of thin wood and a candle [sheraga], since in that case his own action, i.e., that of the one who sent the flame, definitely caused the fire to spread.

The mishna teaches that if one sent a fire in the hand of a halakhically competent person, the halakhically competent person is liable…If another came and fanned the flame the one who fanned it is liable. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says with regard to the correct text of the mishna: The one who teaches it using the word fanned [libba] is not mistaken, and the one who teaches it using the word blew [nibba] is not mistaken.

Rav Naḥman explained: The one who teaches using the word fanned [libba] is not mistaken, as it is written: “With a flame [belabbat] of fire” (Exodus 3:2), and the one who teaches using the word blew [nibba] is not mistaken, as it is written: “He creates the fruit [niv] of the lips” (Isaiah 57:19), which can be interpreted as referring to the breath of the lips.

§ The mishna teaches: If the wind fanned the flames, all the people involved are exempt, indicating that even if one fanned the fire at the same time that the wind was blowing he is exempt. The Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught the same idea explicitly: In a case where one fanned the flame and at the same time the wind fanned it, if his fanning has sufficient strength by itself to fan the flames, he is liable for damage caused by the fire, since even without the wind the fire would have spread. But if his fanning alone was not sufficient, he is exempt.

The Gemara asks: Why is he exempt if his fanning is not sufficient? Let it be the same halakha as the case of one who winnows grain on Shabbat by throwing it into the air, and the wind assists him by separating the chaff from the grain. In such a case he is liable for desecrating Shabbat, despite the fact that without the assistance of the wind he would not have been able to winnow the grain.

Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he fanned the fire from one side and the wind fanned it from the other side, and the fire was blown in the direction the wind was blowing. Therefore, it is clear that his fanning did not help the fire spread, so he is exempt. Rava says: We are dealing with a case where he fanned it along with a typical wind, and this was not sufficient to cause the fire to spread, and suddenly an atypical wind came and fanned it. Therefore, he is exempt since he could not have anticipated this. Rabbi Zeira said: We are dealing with a case where he only heated [detzamera tzamurei] the fire by breathing on it, rather than fanning it properly.

Rav Ashi said: When we say that one is liable in a case where he winnows and the wind assists him, this statement applies with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. With regard to Shabbat, the principle is that the Torah prohibited planned, constructive labor. The primary consideration is that his objective is accomplished, even if he did not perform the entire act of labor. But here, in the context of damages, he is considered to have caused damage merely through indirect action, and one who causes damage through indirect action is exempt.

MISHNA: If one sends forth a fire, i.e., allows it to escape, and it consumes wood, or stones, or earth, he is liable, as it is stated: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation” (Exodus 22:5), which teaches that he is liable also for destroying the field itself.

GEMARA: With regard to the verse cited in the mishna, Rava says: Why do I need the Merciful One to write in the Torah all of these terms: “Thorns,” “a stack of grain,” “standing grain,” and “field,” which seem to be redundant?

Rava explains: All the terms are necessary, because if the Merciful One had written only “thorns” in the Torah, I would say that it is specifically thorns for which the Merciful One renders one liable, because it is common for fire to be near them, and it is common that one is negligent. But with regard to a stack of grain, with regard to which it is not common for fire to be near it, as grain is valuable, so one keeps it out of harm’s way, and it is not common that one is negligent in allowing it to catch fire, I would say that he should not be liable. And if the Merciful One had written only: “A stack of grain,” I would say that it is specifically for such a stack that the Merciful One renders him liable, because it involves a substantial financial loss. But with regard to thorns, which involve only a minimal loss, I would say that he should not be liable. Therefore, the verse teaches that he is liable for damage to thorns as well.

Why do I need the Torah to state the term “standing grain”? It is in order to teach that just as standing grain is exposed, so too, one is liable only for damage caused by fire for all items that are exposed. One is exempt from liability for damage to items that are concealed.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for a concealed article damaged by a fire, why do I need the Torah to state the term: “Standing grain”? The Gemara answers: The term serves to include all items that have stature, i.e., trees and animals, and not only produce. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who derive the halakha of concealed articles from the term “standing grain,” from where do they derive that all items that have stature are included? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the term: “Or standing grain,” since the additional word “or” is an inclusive term.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from the additional word “or”? The Gemara answers: He requires the word “or” to divide the terms, i.e., to teach that one is liable for damage to any one of the items listed, and not only where the fire burned all of them together. The Gemara then asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive the halakha to divide the terms so that one is liable for damage to each one independently? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the second instance of the word “or,” as the verse states: “Or the field.”

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda derive from the phrase “or the field”? The Gemara answers: Since the Merciful One wrote in the Torah: “Or standing grain,” He also wrote: “Or the field,” for stylistic consistency, but no additional halakha may be derived from this term.

Rava continues to elaborate on the different terms in the verse: And why do I need the word “field” in the verse? It serves to include liability for damage in a case when the flames licked a plowed field and charred its stones. The Gemara asks: But let the Merciful One write only the term “field,” and then it would not require all these other terms. If one is liable for damage to a field, which is not totally destroyed by the fire, he is certainly liable for damage to other items that are completely destroyed. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to write the other terms as well, because if the Merciful One had written only “field,” I would say that for what is in the field, yes, one is liable, but for anything else, no, one is not liable. Therefore, it teaches us that one is liable for any damage caused by fire.

§ The Gemara cites an aggadic midrash based on this verse: Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: Calamity befalls the world only when wicked people are in the world, but the calamity begins only with the righteous first, as it is stated in the verse: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed” (Exodus 22:5). When does the fire, i.e., calamity, emerge? At a time when the thorns, i.e., the wicked, are found with it. But calamity begins only from the righteous first, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And a stack of grain is consumed [vene’ekhal].” It is not stated: If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, and consumes [ve’akhal] the stack of grain; rather, it states: “A stack of grain is consumed,” meaning that the stack, i.e., the righteous, has already been consumed before the thorns.

Rav Yosef taught a baraita: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to the plague of the firstborn: “And none of you shall go out of the opening of his house until the morning” (Exodus 12:22)? If the plague was not decreed upon the Jewish people, why were they not permitted to leave their homes? Once permission is granted to the destroyer to kill, it does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked. And not only that, but it begins with the righteous first, as it is stated in the verse: “And will cut off from you the righteous and the wicked” (Ezekiel 21:8), where mention of the righteous precedes the wicked.

Rav Yosef cried and said: Are all these righteous people also compared to nothing when calamity strikes? Abaye said to him: It is goodness for the righteous that they die first, as it is written: “The righteous is taken away because of the evil to come” (Isaiah 57:1), so that he will not have to endure the suffering that will befall the people.

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: