and later on the debtor said: I repaid him, his claim is deemed credible. He must take an oath and is exempt from payment. Therefore, if the creditor comes and asks the court to write an authorization for him to appropriate the property of the debtor, they do not write an authorization and give the document to him.

By contrast, if the court merely said: You are liable to give him what you owe him, but did not complete the process by saying: Go and give it to him, and later on the debtor said: I repaid the debt, his claim is not deemed credible. The assumption is that since he did not pay on his own without the need for litigation, he does not intend to pay until the court finalizes its verdict against him. Therefore, since the debtor is suspected of lying, the creditor takes an oath and collects what he is owed. In this case, if the creditor comes and asks the court to write an authorization for him to appropriate the property of the debtor, they write the document and give it to him.

Rav Zevid says in the name of Rabbi Naḥman: Both in the case where the court said: Go and give him what you owe him, and in the case where the court said: You are liable to give him, if the debtor subsequently said: I repaid the debt, his claim is deemed credible. Therefore, if the creditor comes and asks the court to write an authorization, they do not write the document and give it to him.

Rather, if there is room to make a distinction between different cases, this is how there is room to distinguish between them: If the court said to the debtor: Go and give him what you owe him, and subsequently the debtor said: I repaid the debt, and the witnesses testify concerning him that he did not repay it when the debt was demanded in their presence, and later the debtor said again: I repaid the debt, in such a case, the debtor has assumed the presumptive status of one who denies his debts with regard to that money, and he is no longer believed when he claims that he repaid the debt unless witnesses substantiate his claim.

By contrast, if the court said: You are liable to give him what you owe him, and subsequently the debtor said: I repaid the debt, and the witnesses testify concerning him that he did not repay the debt when it was demanded in their presence, and later the debtor said again: I repaid, in this case, the debtor does not assume the presumptive status of one who denies his debts with regard to that money. His claim that he repaid the debt in the absence of witnesses is accepted after he takes an oath to that effect.

What is the reason that he is not presumed to be lying? It is because before the court verdict was finalized, the debtor was merely trying to evade the creditor, thinking to himself: Since the court has not yet finalized the verdict, I can delay payment until the Sages in the court investigate my case further, as I am not actually liable to pay until the verdict is finalized.

Rabba bar bar Ḥanna says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession that you borrowed from me, and the other says in response: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and the witnesses testify concerning him that, in fact, he does have such a debt, and subsequently the debtor said: I repaid the debt, in that case the debtor assumes the presumptive status of one who denies his debts with regard to that money.

It is like the ruling in this case, where Shabbtai, son of Rabbi Marinus, wrote a pledge to give his daughter-in-law a cloak [itztela] of fine wool [demileta] in her marriage contract, and he accepted upon himself the status of a guarantor for the contract. Her marriage contract was lost, and there was a disagreement between the parties as to its content. Shabbtai said to her: These matters never occurred; I never wrote that I would give you such a cloak. Witnesses then came and said: Yes, he did write her this pledge. Ultimately, he said to them: I paid it, i.e., I gave her the cloak. This case came before Rabbi Ḥiyya. He said to Shabbtai: You have assumed the presumptive status of one who denies his debts with regard to that cloak. His claim was therefore not accepted, even by means of an oath.

Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ela says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one was obligated to take an oath to counter another person’s claim brought against him, and later he said: I took the oath, and the witnesses testify against him that he did not take an oath when it was demanded of him in their presence, and the defendant subsequently said again: I took the oath, he assumes the status of one who denies his obligations with regard to that oath.

The Rabbis stated this ruling before Rabbi Abbahu. He said to them: Rabbi Avin’s statement is reasonable in a case where one was obligated by a court to take an oath. But if one voluntarily obligated himself to take an oath, and he later claims that he took the oath, he is deemed credible. This is because a person is prone to say incidentally that he will take an oath and then change his mind; this does not render him a liar. The Rabbis then brought Rabbi Abbahu’s analysis back to Rabbi Avin and presented it before him. Rabbi Avin said to them: I also said this halakha specifically with regard to one who was obligated by a court to take an oath, as Rabbi Abbahu explained.

It was also stated that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ela says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one was obligated by a court to take an oath to counter the claim of another person, and he subsequently said: I took the oath, and the witnesses testify against him that he did not take an oath when it was demanded of him in their presence, and later the defendant said again: I took the oath, he has assumed that status of one who denies his obligations with regard to that oath. This wording is explicitly in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation.

§ Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who finds a promissory note in the marketplace, and a ratification is written in it, and the date of the loan is written in it, and evidently it was written on that same day, he must return it to the owner, i.e., the creditor.

The Gemara explains why there is no concern that perhaps the debtor does not owe the money: If one were to be concerned because perhaps the debtor wrote the promissory note intending to borrow money, but he ultimately did not borrow it, this is not a concern, as a ratification is written in the promissory note. Since only the creditor would have brought the note for ratification, it is clear that the loan occurred. And if one were to be concerned because perhaps there was repayment, this is not a concern, as we are not concerned that there was repayment on the same day that the loan was taken, since normally one would not take a loan for less than one day.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Does Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Isn’t it you who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one who borrowed money and wrote a promissory note for the loan, and subsequently repaid the debt, may not reuse it to borrow another time, as its lien is already forgiven by virtue of the repayment? A promissory note is valid only for the debt for which it was written.

Rabbi Zeira explains: When did the debtor take the second loan? If we say that it was the day after the first loan, when the promissory note was written, or another later date, then Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is difficult. Why does he specifically give as the reason for the promissory note’s disqualification: As its lien is already forgiven? Instead, he should derive the disqualification of the promissory note from the fact that it is antedated, i.e., dated prior to the actual loan, and we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are invalid. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan could not have been referring to a case where the second loan took place after the date of the first loan.

Rather, is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement not referring to a case where the second loan took place on the same day as the first loan? Evidently, people do occasionally repay their loans on the same day as they take the loan.

Rabbi Asi said to him: Did I say that people do not repay their loans on the same day at all? Rather, I said that it is uncommon for people to repay their loans on the same day. Therefore, if a note is found on the same day it was written, it is reasonable to assume that it has not yet been repaid, even though there is a remote possibility that it has.

Rav Kahana says an alternative explanation: Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to a case when the liable party, i.e., the debtor, admits to the debt. The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating that the note may be returned? This is obvious.

The Gemara answers: Lest you say that even if this debtor admits to the debt, perhaps he actually repaid it, and the fact that the debtor says: I did not repay it, is because he wants to go back and use the promissory note to borrow money again. And the reason he prefers to claim that he did not repay the first debt is that he is concerned about saving the scribe’s fee that he would have to pay for another promissory note. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that this possibility need not be taken into account, as, if that were so, the creditor himself would not allow such a scheme. He would be afraid to act in such a manner, thinking: The Sages will hear about me that I reused the note, and will cause me to lose the payment owed to me.

The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (12b): With regard to one who found promissory notes, if they include a property guarantee for a loan, he may not return them to the creditor.

And we interpreted this mishna as referring to a case when the liable party admits to the debt. And the reason the promissory notes may not be returned is due to the concern that perhaps the debtor wrote the note in order to borrow the money in Nisan, but he ultimately did not borrow it until Tishrei, and the creditor will come to unlawfully repossess land from purchasers who bought the debtor’s land between Nisan and Tishrei. He is entitled to collect land only from those who bought land from the debtor after the loan took place, causing the lien on the debtor’s land to take effect.

The Gemara points out the contradiction between this mishna and Rabbi Kahana’s explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: And this indicates that we do not say that if that were so, if the promissory note were antedated, the creditor himself would not allow the debtor to use it, as he would say to him: Write another note dated properly in Tishrei, lest the Sages hear about the fact that the date is incorrect and disqualify the promissory note, causing me to lose the money.

The Gemara answers: The Sages say that there, in the case of the mishna, since the creditor benefits by using this promissory note, as he can repossess land from purchasers who bought from the debtor between Nisan and Tishrei, it is satisfactory to him, and he does not say anything to the debtor about using this promissory note. By contrast, here, in the case to which Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring, since the creditor does not benefit from reusing the promissory note, as ultimately, the note is written for the current date, what is there for him to repossess from purchasers by means of the note that he cannot repossess by means of a new promissory note? Therefore, he would not allow the debtor to borrow more money from him with a promissory note whose lien was forgiven, as this would result only in risk and have no potential benefit.

§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who claims to have repaid a debt that has already been established by a court enactment, i.e., a rabbinic ordinance obligating one to pay a debt, e.g., the main sum in a marriage contract, but he has no witnesses,