But in the case of a blemished firstborn, use of its wool is permitted, even though an expert did not deem the animal permitted for slaughter. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Asi. The Gemara answers: It is possible that the tanna of that baraita calls the animal unblemished wherever an expert did not yet deem the firstborn permitted for slaughter, even if it was physically blemished.

The Gemara remarks: Let us say that the interpretation of Reish Lakish is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as the baraita states: With regard to one who plucks the wool from an unblemished firstborn, even though it later developed a blemish and the owner slaughtered it, use of the wool is prohibited. In the case of a blemished firstborn from which one plucked wool, and it subsequently died, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems the wool permitted and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda said: It was not with regard to that case that Akavya ben Mahalalel deemed use of the wool permitted. Rather, it was in a case of the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that shed from the animal and one placed the hair in a compartment, and thereafter one slaughtered the animal. In that case Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted, and the Rabbis deem its use prohibited.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei says: My father, Ḥalafta, concedes to Akavya ben Mahalalel in this case of a slaughtered firstborn that use of the wool is permitted. Indeed [aval], the Rabbis said explicitly: One places it in a compartment, as perhaps there is a hope that use of the wool will ultimately be permitted, since if he slaughters the animal all agree that use of the wool is permitted. But if the animal dies by other means, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted and the Rabbis deem it prohibited.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is the explanation of their dispute, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is identical to the opinion of the first tanna in the baraita, as both hold that use of the wool of a slaughtered blemished firstborn is permitted and the dispute between Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis applies to a case where the animal dies by other means. Rather, is it not correct to say the dispute between them concerns the requirement that an expert deem the animal permitted for slaughter?

The Gemara elaborates: As the first tanna holds: If an expert deemed the animal permitted before its wool was shed, then yes, use of the wool is permitted after the animal has been slaughtered; but if not, then use of the wool is not permitted. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even in a case where an expert did not deem the firstborn permitted for slaughter before its wool was shed, use of the wool is still permitted. If so, the interpretation of Reish Lakish is the subject of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei: The first tanna agrees with that opinion and Rabbi Yosei rejects it.

Rava said: No, the interpretation of Reish Lakish is not the subject of their dispute, as everyone agrees that if an expert deemed the animal permitted before its wool was shed, then yes, use of the wool is permitted, but if an expert did not deem the animal permitted beforehand then the use of its wool is not permitted. And there are three disputes concerning this matter, as the first tanna holds: Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a case where the firstborn died, and the same is true, i.e., they disagree, in a case where he slaughtered it. And the reason that the first tanna states they disagree specifically in a case where it died is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Akavya, i.e., that he deems use of the wool permitted even if the animal was not slaughtered.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: With regard to a firstborn that died, all, i.e., Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis, agree that use of the wool is prohibited, and when they disagree it is with regard to a case where the owner slaughtered the animal. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Where he slaughtered it, all agree that use of the wool is permitted, and when they disagree it is with regard to a case where the animal died.

Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, since we learned a mishna in our preferred tractate in accordance with his opinion. As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 5:6): In the case of the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that shed from the animal and one placed the hair in a compartment, and thereafter he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems use of the wool permitted and the Rabbis deem its use prohibited even after the animal’s death.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The mishna is also precisely formulated so that this conclusion can be inferred, as we learned in the latter clause of the mishna: With regard to wool that was not completely shed which is dangling from a firstborn animal, that which appears to be part of the fleece is permitted when the animal is shorn after its death, and that which does not appear to be part of the fleece is prohibited.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explains the proof: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that is difficult: But in what case did he issue this ruling? If we say it was in a case where he slaughtered it that cannot be correct, as whether the halakha follows the opinion of Akavya or whether it follows the opinion of the Rabbis, in both this case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece and that case where it does not, the use of the wool is permitted.

Rather, if one says this is referring to a case where the animal died, that too is difficult. But that cannot be correct either, since if the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis, then both this wool and that wool are prohibited. And if the halakha is in accordance with Akavya, then the mishna should have stated the opposite ruling: If the dangling wool appears to be part of the fleece it is prohibited, as the death of the animal renders it prohibited because it is considered attached to the animal; if it does not appear to be part of the fleece it is permitted, as it was considered detached from the beginning, before the animal died.

Rather, it is obvious that this clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And in what case does the mishna’s ruling apply? If we say it is referring to a case where the animal died, then whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Akavya or whether it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, in both this case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece and that case where it does not, the use of the wool is prohibited.

Rather, is it not referring to a case where he slaughtered the animal? And consequently, if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Akavya, then in both this case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece and that case where it does not, use of the wool is permitted. Rather, is it not correct to say the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? And accordingly, one may conclude from it that Akavya and the Rabbis disagree in a case where he slaughtered the animal? The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.

§ Rabbi Yannai raises a dilemma: With regard to one who plucks wool from an unblemished burnt offering which was later slaughtered, what is the halakha? The Gemara expresses surprise: If one intentionally violates a prohibition and plucks the wool from an unblemished consecrated animal, is there anyone who deems it permitted? All agree that use of the wool is prohibited in such a case. Rather, Rabbi Yannai’s question was: With regard to wool that was torn out by itself from an unblemished burnt offering, what is the halakha?

The Gemara elaborates: Do not raise the dilemma concerning the wool of a sin offering and a guilt offering. Since these offerings come for atonement the owner does not keep them longer than necessary, and therefore there is no reason to deem the wool prohibited. Likewise, with regard to the wool of a firstborn and an animal tithe offering there is also no dilemma. Since they do not come for atonement one might keep them longer than necessary, and therefore the wool is prohibited in order to prevent one from violating the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rather, when you raise the dilemma, it is with regard to the wool of a burnt offering. What is the halakha? Does one say that since