the taking of a life, i.e., karet, so too, the matter pertaining to sacrificial food entails a punishment that involves the taking of a life. The Gemara explains: And if the prohibition is with regard to touching sacrificial food, is there a punishment that entails the taking of a life? Rather, the prohibition is with regard to eating.

The Gemara asks: But this verse is still necessary for Reish Lakish to teach the halakha of a ritually impure person who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood of the offering on the altar, when the meat is not yet permitted. As it was stated: With regard to an impure individual who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged.

Reish Lakish says: He is flogged, as it is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch,” without limiting the prohibition to a specific time, indicating that it is no different if one eats the sacrificial meat prior to sprinkling the blood, and it is no different if one does so after sprinkling the blood. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged, as the Sage Bardela teaches that the prohibition is derived by means of the verbal analogy cited before, as the verse states “his impurity” with regard to an impure person who eats sacrificial food, and states “his impurity” with regard to an impure person entering the Temple. And when “his impurity” is written, it is with regard to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood (see Leviticus 7:20).

The Gemara answers for Reish Lakish: If so, that the verse was referring only to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood, let the verse say: A consecrated item she shall not touch. What is the reason for using the phrase “every consecrated item”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., it also includes not eating sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: With regard to an impure individual who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. Abaye says: This dispute applies with regard to a case of impurity of the body of the one who eats the meat, but with regard to impurity of the flesh itself, i.e., if the sacrificial meat was ritually impure, all agree that he is flogged.

This is as the verse states: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire; and the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” (Leviticus 7:19). The Sages derived that the extra term “and the flesh” serves to include wood and frankincense, which are not fit for consumption, and even so the verse included them as being susceptible to impurity, and one who eats them while he is impure is flogged. Therefore, sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, which is fit for consumption, is certainly included in the prohibition.

And Rava says: This dispute applies with regard to a case of impurity of the body, but with regard to impurity of the meat all agree that he is not flogged. What is the reason? Since one does not apply to meat before the sprinkling of the blood the verse: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings of the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which is referring to meat after the sprinkling of the blood, so too, one does not apply to it the prohibition: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19).

The Gemara challenges the statement of Rava: But doesn’t the Master say that the term “and the flesh” serves to include wood and frankincense that became impure as items that are forbidden to be eaten, despite the fact that they are not fit for consumption? Certainly, then, sacrificial flesh before the sprinkling of the blood should also be included in the category of items forbidden to be eaten.

The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here, that one would be liable for eating wood and frankincense that are impure? It is a case where the wood and frankincense were sanctified in a vessel, and the reason for the liability is that they are then considered like an item for which all of its permitting factors were sacrificed, such as flesh after the sprinkling of the blood, and only then is one liable for eating it while impure.

This is as we learned in a mishna (Me’ila 10a): With regard to anything that has permitting factors, i.e., rites that must be performed or items that must be sacrificed before the meat of the offering may be eaten, such as the meat of an offering that is permitted to be eaten by the sprinkling of the blood; one is liable for eating it while impure from the time that its permitting factors were sacrificed. With regard to anything that does not have permitting factors, such as the handful removed from a meal offering and the frankincense, which themselves render the rest of the meal offering permitted for consumption, one is liable for eating it while impure from the time it is sanctified in a vessel.

§ It was stated: In the case of one who offers up the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, while Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. The Gemara explains the logic for each opinion: Reish Lakish says that he is flogged, because there is a positive mitzva to sacrifice an offering from the herd and the flock (see Leviticus 1:2), which are kosher animals. Therefore, it can be inferred that a kosher animal, yes, one may sacrifice, but a non-kosher animal one may not sacrifice, and one who transgresses a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva is flogged for it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is not flogged for it, as one who transgresses a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva is not flogged for it.

Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita cited in Torat Kohanim: “Whatsoever parts the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews the cud, among the beasts, that may you eat” (Leviticus 11:3). One can infer: But you may not eat a non-kosher animal; and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva.

Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain it to you: With regard to one who sacrifices the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, everyone agrees that he is not flogged, as he violates only a positive mitzva. When they disagree, it is with regard to one who sacrifices a kosher undomesticated animal on the altar, and it was stated like this: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything.

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva, since the Torah commanded that a domesticated animal, yes, should be sacrificed, from which it can be inferred that an undomesticated animal may not be sacrificed, and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything, since that verse which instructs one to sacrifice offerings from the herd and the flock is referring to the optimal manner of fulfilling the mitzva, but if he sacrificed an undomesticated animal, he has not transgressed the mitzva.

Rava raised an objection from a baraita: Had the verse (Leviticus 1:2) stated only: When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, animals [behema], I would say that even an undomesticated animal is included in the category of an animal [behema], like that which is stated: “These are the animals [behema] that you may eat: The ox, the sheep, and the goat, the deer, and the gazelle, and the fallow deer, and the wild goat, and the oryx, and the aurochs, and the mountain sheep” (Deuteronomy 14:4–5), and, for example, the deer and gazelle are undomesticated animals. Therefore, the verse states: “From animals, from the cattle and from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that God says: I have told you to bring offerings from the cattle and the flock, but not an undomesticated animal.

One might have thought that one should not bring an undomesticated animal ab initio, but if one did bring it, it is valid, and to what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher says to him: Bring me wheat, and the student brought him wheat and barley. In this case, it is not as though the student is disobeying the statement of the teacher; rather, he is merely adding to his statement, and that should be valid.

Therefore, the verse states again: “From the cattle” (Leviticus 1:3), and: “From the flock” (Leviticus 1:10), to reiterate that God says: I have told you to bring offerings from the cattle and the flock, but not an undomesticated animal. To what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher told him: Bring me only wheat, and the student brought him wheat and barley. It is not as though the student is adding to the statement of the teacher; rather, it is as though he is disobeying his statement, since his teacher instructed him to bring only wheat. Consequently, one who sacrifices an undomesticated animal does not merely add to a mitzva of the Torah, but also violates a prohibition,