With regard to an unconditional guarantor [kablan], from whom the creditor can collect even if the debtor is able to repay the loan, some say that he can testify on behalf of the debtor if the latter owns other land, and some say that he cannot testify even if the debtor owns other land. The Gemara explains: Some say that he can testify because he is like a guarantor, and some say that he cannot testify, as it is preferable for him that both fields be in the debtor’s possession, so that when a creditor comes to collect the debt, he will take what he wants, and not collect from the unconditional guarantor.

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A craftsman does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, but the son of a craftsman has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. A sharecropper does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, but the son of a sharecropper has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. Both a robber and the son of a robber do not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, but the son of the son of a robber has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances under which there is a distinction between the sons of the craftsman and the sharecropper and the son of the robber? If they come to court with the claim that the item in question belonged to their fathers, then even these sons of the craftsman and the sharecropper should not be able to establish the presumption of ownership, since their claims are based on ownership by those who cannot establish the presumption of ownership. If the case is that they do not come to court with the claim that the item in question belonged to their fathers, but that they own the item in their own right, then even the son of a robber should be able to establish the presumption of ownership.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this distinction in a case where the witnesses say: The prior owner admitted to their father in our presence that the property was the father’s and not stolen. The Gemara explains: With regard to these, the sons of the craftsman and sharecropper, it can be said that the sons are saying the truth, as their claim is substantiated by the testimony of the admission. But with regard to that one, the son of the robber, even though the prior owner admitted this, the son is still not deemed credible, in accordance with the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana said: If the prior owner would not have admitted this to the robber, the robber would have brought him and his donkey to the taskmaster [leshaḥvar], meaning he would have caused him great difficulties. As a robber is assumed to be a ruffian, it is likely that the prior owner admitted this because he was intimidated, and not because the statement was true, so there is no evidence to support the claim of the robber’s son.

Rava says: There are times when even the son of the son of the robber does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. What are the circumstances under which this is so? This is so, for example, in a case where he comes to court with the claim that the item in question belonged to his father’s father. Since his claim is based on its having belonged to one who did not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership, he too is unable to establish the presumption of ownership.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances under which one is considered a robber, who does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case such as where it is established that he is in possession of this field through robbery. And Rav Ḥisda says: Not only in a case where there is knowledge about this specific field, but even in a case such as one where he is a member of the household of so-and-so, a certain known criminal family at the time who kill people over monetary matters. Since people would be afraid to lodge a protest against them, members of this family cannot establish the presumption of ownership with regard to any land.

§ The Sages taught: A craftsman does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. If he descended from his position of craftsmanship and no longer works at that craft, then he has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to items related to his former craft. A sharecropper does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership. If he descended from his position as a sharecropper, then he has the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to land that he works and from which he profits for three years. A son does not have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership with regard to his father’s property, nor a wife with regard to her husband’s property. But with regard to a son who separated himself from his father’s finances, and a woman who became divorced, they are like other people with regard to this property, and have the ability to establish the presumption of ownership.

The Gemara asks: Granted, it was necessary to state that a son who separated himself establishes the presumption of ownership. If the baraita had not stated this, it would enter your mind to say that the father forgave the unauthorized use of his land by his son, and did not lodge a protest despite the fact that the land did not belong to the son. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not so, and that the son does establish the presumption of ownership. But in the case of the woman who became divorced, it is obvious that she has no relationship with her ex-husband, so why is it necessary for the baraita to teach that she is able to establish the presumption of ownership? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that she does not establish the presumption of ownership