Since both Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis agree that an animal which was blemished before it was consecrated can be redeemed, he should have said: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon and those who disagree with him.

The Sages said in response that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says: According to the Rabbis, animals consecrated for the Temple maintenance were included in the obligation of standing and valuation, whereas animals consecrated for the altar were not included in the obligation of standing and valuation. And therefore it is not possible to interpret the mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the latter clause teaches: And if animals consecrated for the altar died, they must be buried even if their consecration preceded their blemish, as they are included in the obligation of standing and valuation.

The Gemara says: From where is it known that this ruling of the mishna: If they died they must be buried, is due to the fact that they require standing and valuation? Perhaps it is because one may not redeem sacrificial animals in order to feed them to dogs. The Sages said in response: If that were so, let the mishna teach: If one of them became an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], it must be buried. Since a tereifa can be stood before the priest, the only reason to require its burial must be due to the prohibition against redeeming a sacrificial animal in order to feed it to dogs.

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that according to the Rabbis, animals consecrated for the altar were included in the obligation of standing and appraising, and therefore the mishna can be explained in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And in fact Rav taught: This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon and those who disagree with him.

§ The mishna teaches: But if their consecration preceded their blemish, they are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn and from the priestly gifts. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught with regard to a verse discussing disqualified consecrated animals: “However, as you eat the gazelle and the hart, so shall you eat thereof” (Deuteronomy 12:22). Just as a gazelle is exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn, as this obligation does not apply to undomesticated animals, so too, disqualified consecrated animals are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn.

The baraita continues: Based on this derivation, I will exclude consecrated animals that developed a blemish from the mitzva of the firstborn but I will not exclude them from the mitzva of the gifts. From where is it derived that such animals are not subject to the mitzva of the gifts either? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “However, as you eat the gazelle and the hart.” This teaches that just as a hart is exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn and from the mitzva of the gifts, so too, disqualified consecrated animals are exempt from the mitzva of the firstborn and from the mitzva of the gifts.

The Gemara asks: If so, then it follows that just as the fat of a gazelle and a hart is permitted, so too, the fat of disqualified consecrated animals should be permitted. In fact, the halakha is that the fat of disqualified consecrated animals is forbidden, like that of other domesticated animals. The baraita answers that the verse states: “However, as you eat the gazelle and the hart.” The term “however” differentiates, i.e., it serves to limit the analogy between these animals to the mitzvot of the firstborn and the gifts, and not forbidden fat.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: I will exclude consecrated animals that developed a blemish from the mitzva of the firstborn but I will not exclude them from the mitzva of the gifts. The Gemara asks: What is different about a firstborn that I would exclude only the mitzva of the firstborn, in the first stage of this interpretation? Why not exclude the mitzva of the gifts as well? The Gemara answers that the mitzva of the firstborn does not apply equally to all animals but only to males, and therefore I do not initially exclude the mitzva of the gifts, as they do apply equally to all domesticated animals, including females. Therefore, when the verse states “a hart” in addition to the gazelle, this is derived as teaching that disqualified consecrated animals are excluded from the mitzva of the gifts as well.

Rav Pappa said another question to Abaye: If one accepts the analogy between disqualified consecrated animals and the animals mentioned in the verse, then one can claim as follows: Just as the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring on the same day does not apply to a gazelle and a hart, so too, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring should not apply to disqualified consecrated animals. Why does the baraita not address this issue?

Abaye said to Rav Pappa: To what are you comparing disqualified consecrated animals? If you are comparing them to non-sacred domesticated animals, the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day applies to them. And if you are comparing them to sacrificial animals, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring also applies to them. Since all domesticated animals are subject to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, one cannot derive the exclusion of disqualified consecrated animals from this verse.

Rav Pappa said to him: If so, then with regard to its fat as well, let us state a claim like this: To what are you comparing disqualified animals? If you are comparing them to non-sacred animals, their fat is forbidden. And if you are comparing them to sacrificial animals, their fat is also forbidden. Since the prohibition of fat also applies to both consecrated and non-sacred animals, by the same reasoning there is no need for the verse to teach that the prohibition of fat applies. Nevertheless, the baraita derives this halakha from the word “however.”

