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באיזה גיל התחלת ללמוד דף יומי






 

Steinsaltz

and partners cannot effect substitution of other animals for their offering. But if you say that it is not acquired by them, and the animal is the property solely of the deceased father, let them also effect substitution on his behalf, as heirs are able to affect substitution for their deceased parents’ offerings.

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as although the verse states: “If he shall at all change [hamer yamir] animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), the superfluous word hamer serving to include the heir as one who is able to effect substitution, nevertheless the subject’s singular form teaches that only one heir can effect substitution, but two heirs cannot effect substitution.

Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this derivation: If that is so, one should say the same with regard to the redemption of the second tithe, as it is written: “And if a man will redeem [gaol yigal] any of his tithe, he shall add to it the fifth part thereof” (Leviticus 27:31), with the superfluous word gaol serving to include the heir as one who must add the one-fifth. So too, it should be derived from the verb’s singular form that if one heir redeems the tithe, he must add one-fifth of its value, but if two heirs redeem it, they do not need to add one-fifth. In fact, the halakha is that partners must also add one-fifth.

The Gemara answers: Redemption of the tithe is different, as the father had the ability to redeem the tithe even in partnership with another when alive. Therefore, the heirs can do so as well. By contrast, substitution of an offering cannot be effected by partners.

Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: But from this halakha itself, that two heirs cannot effect substitution of an offering, it can be proven that they acquire the offering of the deceased. Granted, if you say it is acquired by them, this is the reason that one heir, in any event, can effect substitution of another animal for the offering. But if you say it is not acquired by them, how can even one heir effect substitution?

But doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one consecrates his own animal to atone for someone else and he then redeems it, he adds one-fifth of its value, as he would for any other offering he owned, but if the one for whom it atones redeems it, he need not add one-fifth, since he is not the owner. Nevertheless, only the one for whom the offering atones can render another animal a substitute for it, as in this respect only he is considered its owner. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement concludes: And if one separates teruma from his own produce to exempt the produce of another from the obligation to have teruma separated from it, the benefit of discretion is his. Only the one who separated the teruma is entitled to determine which priest receives it. Since an heir is able to effect substitution, apparently the offering atones for his transgression. This supports the claim that the heir acquires the offering.

Rav Ashi responds: The offering does not atone for the transgressions of the heirs by its essence, as it was not consecrated for their atonement, and they do not acquire it. Therefore, two heirs of a meal offering can bring it, as explained above. Yet, it does atone for them incidentally [mikkufeya]. Therefore, an heir can effect substitution of another animal for it.

§ With regard to the halakha that offerings slaughtered not for their sake are fit to be sacrificed but do not satisfy the obligations of their owners, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: After these offerings are sacrificed, did they atone for the sins for which they came, or did they not atone for them?

Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: It stands to reason that they did not atone, as, if it enters your mind that they did atone, for what purpose is the second offering brought? Why is the owner required to bring another offering if the first atoned for his sin?

The Gemara challenges this reasoning: Rather, what is the alternative? That they did not atone? If so, for what purpose is the first offering sacrificed?

Rav Ashi said: This is what is difficult for Rav Sheisha, i.e., Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi: Granted, if you say that such an offering did not atone, it is brought even when slaughtered not for its sake on the strength of its prior consecration for its sake. And in that case, for what purpose is the second offering brought? It is brought to atone for the sin. But if you say that offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake atoned for the sin, for what purpose is the second offering brought?

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When one brings a burnt offering, which atones for violations of positive mitzvot, does it atone even for a violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after designating the animal as an offering, or does it not atone for such a violation?

The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that the halakha in this case is just as it is with regard to a sin offering, in that just as a sin offering does atone for a sin that one committed before designation of the animal but does not atone for a sin that one committed after designation, here too, a burnt offering does atone for violations that one committed before designation but does not atone for those committed after designation?

Or, perhaps a burnt offering is not similar to a sin offering, as with regard to a sin offering one must bring one sin offering for each and every sin he commits. But here, since a burnt offering atones even for one who has committed several violations of positive mitzvot, one may claim that it also atones even for the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after designation of the animal.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a baraita: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand on the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4). And does placing hands atone for one’s sins? But isn’t atonement achieved only by the sprinkling of the blood, as it is stated: “For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the life” (Leviticus 17:11)? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And he shall place…and it shall be accepted for him to atone”? This teaches that if one deemed the ritual of placing hands to be a non-essential mitzva and consequently failed to perform it, the verse ascribes to him blame as though the offering did not atone for his sins; and nevertheless, the offering atoned for his sins.

What, does the final clause of the baraita not mean that the offer-ing atoned for the violation of any positive mitzva that the owner committed before designation of the animal, but it did not atone for violation of the positive mitzva of placing hands on the head of the offering, as that constitutes a violation of a positive mitzva after designation of the animal? Apparently, a burnt offering does not atone for the violations committed after the animal’s designation.

Rava said in response: You say that the positive mitzva of placing hands is proof? There it is different, since as long as he does not slaughter the offering, he remains obligated to stand and place his hands on its head. He has not yet violated the mitzva. When does the violation of this positive mitzva occur? It occurs after the slaughter, at which point fulfillment of the mitzva is no longer possible. And with regard to a violation committed after the slaughter, we do not raise the dilemma; clearly a burnt offering does not atone for such a violation.

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Say the baraita means that the offering atoned for the transgression of the person,

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
אדם סלומון
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