The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? As the verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.” One can infer: That he die is the matter concerning which he does not testify, but he does testify to acquit. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the Rabbis? Reish Lakish says: A witness cannot offer any statements beyond his testimony because it appears as though he is biased in his testimony. If the court finds the accused liable based on the witness’s testimony, the witness could later be accused of being a conspiring witness. Therefore, it is to his advantage to have the court acquit the accused.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, in what manner do they interpret this term: “That he die”? The Gemara answers: They establish it as teaching the halakha with regard to one of the students. As it is taught in a baraita: If one of the witnesses said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: “One witness shall not testify.” From where is it derived that if there is one of the students who said: I have the ability to teach a reason to deem him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not listen to him? The verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die.”

§ The mishna teaches: In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to deem the accused liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit him may not return and teach a reason to deem him liable. Rav says: They taught this halakha only with regard to the time of the deliberations of the court, but at the time of the verdict, one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable.

The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (40a): The following day, i.e., the day after the initial deliberations, the judges would arise early and come to court. One who yesterday was of the opinion to acquit says: I said to acquit, and I acquit in my place, i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. And one who yesterday was of the opinion to deem him liable says: I said to deem him liable, and I deem him liable in my place. One who yesterday taught a reason to deem him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who yesterday taught a reason to acquit may not then teach a reason to deem him liable.

The Gemara explains the objection: But the following day is at the time of the verdict, and the mishna rules that a judge who had said to acquit may not change his opinion. The Gemara questions this reading of the mishna: And according to your reasoning, are there no deliberations on the following day? The deliberations may resume on the next day. Therefore, one can say that when the mishna teaches that the judge may not change his opinion, it is with regard to the time of the deliberations.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of that mishna, which teaches that if the number of judges who deem him liable is one more than the number of judges who acquit, they continue to deliberate the matter, these judges against those judges, until one of those who deems him liable sees the validity of the statements of those who acquit and changes his position, as the court does not condemn someone to death by a majority of one judge. The Gemara states its proof: And if it is so that one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may return and teach a reason to deem him liable, let the mishna also teach the opposite possibility. The Gemara explains: The tanna is searching for scenarios of acquittal, he is not searching for scenarios of liability. It may be that the halakha is the same in the opposite case, but the tanna prefers to employ an example of acquittal.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: As Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In a case where there was one of the students who argued to acquit and then died, the court views him as if he were alive and standing in his place and voting to acquit. The Gemara asks: But why? According to the opinion of Rav, that a judge may change his opinion at the time of the verdict, let us say: Perhaps if that student were alive, he would retract his opinion and find the accused liable. The Gemara explains: Now, in any event, he did not retract from his opinion. The assumption is that he would not have changed his opinion, although one can do so.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But the Sages sent a statement from there, Eretz Yisrael: According to this version of the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, he engages in a dispute with our teacher, i.e., Rav. Apparently, the previous explanation, which reconciles their opinions, is incorrect. The Gemara answers: That tradition was not accurate, and it was stated that he does not engage in a dispute with Rav.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: After the initial deliberations, two judges’ scribes stand before the court, one on the right, and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who acquit the accused and the statements of those who find him liable.

The Gemara explains the proof: Granted, they write the statements of those who find the accused liable even though they may not change their opinions, as on the following day they may see another reason to find the accused liable, not the reason they gave the day before. And once this new reason is given, the court is required to perform a suspension of the trial until the following day, as they may not issue a verdict in cases of capital law on the same day as the deliberations. But what is the reason the scribes write the statements of those who acquit the accused? Is it not because the halakha is that if the judges would see another reason to find the accused liable, we do not pay heed to them, and in order to ensure that the judges do not change their opinions, the scribes write their statements?

The Gemara answers: No, the reason they write their statements is so that two of the judges should not say one explanation to acquit from two different verses. If two judges each say the same reason to acquit, but derive their reason from different verses, they are not counted as two votes. As Rabbi Asi asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If two of the judges say one explanation to acquit from two different verses, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: We count them only as one, as it is clear that one of the derivations is in error.

§ The Gemara discusses the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is this matter derived? Abaye says: As the verse states: “God has spoken once, twice I have heard this; that strength belongs to God” (Psalms 62:12). Abaye explains: One verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations, but one explanation does not emerge from several verses. Alternatively, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “Is not My word like as fire? says the Lord; and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, one verse is stated by God and from it emerge several explanations.

The Gemara clarifies: What is considered one explanation from two different verses? Rav Zevid says: As we learned in a mishna (Zevaḥim 83a): With regard to certain items that are disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, once they have been placed on the altar they are nevertheless sacrificed, but the altar sanctifies only items that are suited for it, as the Gemara will explain. The tanna’im disagree as to what is considered suited for the altar.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt-offerings and the portions of other offerings burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt-offering that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: “It is the burnt-offering on the pyre upon the altar,” from which it is derived: Just as a burnt-offering that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend, so too any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended, it shall not descend.

Rav Zevid explains: And what do the two of them include by means of these explanations? Disqualified offerings, teaching that if they ascend they do not descend. One Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, brings proof for this halakha from the term “on the pyre,” and one Sage, Rabban Gamliel, brings proof to this halakha from the term “upon the altar.” This is an example of one explanation from two different verses.

The Gemara questions this example: But there, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel disagree, and their explanations cannot therefore be identical. As the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and libations, which are not consumed by the fire, but do ascend onto the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend on the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.

Rather, Rav Pappa says: An example of one explanation from two different verses is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From the fact that it is stated: