Moreover, if a husband wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is the same as your name, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it, the bill of divorce is unfit for the second man to divorce his wife with it. Evidently, even if the bill of divorce was written to be used for divorce, if it was not written specifically for the given woman it is not valid.

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated For the sake of that man’s divorce, and therefore it is not valid for the second man’s divorce. But a bill of divorce that was written without specification might be valid if written for the sake of divorce.

Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he has two wives whose names are identical, and he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older one, and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger one with it. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written specifically to divorce a specific wife.

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated for the sake of the divorce of that other wife.

Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he said to the scribe [lalavlar]: Write a bill of divorce for one of my two wives who have identical names, and I will use it to divorce whichever one of them that I want, this bill of divorce is unfit to divorce either wife with it. Evidently, it must be written for the divorce of a specific woman.

The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as there is no retroactive designation. The designation of the bill of divorce cannot be determined retroactively. It cannot be used for either wife because it was possibly written for the sake of the other wife. But a bill of divorce written without specification may be valid.

Rather, derive it from that mishna (Gittin 26a): With regard to a scribe who writes the standard part of [tofesei] bills of divorce in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will have to add only the details unique to the case, he must leave empty the place of the name of the man, and the place of the name of the woman, and the place of the names of the witnesses, and the place of the date. And in addition, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A scribe must also leave the place of the essential phrase: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, since it must be written for the sake of that specific woman. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written for a specific husband and wife, and if not it is not valid, even if it was written for the sake of divorce.

§ Ravina continued to inform Rav Pappa of Rava’s statements: Rava further raises another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered the animal for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, it is fit? Apparently, only improper intent that is of its type, i.e., for the sake of another offering, ruins the offering and renders it unfit, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type, i.e., for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, is disregarded and does not ruin it.

And Rava raises a contradiction from the aforementioned mishna (Gittin 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman who is being divorced with it is not valid; and by inference, even if it was written for the sake of a gentile woman, it is not valid. With regard to the matter of divorce, a gentile woman is not of the same type as a Jewish woman, as the halakhot of bills of divorce are irrelevant to her.

And Rava resolves the contradiction: If a bill of divorce is written for the sake of a gentile woman it is not valid, because if you remove the intent for the sake of a gentile woman from it, it is considered to be without specification of the woman who is divorced with it, and a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid. But if sacrificial animals are slaughtered for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, they remain fit, since if you remove the non-sacred intent from them, they are considered to be without specification, and offerings slaughtered without specification are fit.

§ And Rava raised another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat it is fit? Apparently, he holds that only improper intent that is of its type ruins it, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to ritually impure carcasses of creeping animals: “And every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls, anything that is in its interior shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33). From the word “interior” it is derived that only food in its interior is rendered impure, but not any food that is in the interior of its interior, i.e., in another vessel within the earthenware vessel. And this is the halakha not only if the inner vessel is an earthenware vessel; even if it is a metal or wooden vessel, which is purified though rinsing in a ritual bath and is therefore susceptible to impurity from its exterior, it nevertheless protects food that is inside it from being rendered impure. Evidently, even a vessel that is not of the same type serves to nullify the status of the interior of an earthenware vessel.

And Rava resolves the contradiction as follows: A vessel purified through rinsing is actually considered of the same type as an earthenware vessel, since they are both vessels. Concerning the halakhot of impurity, the equivalent of intent with regard to the consumption of non-sacred meat is an item that is not a vessel at all; the Sages rendered non-sacred meat with regard to sacrificial animals like a partition with regard to an earthenware oven: Just as a partition in an oven is not effective at all in preventing the transmission of impurity from one side to the other since it is not a vessel, so too, slaughtering an offering for the consumption of non-sacred meat is not effective at all with regard to rendering sacrificial animals unfit.

This is as we learned in a mishna (Kelim 8:1): In the case of an oven that one divided with boards or with curtains, and the carcass of a creeping animal was found in one place, all of the food in the oven, including that on the other side of the partition, is rendered impure.

The mishna continues: In the case of a round barrel that is broken and plugged up with straw and lowered into the airspace of the oven, if the carcass of a creeping animal is inside the barrel, the oven is rendered impure. And if the carcass of a creeping animal is in the oven, the food that is inside the barrel is rendered impure. The broken barrel is not considered a vessel despite its being plugged up with straw, and therefore it does not prevent the transmission of impurity between the creeping animal and the oven. And Rabbi Eliezer deems the food in the barrel pure.

The mishna continues: Rabbi Eliezer said: My opinion can be inferred a fortiori: If a barrel or any other partition between some item and a corpse under the same roof protects the item from becoming impure, even though impurity imparted by a corpse is severe in that it lasts seven days, shouldn’t a partition protect food in the airspace of an earthenware vessel from impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, which is mild by comparison?

The mishna continues: The Rabbis said to him: Your inference is not correct.