a mortar [udaini], which people pay to use, the rent goes to the middle? But isn’t the profit accruing from a mortar considered profit accruing on his, i.e., the adult son’s, own account, as the adult son must supervise its operation, and there is no outlay from the property? The Gemara dismisses this objection: A mortar is different, as for its typical use it can suffice with supervision, and even minors are able to supervise its use. Since the adults do not contribute anything more than the minors, they cannot demand a greater share of the profits.

§ The mishna teaches: If the adult sons said from the outset: See that which our father left behind; we are going to engage in business with our share of the property and profit from it, then they enhanced the property for themselves. The Gemara relates: Rav Safra’s father left him dinars. Rav Safra took them and entered into a business venture with them. His brothers came and charged him in a court of law before Rava, claiming their share of the profits. Rava said to them: Rav Safra is a great man; he does not abandon his studies and toil for others. It is therefore clear that if he invested the money, it was for his own profit, even if he did not explicitly declare so at the outset.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to a wife who enhanced the property of her deceased husband, she enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle. The Gemara asks: What is the deceased’s wife doing with the orphans’ property? What rights does she have to the property? Rav Yirmeya said: The mishna is referring to a wife who is an heiress, e.g., if she were the daughter of her husband’s brother, and both brothers died without leaving sons, in which case she inherits in her father’s stead.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that the halakha in this case is the same as with regard to any other heir? The Gemara replies: It is necessary to state this, lest you say that since it is not a woman’s way to toil to enhance property, then even though she did not expressly state that she is toiling for herself, it is considered as though she had expressly stated this. The mishna teaches us that only if she expressly stated this do the profits accrue to her.

The mishna teaches: And if she said: See that which my husband left me; I am going to engage in business with my share and profit from it, then she enhanced the property for herself. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this, lest you say that since it is praiseworthy for her to enhance the property on behalf of the orphans, as people will say: See how she toils for the orphans, she relinquishes her right to the profits and they should divide them equally. The mishna teaches us that this is not the case.

Rabbi Ḥanina says: In the case of one who marries a woman to his eldest son and arranges the wedding feast in a house that he designated for the purpose of the wedding canopy and the wedding feast, the son acquires the house as a gift. The Gemara notes: And this is the halakha specifically in the case of the eldest son, and specifically if he is marrying a virgin, and specifically when this woman is his first wife, and specifically when the father married him off first among his sons. When all these conditions exist, it is presumed that the father has a particular fondness toward the son, due to which he gave him the house.

The Gemara clarifies the details of this halakha: It is obvious that if his father designated a house for the son’s nuptials and there is an upper story above the house, the son acquired the house, but he did not acquire the upper story. If he designated a house for the son, and there is a portico [ve’akhsadra] in front of the house, what is the halakha? If there were two houses, one within the other, and the inner one was designated for the son’s nuptials, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: These questions shall stand unresolved.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If his father designated a house and furniture for his son’s nuptials, the son acquired the furniture, but he did not acquire the house. Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is referring to a case where his father’s storeroom was placed there. It is clear that just as his father did not intend to give him the storeroom, neither did he intend to give him the house. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if there is only a dovecote in the house that belongs to the father, the son does not acquire the house. Rav Yehuda and Rav Pappi say: Even if there is only a pot [atzitza] of small fried fish, the son does not acquire the house. Mar Zutra married off his son, and hung a sandal in the house, to indicate that he did not intend to give the house as a gift. Rav Ashi married off his son, and hung a jug [ashisha] of oil in the house.

Mar Zutra says: These three matters were instituted by the Sages as a halakha without any explanation of their process, i.e., they instituted these enactments despite the fact that the mechanism by which they function is unclear: One is this halakha with regard to the son acquiring the house designated for his nuptials. Another is that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who writes a deed granting all of his property to his wife renders her only a steward of his property, i.e., he intends only to put her in charge of the property and she does not acquire it. Another is that which Rav says: With regard to one who says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession; give it to so-and-so, if this occurred in the presence of all three parties, that third person acquires it, without need of witnesses or a formal act of acquisition.