But if the defendant is in the city, the court does not ostracize him for failing to respond to a summons conveyed through a woman or a neighbor, as we say: Perhaps they did not tell him of the court’s summons, as they said to themselves: Since the defendant is in the city, a court agent has already found him and told him. As a result, these unofficial messengers will not deliver the court’s summons to the defendant at all.

And similarly, we said that the court will ostracize one who does not respond to a summons conveyed through a woman or a neighbor only in a case where he does not pass by the court’s entrance on his way home, but if he does pass by the court’s entrance, the court does not ostracize him. This is because it is possible that the unofficial messengers will say to themselves: Since he passes by the courthouse, the court has already found him and told him.

And furthermore, we said that the court will ostracize one who does not respond to a summons only in a case where he comes home on the same day that the woman or neighbor is sent to deliver the court summons. But if he does not come home on the same day, he is not ostracized, because it is possible to say that they forgot to notify him.

Rava said: With regard to one who had a document of ostracism written about him due to the fact that he did not come to court, we do not tear up the document for him until he actually comes to court, and it is not enough for him to simply commit to appearing. Similarly, if the document of ostracism was written due to the fact that he did not obey the ruling of the court, we do not tear it up for him until he actually obeys the ruling. The Gemara comments: This second statement is not so. Rather, once he has acquiesced and said: I will obey, we immediately tear up the document for him.

Rav Ḥisda said: The court sets a date for an individual to appear in court on the upcoming Monday. And if he does not appear, they set a date for that Thursday, and if he does not appear, they set a date for the following Monday, so that he has a second date and then a third date after the first date. And if he does not appear in court by the third date, then on the next day we write a document of ostracism.

The Gemara relates that Rav Asi happened to come to the house of Rav Kahana. He saw that there was a certain woman whom Rav Kahana had summoned to appear in court in the evening, but she did not appear, and in the morning Rav Kahana wrote a document of ostracism concerning her. Rav Asi said to him: Does the Master not hold in accordance with that which Rav Ḥisda says, that the court sets a date for the coming Monday, and then Thursday, and then the following Monday before it issues a document of ostracism?

Rav Kahana said to him: That matter applies only with regard to a man, as he is a victim of circumstance and is not always in the city due to his vocational activities. But in the case of a woman, since she is always in the city, when she does not come to court the first time she is immediately considered rebellious, and the court may issue a document of ostracism right away.

Continuing the discussion of court dates, Rav Yehuda says: The court does not set a date for legal proceedings during the days of Nisan, nor during the days of Tishrei, and also not on the eve of a Festival nor the eve of Shabbat because these are busy times. But during Nisan we may set a court date to take place after Nisan, and likewise, during Tishrei we may set a court date to take place after Tishrei. By contrast, on the eve of Shabbat we do not set a court date to take place after the eve of Shabbat. What is the reason for this? It is because one is preoccupied with his work in preparation for Shabbat and it is possible that he will forget about the court summons.

Rav Naḥman says: We do not set a court date for participants in the kalla, the gatherings for Torah study during Elul and Adar, during the months of the kalla, nor for participants in the public discourses prior to the Festival during the period leading up to the Festival. The Gemara relates: When people would come before Rav Naḥman during the kalla period in order to make legal claims against others, he would say to them: Did I gather you here for your own needs? No, I gathered you to participate in Torah study. The Gemara adds: But now that there are scoundrels, who do not come to study Torah but rather to avoid trial, we are concerned that they will continue to evade prosecution, and therefore we summon them to court even during these time periods.

§ The mishna teaches, with regard to one who left a stolen item to his children, if the item was something that may serve as a legal guarantee of a loan, the heirs are obligated to pay the owner. The Gemara states that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would teach this mishna to Rabbi Shimon, his son, and explain that it does not refer only to something that can actually serve as a guarantee for a loan, i.e., land. Rather, it refers even to a cow that he plows with, or a donkey that he drives by directing it from behind, which the heirs are obligated to return because of the honor of their father, so that people will not continually point out that the inheritance was stolen and thereby disgrace their deceased parent.

Rav Kahana raises a dilemma before Rav: If the robber left his heirs a stolen item that is used in relative privacy, such as a bed that he lies on or a table upon which he eats, rather than something as conspicuous as a large animal, what is the halakha? Are the heirs obligated to return it to its owner? Rav said to him: “Give to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser” (Proverbs 9:9), meaning that from the fact that the heirs must return a cow and a donkey, one can infer that they must also return a bed and a table.

