And the halakha that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from the verse discussing second tithe. The verse states with regard to a peace offering: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and you shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7), and the verse states with regard to second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there” (Deuteronomy 14:23). And from this it may be concluded: Just as peace offerings are not themselves brought from second tithe, as they are not produce, so too with regard to the loaves of a thanks offering, they are not themselves brought from second tithe. And that wheat which is purchased with second-tithe money is also not itself second tithe; it may therefore be used for the loaves of the thanks offering.

Now I will say my reasoning for why one may not prepare the loaves of a thanks offering with wheat that was purchased with second-tithe money: From where do I derive the halakha that a thanks offering may be brought from second-tithe money? I derive it from the halakhot of a peace offering. And the halakha that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from second tithe. Therefore, just as a peace offering is not of the same species as second tithe, so too the loaves of a thanks offering may not be of the same species as second tithe. This serves to exclude wheat purchased with second-tithe money, which is of the same species as second tithe.

§ Rabbi Ami says: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the money does not assume the status of a peace offering. What is the reason? The reason is that the sanctity of the peace offering is not strong enough to take effect upon items that have the sanctity of second tithe.

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 1:4): Ideally, one should use second-tithe money to purchase peace offerings. If one purchases a peace offering with second-tithe money, only the flesh of the animal is consecrated, while its hide is non-sacred. The mishna teaches: With regard to one who uses second-tithe money in an improper manner and purchases an undomesticated animal for a peace offering, a purpose for which an undomesticated animal cannot be used, or purchases a domesticated animal for meat of desire, i.e., ordinary meat, the Sages penalized him and decreed that the hide does not become non-sacred. The Gemara asks: Is that not to say that the hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money assumes the status of a peace offering, and it must be sold and the money used to purchase a peace offering, in contradiction to the statement of Rabbi Ami?

The Gemara rejects this: Wasn’t it stated concerning that mishna that Rav said: The hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money does not assume the status of a peace offering; and what is the meaning of the mishna that the hide does not become non-sacred? This is what the mishna is saying: The hide, as part of an undomesticated animal, is not in the category of a peace offering at all so that its hide would become non-sacred. What is the reason? Rabba says: Since he used the second-tithe money in an improper manner, it is considered as if he purchased an ox for plowing, to which no sanctity of second tithe applies.

§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The money assumes the status of a peace offering, and Rabbi Elazar says: The money does not assume the status of a peace offering.

The Gemara elaborates: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Second tithe is non-sacred property, everyone agrees that the money assumes the status of a peace offering. When they disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Second tithe is property belonging to the Most High. The one who says that the money does not assume the status of a peace offering holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and one may not designate property of the Most High for another purpose. And the one who says that the money assumes the status of a peace offering holds that since second tithe is called a peace offering, as an animal purchased with second-tithe money without specification is brought as a peace offering, when he designates the money for a peace offering, it as well is designated with the sanctity of a peace offering.

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Elazar from a baraita: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the sanctity of a peace offering is applied to this money in addition to the sanctity of second tithe. Therefore, when he redeems this money, he adds to it two-fifths: One-fifth for the redemption of the sacrificial sanctity of a peace offering and one-fifth for the redemption of second tithe. Evidently, the sanctity of a peace offering does take effect on second-tithe money.

The Gemara responds: Do you maintain that this baraita is agreed upon by everyone? In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second-tithe money is non-sacred property. Accordingly, the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect on the money. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

MISHNA: From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, that he may bring it only from non-sacred money? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). The verse is difficult: Doesn’t the Paschal offering come only from lambs and goats? If so, why does the verse state: “The flock and the herd”? It is to juxtapose all offerings that come from the flock and from the herd to the Paschal offering, teaching that just as the Paschal offering is a matter of obligation and comes only from non-sacred money, so too any matter of obligation comes only from non-sacred money.

Therefore, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a peace offering, since these offerings come as an obligation due to his vow, they may be brought only from non-sacred money. And libations, in any case, may be brought only from non-sacred money, and not from second-tithe money, because second-tithe money must be used to purchase items eaten by people, while libations are poured out next to the altar.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the halakha that any matter of obligation must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the halakha of the Paschal offering. The Gemara asks: And concerning the Paschal offering itself, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred property? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: “Paschal offering” is stated in the Torah with regard to the offering sacrificed in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3), and “Paschal offering” is stated with regard to the yearly obligation throughout the generations (see Exodus 12:25). Therefore, just as the Paschal offering stated with regard to Egypt was brought only from non-sacred property, as there was no second tithe in Egypt, so too the Paschal offering stated with regard to the obligation throughout the generations may be brought only from non-sacred property.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: But does one derive the possible from the impossible? Does one derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, when there exists the possibility of using second-tithe money, from the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt, when there was no second tithe? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Even though it was impossible to bring the Paschal offering in Egypt from consecrated money, it is a great proof, and we shall derive this halakha from it.

Rabbi Akiva then presented a different logical derivation to reject the proof of Rabbi Eliezer: One cannot derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from that of the Paschal offering in Egypt, as what is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar.