We derive the halakha governing the accessories relating to a dead person, e.g., a shroud, from the halakha governing the accessories used in idol worship, e.g., the animal sacrificed to the idol. This is to the exclusion of a heifer whose neck is broken, which is itself consecrated for the ceremony taking place in the valley and is not an accessory used in that ceremony.

The Gemara asks: And Abaye, what is the reason that he did not derive the halakha by way of a verbal analogy from the halakha governing accessories used in idol worship? The Gemara answers: Abaye could have said to you that we learn the halakha governing something that involves a proper way of conduct, i.e., burying the dead, from the halakha governing something that involves a proper way of conduct, i.e., the rite relating to the heifer whose neck is broken, as these are both mitzvot by Torah law. This is to the exclusion of objects of idol worship, which do not involve a proper way of conduct.

§ The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the forthcoming series of attempted proofs concerning the dispute between Rava and Abaye: Scarf; monument; that was hewed; pouch; craftsman.

The Gemara raises an objection against Rava from a baraita discussing ritual impurity that is contracted by treading: If a scarf is ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, e.g., after a zav sat or lay down upon it, and its owner then designated it as a cover for a Torah scroll, it is pure of the more severe level of ritual impurity, that which is imparted by treading, even without immersion, because it is no longer an object intended to be lied on or sat upon. But it is still impure with the less severe ritual impurity, that which is contracted by touching that which is treaded upon. This indicates that mere designation has halakhic significance and validity. The Gemara rejects this argument: Say that the baraita should read as follows: The owner of the scarf designated it as a cover for a Torah scroll and wrapped it around the scroll, so that there was not only designation, but an action as well.

The Gemara asks: If there was an action, why do I need for the baraita to say that the owner designated it and wrapped it? Wouldn’t wrapping alone have sufficed? The Gemara answers: The baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to this cloth that one designated for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it, if he already bundled phylacteries in it, then it is forbidden to bundle coins in it, as it was designated and used as an accessory of a sacred object. But if he merely designated it for that purpose but did not yet bundle phylacteries in it, or if he bundled phylacteries in it but did not previously designate it for bundling phylacteries, then it is permitted to bundle coins in it. Consequently, in the case of the scarf, it was necessary both to designate it as a cover for the Torah scroll and to actually wrap it around the scroll.

And according to Abaye, who said that designation is a significant matter, the halakha is as follows: If he designated the cloth for the purpose of bundling phylacteries in it, even if he did not bundle phylacteries in it, it is prohibited to bundle money in it. In a case where he already bundled phylacteries in it, if he designated the cloth for bundling phylacteries, yes, it is prohibited to bundle money in it; but if he did not designate it for bundling phylacteries, bundling money in the cloth is not prohibited.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof against Rava: With regard to a monument that was built as a memorial for the sake of an individual while he was still alive, one is permitted to derive benefit from it, as it is like any other construction; but if even a single row of stones was added to it for the sake of a corpse, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it, apparently even before the deceased is buried there. This seems to indicate that mere designation is a significant matter. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the corpse was placed under the monument, so that it became forbidden not through mere designation, but by way of an action.

The Gemara asks: If so, why does the baraita specifically mention that a row of stones was added? If the deceased was buried under the monument, one should be prohibited from deriving benefit from it even when a row of stones was not added, as the entire monument has been used for the dead. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary for the baraita to state that a row of stones was added in order to teach us that even if the corpse was later removed from the grave, the monument remains forbidden since it had been designated for a corpse.

Rafram bar Pappa says that Rav Ḥisda says: If the corpse was later removed from the grave and one recognizes the row of stones that had been added to the monument in the dead man’s honor, he may remove that row of stones, and it is permitted to derive benefit from the rest of the construction.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear yet another proof against Rava from a baraita: If one hewed a grave for his deceased father in one place, and then went and buried him in a different place, the son may never be buried in the grave that he had dug. This indicates that mere designation is a significant matter. The Gemara answers: There, the son may not be buried in the grave that he had dug because that would detract from the honor that he must show his father, not because the designation is significant with regard to the status of a grave in general.

The Gemara comments: So, too, it is reasonable that the son may not be buried in the grave that he had dug only because of the honor due to his father, as the latter clause of the same baraita teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if one hewed stones for his father’s grave and then went and buried him in a different place, the son himself may never be buried in a tomb constructed from those stones.

The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the son may not be buried in the grave that he dug for his father because of the honor that must be shown his father, it is well understood why he can also not be buried in tomb constructed from stones that he hewed for his father’s grave. But if you say that it is because of designation, the son should be permitted to be buried in such a tomb, as is there anyone who says that spinning yarn in order to weave it into cloth for shrouds is regarded as designating an item for a dead person, resulting in a prohibition against deriving benefit from the yarn? In such a case there is certainly no prohibition, and the case of hewing stones for a tomb is analogous to a case of spinning yarn in order to weave it into cloth.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof in support of Rava from a baraita: With regard to a fresh grave that was not designated for a particular individual, one is permitted to derive benefit from it. But if even a non-viable newborn that died was cast into it, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave. It may be inferred from here that if a non-viable newborn was cast into the grave, yes, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, but if it was not cast into the grave, one is not prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, indicating that mere designation is insignificant.

The Gemara rejects this inference: The same is true even if a non-viable newborn was not cast into the grave; one is still prohibited from deriving benefit from the grave, merely by virtue of the designation. Why, then, does the baraita say that a non-viable newborn was cast into the grave? This serves to exclude the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says: A non-viable newborn does not take possession of its grave to render it forbidden even once it is buried there. To counter this opinion, the baraita teaches us that this opinion is not accepted, and a non-viable newborn is treated like any other corpse.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof in support of Rava’s opinion from a mishna (Shekalim 2:5): The money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. The money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. Evidently, money that had been designated for the sake of a dead person but was not actually used for burying him does not become forbidden, and his heirs may use it. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with money that had been collected for the deceased during his lifetime. It was thought that a certain individual was soon to die, and money was collected to cover the costs of his burial. Since at the time the money was collected the person was alive, the money had not been designated for the sake of a dead person. Therefore, one is permitted to derive benefit from it, and it is given to the heirs of the deceased.

The Gemara raises an objection: But we were not taught this, as we learned in the mishna: The money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. The money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. And it is taught with regard to this mishna in a baraita: How so? If they collected money for the purpose of burying the dead without specification, this is the case about which they said that the money left over from the money that was collected for burying the dead must be allocated to the burial of other dead people. But if they collected money for the sake of this particular dead person, this is the case about which they said that the money left over from the money that was collected for burying a particular dead person is given to his heirs. This indicates that the mishna is discussing a case where the money was designated for a one who had already died.

The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of that same mishna, which appears to support the opinion of Abaye: Rabbi Meir says: If money was left over from the sum collected for the burial of a particular dead person, the money may not be touched until Elijah comes and resolves the uncertainty as to whether or not the money is forbidden. Rabbi Natan says: The leftover money shall be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier as he is brought for burial. This indicates that there are certain tanna’im who maintain that mere designation is in fact significant.

Rather, Abaye can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning, and Rava, too, can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning. The Gemara explains: Abaye can explain the entire mishna according to his line of reasoning, as follows: According to everyone, i.e., the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan, mere designation is a significant matter. The first tanna holds that the sum that it is fitting to spend for the burial of the particular dead person is encompassed by the prohibition, and the sum that it is not fitting to spend is not encompassed by the prohibition. Therefore, whatever money is not required for his burial is given to his heirs, as it was never included in the prohibition.

And Rabbi Meir is uncertain as to whether the sum that it is not fitting to spend for his burial is encompassed by the prohibition or is not encompassed by the prohibition. Therefore, the leftover money may not be touched until Elijah comes and clarifies the matter. And it is obvious to Rabbi Natan that all of the money collected is certainly encompassed by the prohibition, including the money that it is not fitting to spend for the deceased’s burial. Therefore, whatever money is left over should be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier.

And Rava, too, can explain the mishna according to his line of reasoning, as follows: According to everyone, i.e., the first tanna, Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Natan, mere designation is nothing, and so the money collected for the burial of a particular dead person does not become forbidden. And the disagreement is about an entirely different manner. The first tanna holds that even though the heirs of the deceased disgraced him by collecting money for his burial, the deceased still forgoes his disgrace for the benefit of his heirs, and therefore the leftover money is given to them.

And Rabbi Meir is uncertain as to whether the deceased forgoes his disgrace or does not forgo it. Therefore, the leftover money may not be touched until Elijah comes and clarifies the issue. And it is obvious to Rabbi Natan that the deceased does not forgo his disgrace. Therefore, whatever money is left over should be used for the laying of another row of stones over the grave of the deceased, or for the sprinkling of fragrant wine before his bier.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof in support of Rava’s opinion from a baraita: If the father and the mother of the deceased were throwing garments onto their late son’s bier so that they would be buried along with him, it is a mitzva for the others present to save those garments from being lost. This indicates that mere designation is insignificant, as were it significant, one would be prohibited to derive benefit from the garments as soon as the parents cast them onto the bier.