Rabbi Shimon says: Even though the Sages said that when one party takes possession of a garment, the other party acquires a gold dinar, but when one party takes possession of a gold dinar, the other party does not acquire a garment, in any case, that is what the halakha would be. But the Sages said with regard to one who reneges on a transaction where one party pulled the gold dinar into his possession: He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the people of the generation of the dispersion, and from the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians in the Red Sea, will in the future exact payment from whoever does not stand by his statement.

The baraita concludes: And one who negotiates, where the negotiation culminates with a statement committing himself to acquire the item, did not acquire the item without a formal act of acquisition. But with regard to one who reneges on his commitment, the Sages are displeased with him.

And Rava says: With regard to one who reneges on his commitment, we have only the statement that the Sages are displeased with him, but not that he is subject to a curse. The Gemara explains: If there is a statement of commitment and there is the payment of money accompanying it, he stands subject to the curse: But the Sages said: He Who exacted payment. If there is a statement of commitment and there is no payment of money accompanying it, he does not stand subject to the curse: But the Sages said: He Who exacted payment.

§ Rava says: A verse and a baraita support the opinion of Reish Lakish that money does not effect acquisition of movable property by Torah law. A verse, as it is written: “And deal falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or oppressed his colleague” (Leviticus 5:21). The verse is referring to cases similar to a deposit where there is denial of an item and not merely a debt. With regard to the term “pledge,” Rav Ḥisda says: This is referring to a case where the debtor designated a vessel as collateral for his loan and then denies his debt. With regard to the term “oppressed,” Rav Ḥisda says: This is referring to a case where the employer designated a vessel for him to guarantee payment of his wages and withheld payment, resulting in his oppression.

And when the verse repeats three of these cases after stating that each individual admitted that he lied and is liable to return the item that he misappropriated, it is written: “And then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took by robbery, or the thing that he has gotten by oppression, or the deposit that was deposited with him” (Leviticus 5:23), while the verse does not repeat the term “pledge.” What is the reason that the verse omits that case? Is it not because it lacks pulling by the lender? Since the lender did not pull the item designated as collateral for the loan, he did not acquire the item and is not liable to bring an offering for taking a false oath if he fails to pay, as he denied owing an abstract debt, not an actual item. Apparently, there is no full-fledged acquisition without pulling the item into one’s possession.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Say that it suffices that the verse repeated the case of oppression. In that case, there is also no denial of an actual item, merely of an obligation to pay one’s worker. The halakha would be the same in the case of a pledge, i.e., of a loan where the lender designated an item although there was no pulling. The Gemara rejects that contention: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the workers took the item for their payment from the employer, and then deposited that item with him, and the employer than denied having received that deposit. Accordingly, he is denying owing an actual item, not an abstract debt.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: That is precisely the case of a deposit that is already mentioned in the verse. What novel element is introduced by this case? The Gemara explains: There are two types of deposit: A standard deposit and the case where one deposits with a bailee an item that had previously belonged to the bailee.

The Gemara asks: If so, and that is the explanation of the verse, let the verse repeat the case of a pledge as well, and interpret it in a case where the lender took the item from him by pulling it into his possession, and then deposited that item with the debtor. The Gemara responds: If the verse had repeated the case of a pledge it would be neither a refutation of nor a support for the opinion of Reish Lakish, as the cases could be explained otherwise. Now that the verse does not repeat the case of a pledge, it supports his opinion that one acquires movable property only by means of pulling it into his possession.

The Gemara asks: And does the verse not repeat the case of a pledge? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said: From where is it derived to apply that which is stated above, in the first verse cited from Leviticus, to the verse stated below, i.e., the second verse cited from Leviticus? It is derived as it is written: “Or anything about which he has taken a false oath” (Leviticus 5:24). And Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: This clause serves to include the case of a pledge in the requirement of return, teaching that even in the case where the debtor designated an item as collateral for a loan, the lender is obligated to return the item although there was no pulling. The Gemara rejects that contention: In any event, the verse did not repeat the case of a pledge explicitly, and one derives support for the opinion of Reish Lakish from that omission.

From where do we derive support for the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita? It is as it is taught in a baraita: If one had consecrated money and gave it to a bathhouse attendant [leballan] as payment for use of the bath, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property as soon as he pays him, even before he uses the bathhouse. And Rav says: One can infer that it is specifically with regard to one giving the consecrated money to a bathhouse attendant that he is liable immediately, as in that case there is no lack of pulling, since he is paying for usage of the bathhouse, not for an item. But one can infer that in cases involving other matters, where the one giving the consecrated money is acquiring an item and there is a lack of pulling, he is liable for misuse only once he pulls the item he is purchasing. Apparently, by Torah law, it is only by means of pulling an item into his possession, not through payment of money, that one acquires an item.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one had consecrated money and gave it to a barber, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property immediately, as soon as he gives him the money, and in the case of a barber, doesn’t he need to pull the haircut utensils in order for their transaction to be finalized? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a gentile barber, who is not subject to the requirement of pulling, which applies only to Jews, as it is written: “And if you sell to your colleague something that is sold.” Everyone agrees that a transaction with gentiles is finalized with the payment of money.

The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita: If one had consecrated money and gave it to a barber, or to a sailor, or to any craftsmen, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property only once he pulls the item belonging to the worker. The Gemara asks: These two baraitot are difficult, as they contradict each other. The first baraita states that if one had consecrated money and he gave it to a barber, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property as soon as he gives the money. The second baraita states that he is liable for misuse of consecrated property only once he pulls the item. Rather, must one not conclude from it that here, the halakha in the first baraita is with regard to one who gives consecrated money to a gentile barber, who is liable when he gives the money to the barber, and there, the halakha in the second baraita is with regard to one who gives consecrated money to a Jewish barber, who is liable only once he pulls the item? The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

The Gemara comments: And so says Rav Naḥman, in agreement with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: By Torah law, the giving of money effects acquisition of movable property. The Gemara adds: And Levi examined his compendium of baraitot, and he discovered this baraita: If one had a consecrated ma’a and he gave it to a wholesaler [siton] as the first payment for a large quantity of produce, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property. This baraita describes a situation where the buyer did not pull the produce, yet he is liable for misuse. Apparently, by Torah law the giving of money effects acquisition.