The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as communal sin offerings for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.

Ravina objects to this: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, why not say that for that which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included; and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included. Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?

And if you would say that had the verse not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.

Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.

The Gemara challenges this: The halakha of the one who slaughters has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before God” (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term “it”?

He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it,” to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters does not have to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?

The Gemara answers: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. It might enter your mind to say: Let it be derived that a bird must be killed in the north by an a fortiori inference from the halakha of a sheep, as follows: Just as is the case for a sheep brought as a burnt offering, that the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, yet nevertheless it fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a bird offering from the halakha of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term “it” is not necessary to exclude this possibility.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The halakha that the Paschal offering need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: “It,” but rather it is derived as stated by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter yet fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.

The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the halakha of a Paschal offering from the halakha of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it has the power to atone for those sins liable for punishment by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.

The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the halakha of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by karet, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings the halakha of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them either, since each of them is an offering of the most sacred order.

The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Rather, the term “it” teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this halakha from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation of Rabbi Aḥiyya from the term “it” does not come to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that is known already from the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. Rather, this is what Rabbi Aḥiyya is saying: The one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.

The Gemara questions this inference: The halakha that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: “And the priest shall take” (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This tanna does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: “And the priest shall take.” Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.

§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven. Rav Pappa said: If one baked a meal offering as leaven he is flogged with two sets of lashes, one for shaping the dough and one for baking it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But you said in the baraita: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single action and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself; this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of the baraita, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case where he shaped the dough and he, the same person, also baked it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. That statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation where another person shaped the dough and gave the shaped dough to him, and he baked it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bekhorot 3:6): In the case of an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, one may let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision does not cause a permanent blemish. But one may not let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: One may even let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, provided that he does not slaughter the animal on the basis of that blemish, even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says: