that the feathers at the front of the neck were unraveled by the arrow, a clear indication that slaughter was performed from the front of the neck.

The Gemara notes another difficulty encountered in the slaughter of a flying bird with an arrow. But doesn’t the bird’s blood require covering with earth? And if you would say that Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa covers the blood, but doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say that Rav says: In fulfilling the mitzva of covering the blood, one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or bird must place earth beneath the blood and earth above it, as it is stated: “He shall spill its blood, and cover it in earth” (Leviticus 17:13). It is not stated: Cover it with earth, but rather “in earth.” This teaches that one who slaughters must place earth beneath the blood and earth above the blood, so that the blood will be within the earth.

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa would designate for himself the earth of the entire valley [patka] before shooting the arrow. That earth would serve as the layer of earth beneath the blood and he would proceed to cover the blood with another layer of earth.

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where one was in the process of slaughtering the animal in the standard manner and he decapitated the animal in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck, the slaughter is valid. Rabbi Zeira says: The knife must be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did Rabbi Zeira mean: Equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck by an amount equivalent to the breadth of the entire neck, in which case the length of the knife would equal the breadth of two necks? Or perhaps he meant: Equivalent to the breadth of the entire neck and beyond the neck by any amount?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof to resolve the dilemma from the continuation of the mishna: If one was in the process of slaughtering two animals simultaneously, and he decapitated two heads in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals the slaughter is valid. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: The breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals? If we say that it means the breadth of one entire neck and nothing more, that is difficult. Now, for the slaughter of one animal, we require that the knife be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck; for the slaughter of two animals, is it possible that a knife whose length is equivalent to the breadth of one animal’s entire neck would be sufficient? Rather, it is obvious that it means that the length of the knife must be equivalent to the breadth of one entire neck beyond the breadth of two necks.

The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna that Rabbi Zeira means that the length of the knife must be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck by the breadth of the entire neck. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this was Rabbi Zeira’s intent.

§ The mishna continues: In what case is this statement said? It is when one drew the knife back and did not draw it forth, or drew it forth and did not draw it back. But if he drew it back and forth, even if the knife was of any length, even if he slaughtered with a scalpel, the slaughter is valid. Rav Menashe said: This is the halakha in the case of a scalpel that does not have protrusions from the sides. If there are protrusions, since the scalpel is short, there is concern that the corners may perforate the simanim or enter between the simanim and invalidate the slaughter.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Menashe: What is the halakha with regard to slaughter with a needle? Rav Menashe said to him: A needle pierces the simanim, as it perforates the neck instead of cutting it.

Rav Aḥa then asked Rav Menashe: What is the halakha with regard to slaughtering with a cobbler’s needle, which is flat and has sharp sides? Rav Menashe said to him: We already learn in the mishna: Even if the knife was of any length, the slaughter is valid. What, is it not referring to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle? The Gemara responds: No. The reference is to slaughtering with a scalpel, which is larger than a cobbler’s needle. The Gemara objects: The tanna teaches the case of a scalpel explicitly in the mishna. Therefore, the phrase in the mishna: A knife of any length, must be referring to an item smaller than a scalpel. The Gemara explains: The subsequent mention of the scalpel is explaining the phrase: Even if the knife was of any length. What is the knife of any length with which slaughter is valid? It is a scalpel.

This too stands to reason, as, if it enters your mind that the phrase: A knife of any length, is referring to a cobbler’s needle, now that it is permitted to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle, is it necessary for the tanna to teach that it is permitted to slaughter with a scalpel, which is larger than a cobbler’s needle? The Gemara rejects that reasoning: It is necessary for the mishna to teach both the case of a cobbler’s needle and the case of a scalpel, as it could enter your mind to say that it is prohibited to slaughter with a scalpel even though it is permitted to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle. The reasoning for this distinction would be: Let the Sages issue a decree prohibiting the use of a scalpel with no protrusions due to the prohibition against using a scalpel with protrusions. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that there is no decree and it is permitted to slaughter with a scalpel that has no protrusions.

MISHNA: If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid, as it is stated: “And you shall slaughter…and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7), from which it is derived: That which you slaughter you may eat, and that which was slaughtered on its own, you may not eat.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a knife fell and slaughtered an animal the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara notes: The reason the slaughter is not valid is that the knife fell. But by inference, if one dropped the knife the slaughter is valid, and that is the halakha even though when dropping the knife he did not intend to slaughter the animal.

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he says about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava already say it one time that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan? As we learned in a mishna (2a): And with regard to any of them, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid even though they are incapable of intent. And we said: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? And Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan.

The Gemara answers: Both statements are necessary. As had Rava taught us his statement there with regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, one would have thought that the slaughter is valid due to the fact that although the individual lacks intent to slaughter the animal, he intends his action for the sake of cutting in general. But here, with regard to throwing a knife at the wall, where he does not intend to cut at all, say no, the slaughter is not valid.

And had Rava taught us his statement here with regard to throwing the knife, one would have thought that the slaughter is valid is due to the fact that it comes due to the action of a mentally competent person. But there, with regard to slaughter by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, where the slaughter does not come due to the action of a mentally competent person, say that the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, it is necessary for Rava to teach both cases.

§ The mishna is now cited as proof in an amoraic dispute. It was stated: With regard to a menstruating woman who, after the menstrual flow ended, was compelled against her will and immersed in a ritual bath, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: She is ritually pure vis-à-vis her house, i.e., it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband, but it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma because the immersion is not considered valid for that purpose. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She was not purified even vis-à-vis her house.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to the opinion of Rav, who says that she is ritually pure vis-à-vis her house but it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, it is difficult. With regard to a transgression punishable by karet, i.e., intercourse with a menstruating woman, she was rendered permitted by immersion against her will; with regard to partaking of teruma, a prohibition punishable by death at the hand of Heaven, which is a lesser punishment, is it necessary to say that it is permitted for her through immersion against her will? Why then does Rav deem it prohibited for her to partake of teruma?

Rav Naḥman said to him: The halakhic status of her husband is non-sacred, and non-sacred items do not require intent for purification. And from where do you say so? It is as we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 5:6): In the case of a wave that was detached from the sea, and in it were forty se’a of water, and that wave fell on an impure person or on impure vessels, they are ritually pure. What, is it not that a person is similar to vessels? Just as vessels do not intend to be purified and they are purified by the wave, so too, a person does not require intent in order to be purified.

The Gemara rejects that proof: From where is there proof that this is the meaning of the mishna? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of one who sits near the water and waits to determine when the wave will be detached, which is tantamount to having intent to immerse,