the seller is not compelled to sell the field another time, i.e., to provide the purchaser with a document denoting him as the owner of the field. But if he said to him: I will purchase the field on the condition that you will provide a deed in my name, the seller is compelled to sell the field again, i.e., to provide the purchaser with a document denoting him as the owner.

The Gemara clarifies the baraita: The Master said: In the case of one who purchases a field in the name of another, the seller is not compelled to sell the field another time. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the purchaser can say to the seller: You knew that I took, i.e., purchased, the field for myself, and it was merely for protection [ufanaḥya] that I desired to obtain ownership by claiming to purchase it in the name of the other person, and I do not throw out money for naught. Rather, it was with the intention that you will write another document for him, i.e., the seller, stating that I purchased the field. The baraita therefore teaches us that the seller can say to him: I have performed a matter for you together with the one in whose name you purchased the field, and let him write you another document.

The Gemara discusses Abaye’s interpretation of the latter clause of the baraita, which states: But if he said to him: I will purchase the field on the condition that you will provide a deed in my name, the seller is compelled to sell the field again. Isn’t that obvious? No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the purchaser said to the witnesses in front of the seller: You can see that I require another document. Lest you say that the seller can say to him: I thought that it was a document from the one in whose name you purchased the field that you were saying you required, and not from me. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the purchaser can say to him: It was for this that I took the trouble and said to the witnesses, in front of you, that I require another document, as it is from you that I require the document.

§ The Gemara mentions a related incident: Rav Kahana gave money to a salesman in exchange for flax, and temporarily left the flax in the possession of the seller. Ultimately, the flax appreciated in value and the owner of the flax sold it for a greater profit on behalf of Rav Kahana, intending to give him all of the money. Rav Kahana then came before Rav, and said to him: What should I do? Should I go and take my money, or would doing so have the appearance of collecting interest for a loan? Rav said to Rav Kahana: If, when they sold the flax, they said: This flax is Kahana’s, go take the money, as in such a case it is as though the flax was purchased directly from you. But if they did not say this, do not take the money, since you would be receiving a greater sum of money than you provided, and this would appear to be a loan repaid with interest.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion was Rav’s ruling? Was it only in accordance with the opinion of the people of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who say: Who informed the owner of the wheat that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money? As the Gemara taught earlier, the Sages of Eretz Yisrael hold that the sale can be performed on another’s behalf only if such an arrangement is explicitly stated at the time of the transaction. In this case as well, if the seller did not explicitly state that the money would belong to Rav Kahana, all the money from the sale would be acquired by the seller, who would then be prohibited to give it to Rav Kahana due to the appearance of paying interest.

The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that Rav Kahana gave four dinars and took eight in return? He did not lend money to the seller. Rather, the flax appreciated in value by itself, and when the seller sold it he robbed Rav Kahana of his flax, and we learned in a mishna (93b) that all robbers pay compensation according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. Therefore, according to all opinions the seller owes Rav Kahana the value of the flax at the time the seller sold it for its appreciated value, and Rav Kahana’s accepting the money would not constitute collecting interest for a loan.

Having rejected the previous explanation of Rav’s ruling, the Gemara presents an alternative understanding of the case. The Sages say: There, it was a matter of trust, as the seller was paid in advance and Rav Kahana did not pull the flax as an act of acquisition, or perform any other formal act of acquisition. Consequently, at the time of the second sale the flax belonged to the seller. And Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav says: One may make an arrangement of trust with regard to the delivery of items such as produce, i.e., one may pay the money in advance with the agreement that he will receive the produce at a later date, but one may not make an arrangement of trust with regard to money, i.e., one may not pay the money in advance with the agreement that he will receive the value of the produce at a later date, as this has the appearance of collecting interest.

MISHNA: One who robs another of an item having the value of at least one peruta and takes a false oath to the robbery victim claiming his innocence, and then later wishes to repent, must bring the money, which includes the principal together with an additional one-fifth payment, to the robbery victim, even if this necessitates following after him to a distant place like Medea. The robber may not give the payment to the robbery victim’s son to return it to the robbery victim, and neither may he give it to his agent, but he may give the payment to an agent of the court. And if the robbery victim dies, he returns it to his heirs.

If he gave the robbery victim the principal value of the stolen item but did not give him the additional one-fifth payment, or if the owner forgave him concerning the principal but did not forgive him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of less than one peruta of the principal, he need not pursue him to repay the remaining debt. By contrast, if he gave the robbery victim the additional one-fifth payment but did not give him the principal, or if the robbery victim forgave him concerning the additional one-fifth payment but did not forgive him concerning the principal, or if he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of one peruta of the principal, he must pursue him to repay the remaining debt.

If the robber gave the robbery victim the principal and took a false oath to him concerning the additional one-fifth payment, asserting that he had already paid it,