The Gemara responds: Rav Dimi is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and tear loose, since it is obvious that this is not considered slaughter at all and one is not required to cover the blood. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, I would say that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Rav Dimi teaches us in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba (85a), that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered an act of slaughter, and one is therefore not required to cover the blood of this bird.

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, what is the reason Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say: Go out and render the bird a tereifa? And if you would say the reason is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is considered an act of slaughter, and one would be required to cover the blood, this is untenable. As doesn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi saw as correct the statement of Rabbi Shimon, that an ineffective slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, and taught it in the mishna here using the term: The Rabbis?

The Gemara responds: Ravin is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. That is, it is not necessary to teach: Go out and render the bird a tereifa, since an act of slaughter that is not fit to render the meat permitted is not considered slaughter and one would not be required to cover the blood of the bird. But with regard to the instruction: Go out and tear loose the windpipe and gullet, I would say that the slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law to render it permitted for consumption, and consequently, the tearing loose of its windpipe and gullet is considered its slaughter and the blood of this bird should require covering. Therefore, Ravin teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the slaughter of a bird is obligatory by Torah law, as he himself derives from the verse: “As I have commanded you” (Deuteronomy 12:21).

§ The Gemara questions the very occurrence of the incident involving Rabbi Ḥiyya: And could moths have infested his flax? But doesn’t Ravin bar Abba say, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Sheva says: From when the people of the Exile ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael there ceased to be meteors, earthquakes, storm winds, and thunder; and their wine did not sour, and their flax was not stricken with an infestation of moths; and the Sages placed their eyes, i.e., attributed these phenomena, to the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons, who ascended from Babylonia? If so, how was Rabbi Ḥiyya’s flax affected?

The Gemara responds: When their merit is effective, it is effective for the rest of the world but not for themselves. And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Each and every day a Divine Voice emerges and says: The entire world is sustained in the merit of Ḥanina ben Dosa, My son, and yet for Ḥanina, My son, a kav of carobs, i.e., a very small amount of inferior food, is sufficient to sustain him from one Shabbat eve to the next Shabbat eve. Similarly, the merit of Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons was effective for others but not for themselves.

MISHNA: In the case of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird, and others saw them and ensured that the slaughter was properly performed, in which case the slaughter is valid (see 2a), one who oversaw the slaughter is obligated to cover the blood. If they slaughtered the animals among themselves without supervision, one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood.

And likewise with regard to the matter of slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an undomesticated mother animal and others saw them, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring after them. If they slaughtered the mother animal among themselves, Rabbi Meir deems it permitted to slaughter its offspring after them and the Rabbis deem it prohibited. And the Rabbis concede that if one slaughtered the offspring thereafter that he does not incur the forty lashes, as it is possible the mother was not properly slaughtered.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is different about the first clause of the mishna that discusses the covering of the blood, where they do not disagree with the statement that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered an animal without supervision one is exempt from the obligation to cover the blood, which indicates the Rabbis hold that such an act of slaughter is not considered an act of slaughter; and what is different about the latter clause of the mishna that discusses the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring on the same day, where they disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor slaughtered a mother animal without supervision one is prohibited to subsequently slaughter its offspring, indicating they hold that such an act of slaughter is in fact considered an act of slaughter?

The Gemara responds: Actually, it is uncertain whether this slaughter is valid or not. With regard to the first clause, if we say one is obligated to cover the blood from an unsupervised slaughter, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter, and it is in fact forbidden to eat from their slaughter. Therefore, the Rabbis did not require the covering of the blood.

The Gemara challenges: If so, then with regard to the latter clause of the mishna as well, since the Rabbis say it is prohibited to slaughter the offspring of the mother after them, people might say this is because the slaughter performed by these people is proper, and they will come to eat meat from their slaughter.

The Gemara rejects this: With regard to the latter clause, prohibiting the slaughter of the offspring will not cause people to conclude the unsupervised slaughter of the mother by disqualified people was valid. Rather, they will say: The reason the offspring is not slaughtered is because the owner does not need the meat. The Gemara asks: But with regard to the first clause as well, covering the blood will not lead one to conclude that the unsupervised slaughter was valid, as people will say: He is covering the blood because he needs to clean his courtyard of the blood. If so, let the Rabbis deem one obligated to cover the blood.

The Gemara rejects this: But if a disqualified person slaughtered the animal in a garbage dump, what can be said to allow the covering of the blood? Obviously, people will not assume one covers the blood in order to clean a garbage dump. Similarly, if one comes to consult the court, what can be said? That is, if one sees from a distance that a disqualified person slaughtered an animal and the blood is uncovered, and he comes to consult the court with regard to the obligation to cover the blood, if the court tells him to cover the blood he might conclude that this is because the unsupervised slaughter was valid. Accordingly, since there are scenarios in which one might mistakenly conclude that the unsupervised slaughter of inept people is valid, the Rabbis concede that one is exempt from covering the blood of such an act of slaughter in all cases.

The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning that the Rabbis are concerned for the aforementioned scenarios, then with regard to the latter clause as well, if one comes to consult the court with regard to the slaughter of the offspring, what can be said? That is, if one sees a disqualified person slaughter the mother, and he comes to ask the court whether he may slaughter the offspring on the same day, if the court prohibits him from slaughtering it he might conclude that this is because the slaughter of the mother was valid. Why, then, do the Rabbis prohibit one from slaughtering the offspring?

The Gemara concludes: Rather, it must be that the Rabbis disagree concerning the entire matter, i.e., they disagree with regard to covering the blood as well, and hold that if a disqualified person slaughtered an animal while unsupervised, one must cover the blood; and the Rabbis waited for Rabbi Meir until he concluded his statement, and then they disagreed with him on both accounts.

The Gemara asks: If so, granted, the opinion of the Rabbis is understandable, as they consistently rule stringently. That is, although it is prohibited to consume the meat of an unsupervised slaughter performed by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, the Rabbis require one to cover the blood and prohibit one to slaughter the offspring, due to concern that the person may have performed a valid slaughter. But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that one is exempt from covering the blood and that one may slaughter the offspring on the same day, what is the reason he does not rule stringently due to uncertainty?

Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir would deem one liable to receive lashes for eating from the slaughter of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, due to violation of the prohibition against eating from an animal carcass. According to Rabbi Meir there is no uncertainty with regard to such slaughter, and it is not considered an act of slaughter at all. Consequently, one may become liable to receive lashes for its consumption. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Ami says: Since the majority of actions of a deaf-mute, imbecile, and a minor are bungled, i.e., they are performed incompetently, it can be assumed that their slaughter was performed improperly as well.

Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Why did Rabbi Ami specifically state that the reasoning of Rabbi Meir is based on the assumption that the majority of their actions are bungled? Even if only a minority of their actions are bungled and the majority are performed competently, Rabbi Meir would also maintain that the animal is considered a carcass, as Rabbi Meir is concerned for a minority when it can be combined with a presumptive status. If so, append the minority to the presumptive status of an animal prior to its slaughter, i.e., that it is prohibited for consumption, and the majority of competent acts of slaughter is thereby weakened.

The Gemara proves that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority: As we learned in a mishna (Teharot 3:8): In the case of a ritually impure child who is found alongside ritually pure started dough, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure. This is because there is no proof the child touched it; he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure because it is the manner of a child to handle items. And we say with regard to this mishna: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity since its impurity has not been definitively determined.