MISHNA: One may not exchange larger coins for smaller ones from the trunk of customs collectors nor from the purse of tax collectors, and one may not take charity from them, as they are assumed to have obtained their funds illegally. But one may take money from the collector’s house or from money he has with him in the market that he did not take from his collection trunk or purse.

GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition against exchanging money from the trunk of a customs collector: But one may give the customs collector a dinar as payment for a debt that amounts to less than a dinar, and when the collector gives him change, he may accept it.

It was taught in the mishna that one may not exchange money from the trunks of customs collectors, which are assumed to include stolen funds. The Gemara questions this ruling: But doesn’t Shmuel say that the law of the kingdom is the law, i.e., halakha requires Jews to obey the laws of the state in which they live. Accordingly, the customs are collected legally and it should be permitted to make use of the funds.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The mishna is discussing a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed by the governor on the amount he may collect, and he collects as he pleases. Alternatively, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The mishna is discussing a customs collector who stands on his own, i.e., he was not appointed by the government but, on his own, he forces people to give him money.

The Gemara notes: There are those who teach the statements of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai with regard to this following mishna (Kilayim 9:2) and its attendant discussion. The customs collectors would not levy a duty for the garments one was wearing. In light of this, the mishna teaches: A person may not wear a garment made of diverse kinds, i.e., a combination of wool and linen, even if he wears it on top of ten garments, in order to avoid paying customs. It was noted that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a baraita: It is prohibited to avoid paying customs by wearing a garment of diverse kinds. Rabbi Shimon says in the name of Rabbi Akiva: It is permitted to avoid paying customs in this manner.

The Gemara comments: Granted, with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, they disagree about this: One Sage, i.e., Rabbi Akiva, holds that an unintentional act is permitted. In this case, the prohibition is to benefit from wearing the garment, and that is not his intent, as his intention is merely to avoid paying the customs duties. Therefore, it is permitted. And one Sage, i.e., the first tanna in the baraita, holds that an unintentional act is prohibited. But is it ever permitted to avoid customs? Doesn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law?

In answer to this question, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The dispute in the baraita is with regard to a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed on the amount he may collect. Alternatively, Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The dispute is with regard to a customs collector who stands on his own, i.e., who is self-appointed.

The Gemara notes: And there are those who teach the statements of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai with regard to this mishna (Nedarim 27b): One may vow before murderers, plunderers, and customs collectors in order to reinforce the claim that a certain item that is being commandeered is teruma, or that it belongs to the king’s house, and thereby avoid its seizure, despite the fact that it is not teruma or that it does not belong to the king’s house. It was asked: Can it be that it is permitted to pronounce such a vow before customs collectors? But doesn’t Shmuel say: The law of the kingdom is the law? It should therefore be prohibited to state such a vow before the customs collectors.

Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana said that Shmuel says: The mishna in Nedarim issues its ruling with regard to a customs collector who does not have a limitation placed on the amount he may collect. Alternatively, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The mishna issues its ruling with regard to a customs collector who stands on his own.

Rav Ashi said: The mishna issues its ruling with regard to a gentile customs collector, whom one may deceive, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a Jew and a gentile who approach the court for judgment in a legal dispute, if you can vindicate the Jew under Jewish law, vindicate him, and say to the gentile: This is our law. If he can be vindicated under gentile law, vindicate him, and say to the gentile: This is your law. And if it is not possible to vindicate him under either system of law, one approaches the case circuitously, seeking a justification to vindicate the Jew. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and says: One does not approach the case circuitously in order to vindicate the Jew due to the sanctification of God’s name, as God’s name will be desecrated if the Jewish judge employs dishonest means.

The Gemara infers from this baraita: And even according to Rabbi Akiva, the reason that the court does not employ trickery in order to vindicate the Jew is only because there is the consideration of the sanctification of God’s name. Consequently, if there is no consideration of the sanctification of God’s name, the court does approach the case circuitously. Apparently, it is permitted to deceive a gentile.

The Gemara challenges this assertion: But is robbery from a gentile permitted? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon said that Rabbi Akiva taught this matter when he came from Zephirin: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to rob a gentile? It is from the fact that the verse states with regard to a Jew who has been sold as a slave to a gentile: “After he is sold he may be redeemed” (Leviticus 25:48),