Rather, didn’t you say in the baraita: “However,” but not their fat? Say also: “However,” but not a mother and its offspring. With regard to both halakhot, which apply to domesticated but not undomesticated animals, the reason that the analogy is not extended is not due to Abaye’s claim, as the juxtaposition between the animals would teach that their halakhot are the same. Instead, both exclusions are derived equally from the word “however,” which serves to differentiate disqualified consecrated animals from the gazelle and the hart both with regard to forbidden fat and with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring. Interpreting the exclusion in this manner means that disqualified consecrated animals are at least comparable to sacrificial animals in that they are excluded from the mitzva of the firstborn and the priestly gifts. Had the exclusion been interpreted with regard to the mitzva of the firstborn and the priestly gifts, disqualified consecrated animals would not be comparable to any type of animal.

The Gemara cites a different interpretation. Rava says: The word “however” comes to exclude the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring from the comparison between disqualified consecrated animals and the gazelle and hart, and the exclusion of its fat is derived from the term “its blood.” As it is written with regard to a blemished firstborn animal: “You shall eat it…as the gazelle, and as the hart. Only you shall not eat its blood” (Deuteronomy 15:22–23).

Rava elaborates: What is “its blood” referring to? If we say that it is referring to its actual blood, the Torah would not have had to state this explicitly, as even if it were merely similar to the blood of a gazelle and a hart, is that to say that anyone permits the blood of a gazelle and a hart? Since the blood of all animals is forbidden, it is already established that the blood of a blemished firstborn animal is forbidden. Rather, the term “its blood” is referring to its fat.

The Gemara challenges: But in that case, let the Merciful One write: Its fat, instead of “its blood.” The Gemara explains: If the Merciful One had written fat, I would say: The juxtaposition between disqualified consecrated animals and a gazelle and a hart is effective with regard to fat, and the verse itself is also effective, i.e., it can be derived from the juxtaposition and the verse together that the prohibition of fat applies to disqualified consecrated animals to a certain extent, but not fully.

The Gemara elaborates: The juxtaposition is effective in that it excludes one who eats the fat of consecrated animals from the punishment of excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. The reason is that when the Merciful One writes “karet,” it is written with regard to one who eats the fat of a domesticated animal, as it is stated: “For anyone who eats the fat of the domesticated animal…even the soul that eats it shall be excised from his people” (Leviticus 7:25). The juxtaposition to a gazelle and a hart would teach that the punishment of karet does not apply in the case of disqualified consecrated animals.

And at the same time the verse in Deuteronomy 15:23 would also be effective, as, if it were written: Only you shall not eat its fat, it would establish the consumption of the fat of disqualified consecrated animals as a prohibition for which one is liable merely to receive lashes. For this reason, the Merciful One expresses the prohibition against eating the fat using the language “its blood,” in order to tell you that just as consumption of its blood is punishable by karet, so too, consumption of its fat is punishable by karet. By using the term “its blood,” the Torah conveys that one is liable to receive karet for eating the fat of disqualified consecrated animals, i.e., that with regard to this particular halakha the juxtaposition does not apply at all.

Rava stated that the halakha with regard to the consumption of the fat of a disqualified consecrated animal is derived from the verse: “Only shall you not eat its blood.” The Gemara asks: But didn’t the tanna of the baraita say that the word “however” limits the juxtaposition so that disqualified consecrated animals are not included in the mitzvot of the firstborn and the gifts, but they are not excluded from the prohibition against eating its fat? How can Rava suggest a different source than the one cited in the baraita?

The Gemara answers that according to Rava, this is what the baraita is saying: Had the term “its blood” not been stated, I would have said that the word “however” teaches: But not its fat. But now that it is stated: “Its blood,” the word “however” comes to teach that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day applies to disqualified consecrated animals.

§ The mishna teaches: And animals whose consecration preceded their blemish do not completely emerge from their sacred status and assume non-sacred status in order to be shorn and to be utilized for labor. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to a verse discussing consecrated animals that developed a blemish and were redeemed: “Notwithstanding, after all the desire of your soul, you may slaughter and eat flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:15). The term “you may slaughter” teaches that slaughtering the animal is permitted, but not shearing it. Likewise, “you may eat flesh” teaches that its meat is permitted, but not its milk. Finally, “you may eat” teaches that you may eat the meat, but you may not feed it to your dogs. From here it is derived that one may not redeem sacrificial animals in order to feed them to dogs.