is regarded as though it were cut. Therefore, it is regarded as though the foreleg had already been severed from the body of the fetus, and the point of contact between them is not considered to be a concealed area. Rather, it is regarded as if the foreleg and fetus were two separate items that came into contact with each other. Consequently, the former can impart impurity to the latter.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this halakhic principle that Ravina cites? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 10:5): When a vessel is immersed in a ritual bath, it is purified only if all parts of the vessel are submerged at the same time. But with regard to any handles of vessels that are too long and therefore will ultimately be cut off, one must immerse them only until the point of their eventual size. Even though the part of the handle that will be cut off is not submerged, the vessel is nevertheless purified; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Evidently, Rabbi Meir holds that even though the handle is still physically attached, since that part of the handle stands to be cut off, it is already regarded as though it were cut off. Consequently, immersing the handle up until that point is regarded as immersing the entire vessel.

And the Rabbis say that the vessel is not purified until he immerses all of it, including the handle. Apparently, the Rabbis do not hold that an item that stands to be cut is regarded as though it was already cut, and Ravina’s explanation is in accordance only with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara responds: You may even say that Ravina’s explanation is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir concerns utensils, but even the Rabbis agree that the connections between two pieces of food are disregarded, and the item is considered as though it is already separated into two pieces that are touching one another, and so ritual impurity can be imparted from one piece to another. Similarly, the fetus and the foreleg are considered like food in this regard. Therefore, it is considered as if they have already been separated and are touching, allowing the foreleg to impart impurity to the fetus.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the explanation of Ulla that the fetus was rendered impure at the time of separation of the flesh of the fetus from the limb, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches, that the foreleg was severed from the body of the fetus. But according to the explanation of Ravina, the connection between the foreleg and fetus is like that of food, and even if the foreleg was never severed from the fetus it would still impart impurity to the fetus. What, then, is the reason the mishna states it was severed? The Gemara answers: Since the mishna needed to teach in the first clause that the foreleg was severed, it also taught in the latter clause that it was severed, for stylistic consistency, even though the halakha would apply even were it not severed.

§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: The flesh of a fetus that extended its foreleg outside the mother’s womb and whose mother was subsequently slaughtered has ritual impurity due to having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Does a slaughtered tereifa impart impurity? The Gemara answers: Yes, and this is in accordance with the statement of Shmuel’s father, as Shmuel’s father says: The Sages decreed that a tereifa that one slaughtered imparts impurity to sacrificial animals, i.e., it will disqualify them if it comes in contact with them.

§ The mishna cites the Rabbis’ rationale for their opinion: Just as we found in the case of a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure according to Torah law, i.e., it prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass, despite not rendering the animal permitted for consumption, so too, the slaughter of the mother animal should render the limb of its fetus that left the womb ritually pure, despite the fact that it is prohibited for consumption.

The mishna itself proceeds to cite Rabbi’s Meir’s response to this claim. The Gemara here cites a different version of his response based on that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? You might say it is the slaughter of its mother, but if so, the act of slaughter should also permit it even for consumption.

The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the ritual impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we learned in the mishna (68a): If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it, then even if those pieces were left inside the animal, their consumption is prohibited.

The Gemara clarifies the response of the Rabbis: What are the Rabbis saying? Rava said, and some say it unattributed [kedi] to any particular Sage, that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? You might say it is the slaughter of its mother, but if so, it should also permit it even for consumption. In response the Rabbis said to him: Let the halakha of a tereifa prove the point, as its slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of a carcass but it does not permit it for consumption. Similarly, the slaughter of the mother animal should render pure even the foreleg of its fetus, even if it does not permit it for consumption.

Rabbi Meir said to them: No, even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the animal itself pure from having the impurity of a carcass, that is true with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body? The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we learned in the mishna at the beginning of the chapter: If one severs pieces from a fetus that is in an animal’s womb and then slaughters the mother animal, their consumption is permitted. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, their consumption is prohibited.

The Gemara notes that this clarification of Rava is also taught explicitly in a baraita: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? The Rabbis said to him: It is the slaughter of its mother. Rabbi Meir responded: But if so, it should also permit it even for consumption. In response the Rabbis said to him: Let the halakha of a tereifa prove the point, as its slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of a carcass but it does not permit it for consumption. Similarly, the slaughter of the mother animal should render pure even the foreleg of its fetus, even if it does not permit it for consumption.

Rabbi Meir said to them: Even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the animal itself pure, and likewise the slaughter of any animal renders the limb that was partially cut from it but still hangs from it pure from imparting the impurity of a carcass despite being prohibited for consumption, that is the halakha with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body?

The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we have learned in the mishna above: If one severed pieces from a fetus that was in an animal’s womb and then slaughtered the mother animal, their consumption is permitted. But if one severed pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it, their consumption is prohibited.

§ Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to fetuses, concerning whether the slaughter of the mother prevents a limb that emerged from the womb from having the impurity of a carcass, so too, they have a parallel dispute with regard to limbs of an animal that were partially cut from it but still hanging from it, whether the slaughter of the animal prevents such limbs from having the impurity of a carcass.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Their dispute is only with regard to a limb of a fetus that emerged from the womb, but with regard to a limb hanging from an animal, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal renders such a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the slaughter does not prevent the limb from having the impurity of a carcass.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for the distinction made by Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the opinion of the Rabbis that the slaughter of an animal renders pure the limb of its fetus, but does not render pure a limb hanging from the animal itself? The reason is that this limb of the fetus that emerged from its womb has a means of rectification by returning back inside the womb, in accordance with the opinion that it will then be permitted for consumption by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But this hanging limb does not have a means of rectification by returning, as it cannot be reattached to the animal’s body.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion from the baraita cited above: Rabbi Meir said to them: No, even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders pure the animal itself and similarly the slaughter of any animal renders pure the limb that is hanging from it from having the impurity of a carcass, this is true with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body?