that are unique to people.

The Gemara asks: But even so, why is it necessary for the Torah to delineate all the common blemishes? Let the Merciful One write all of them in the verses discussing one of them, either an animal or a person, and as for those that are not relevant for the other, i.e., those blemishes that apply only in the case of an animal, let the Merciful One write with regard to an animal, and as for those that are not relevant for the other, i.e., those blemishes relevant only to a person, let the Merciful One write with regard to a person. And let the Torah write the blemishes of a scab and scurvy both here and there, for the purpose of the verbal analogy, and let the fact that their common blemishes disqualify in both cases be derived from one another.

Rather, the reason the Torah repeats their common blemishes is in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Every passage in the Torah that was stated and repeated was repeated only for the novel element introduced therein. It is the style of the Torah to repeat a passage even in order to teach only one additional halakha. Consequently, with regard to the blemishes of a person and an animal, their common blemishes were repeated on account of those blemishes that apply only to an animal or a person.

§ Rava says: Why do I need the Merciful One to write that a blemish causes disqualification from Temple service in the case of a person, i.e., a priest (see Leviticus 21:17–23), and that a blemish causes disqualification in the case of sacrificial animals (see Leviticus 22:20–25), and that a blemish causes disqualification for sacrifice in the case of a firstborn animal (see Deuteronomy 15:21)?

Rava answers: They are all necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only that a blemish causes disqualification in the case of a person, one might suggest that blemishes cause disqualification only in that case, since a person was included in the performance of mitzvot. Similarly, had the Merciful One written only that blemishes disqualify a firstborn animal from being sacrificed, it could be claimed that one cannot derive the disqualification of a person on account of blemishes from the disqualification of a firstborn animal, since an animal has an added aspect of stringency in that it itself is sacrificed upon the altar.

Additionally, one cannot derive the disqualifications of sacrificial animals from those of a firstborn animal, since the sanctity of a firstborn animal is from the womb, i.e., from birth, whereas the sanctity of other offerings applies only upon consecration by a person, and they are therefore of a lesser sanctity.

Furthermore, had the Merciful One written only that sacrificial animals are disqualified due to blemishes, it could be claimed that one cannot derive the disqualifications of a person from that of sacrificial animals, as the offerings themselves are sacrificed. Similarly, one cannot derive the disqualifications of a firstborn animal from those of sacrificial animals, as the sanctity of other offerings is greater than that of a firstborn animal because there are many types of other offerings, whereas a firstborn animal has only one type of sanctification. Therefore, it was necessary for the Merciful One to specify that blemishes disqualify in each case.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, the disqualification of one of these cases cannot be derived from only a single other one. But let one of them be derived from the other two. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: From which two should the other one be derived? If you will say: Let the Merciful One not write that blemishes disqualify a firstborn animal and one should derive that case from these, i.e., the disqualifications of a person and sacrificial animals, this suggestion can be rejected. What is notable about these? They are notable in that their sanctity is greater than that of a firstborn offering, as in the case of a person, he is included in the performance of mitzvot; and in the case of a sacrificial animal, there are many types of offerings. Moreover, the halakhot of these blemishes apply to regular, i.e., non-firstborn, animals and people.

Furthermore, if one will say: Let the Merciful One not write that blemishes disqualify sacrificial animals and one should derive that case from these cases, a person, i.e., a priest, and a firstborn animal, this too can be rejected: What is notable about these? They are notable in that their sanctity is automatic and requires no consecration, as a priest is a priest by virtue of being the son of a priest, and a firstborn attains its status by being the first child of its mother, while offerings are consecrated by their owners.

Finally, if one will say: Let the Merciful One not write that blemishes disqualify a person and one should derive that case from these cases, the firstborn animal and sacrificial animals, this suggestion too can be rejected: What is notable about these? They are notable in that they themselves are sacrificed upon the altar, whereas a person is not. Therefore, all three verses are necessary, to teach that blemishes disqualify in all these cases.

§ The mishna teaches that in addition to those blemishes that disqualify an animal, there are other blemishes that apply to a person despite the fact that they are not actual defects. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: These halakhot are derived from that which the verse states: “No man among the seed of Aaron the priest who has a blemish shall come forward to sacrifice the offerings of the Lord made by fire” (Leviticus 21:21). The verse indicates that the priest must be a man who is equal among the seed of Aaron, i.e., one whose appearance is similar to the other priests.