will not derive an inference with regard to Goring from a different case of Goring. I will instead derive an inference with regard to Goring from Trampling: And if in a place where the Torah was lenient with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically in the public domain, as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Goring, requiring him to pay half the cost of the damage, then in a place where the Torah was strict with regard to damage classified as Eating and Trampling, specifically on the property of the injured party as the animal’s owner is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, is it not right that we should be equally strict with regard to damage classified as Goring and require payment of the full cost of the damage in this case as well?

The Rabbis said to him: Here as well, it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, and therefore, just as one is liable to pay half the cost of the damage classified as Goring in the public domain, so too, for damage classified as Goring on the property of the injured party he will be liable to pay only half the cost of the damage, as ultimately your inference still depends on the fact that for Goring in the public domain one pays half the cost of the damage.

GEMARA: And is it true that Rabbi Tarfon does not accept the principle of: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source? But that cannot be, as the principle that begins with: It is sufficient, is an aspect of Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita: The Sages said that one of the ways in which the Torah may be interpreted is by an a fortiori inference. How is this so? It is written (Numbers 12:14): “And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had but spit in her face, should she not hide in shame seven days? Let her be shut up seven days outside the camp, and after that she shall be brought in again,” and therefore, using an a fortiori inference it can be derived that if the Divine Presence reprimanded her, she should hide in shame for fourteen days. Why was Miriam banished for only seven days? Rather, it is because it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerged from the a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference. Consequently, this principle is mandated by the Torah itself.

The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Tarfon does not accept the principle: It is sufficient, it is where this principle completely refutes the a fortiori inference, leaving no halakha derived from it. But where it does not completely refute the a fortiori inference, Rabbi Tarfon accepts the principle: It is sufficient. Consequently, there, with regard to Miriam, the seven days during which she deserved to be banished from the camp due to the rebuke of the Divine Presence were not written, so the a fortiori inference came and brought those days plus additional days, adding up to a total of fourteen, and then the principle: It is sufficient, came and removed seven days and left seven days intact. Consequently, the a fortiori inference was effective with regard to the seven days during which she was banished from the camp.

But here, payment for half the cost of the damage is written explicitly in the Torah with regard to the halakha of Goring in the public domain, and the a fortiori inference comes and brings an additional payment for half the cost of the damage, forming a payment of the full cost of the damage. If you interpret the halakha employing the principle: It is sufficient, to reduce the payment to half the cost of the damage, this completely refutes the a fortiori inference, as no halakha would be derived from the inference; the initial payment for half the cost of the damage was written explicitly in the Torah. Consequently, in this case, Rabbi Tarfon does not employ the principle: It is sufficient.

The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis understand this matter? How do they respond to Rabbi Tarfon’s reasoning? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the seven days during which Miriam had to be banished due to the reprimand she received from the Divine Presence are in fact written in the Torah: “Let her be shut up seven days.” This indicates that the a fortiori inference is not required to teach the halakha of the seven days she was banished, as it would have added only the extra seven days. This means that according to the Rabbis, there is a source in the Torah that the principle: It is sufficient, is employed even when it refutes the a fortiori inference completely.

The Gemara asks: And what would Rabbi Tarfon say about that reasoning? The Gemara answers: He would say that this verse: “Let her be shut up seven days,” is necessary to teach us the basic fact that we interpret the halakha according to the principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source.

The Gemara asks: And what would the Rabbis say in response? The Gemara answers: They would point out that a different verse is written about Miriam: “And Miriam was shut up outside the camp seven days” (Numbers 12:15). The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Tarfon respond to that? The Gemara answers: That verse teaches that we interpret the halakha according to the principle: It is sufficient, even generally, and not only in this specific case. And this point is necessary so that you do not say: Here the principle: It is sufficient, is employed due to respect for Moses, but generally that is not done. This verse therefore teaches us that this is not so.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Is the fundamental principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, actually accepted by all authorities? But there is this tanna, who does not interpret the halakha in accordance with the principle: It is sufficient, even though it is a case where the principle does not refute the a fortiori inference completely. As it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the semen of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav] imparts ritual impurity by someone carrying it as well as by coming into contact with it, just as the actual gonorrhea-like discharge does? It is a logical derivation from an a fortiori inference: Just as spittle, which is ritually pure when coming from a person who is ritually pure, is impure when coming from someone like a zav who is impure, is it not logical that semen, which is impure when coming from someone who is pure, should be impure when coming from someone who is impure?

And the tanna brings this derivation and applies it whether discussing ritual impurity imparted by contact or whether discussing impurity imparted by carrying. And why is this the case? Let us say: The a fortiori inference is effective in teaching that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by contact alone, as is the halakha with regard to the semen of a pure man, and the principle: It is sufficient, is effective by limiting the scope of the a fortiori inference to exclude the semen of a zav from imparting ritual impurity by carrying. Since the tanna does not formulate his derivation in this manner, it appears that he rejects the principle: It is sufficient, in all situations.

And if you would say that the a fortiori inference was not necessary to teach that the seminal emission of the zav imparts ritual impurity by contact, as it is certainly no less impure than if it had come from a man who was pure, so the inference was necessary only to teach that the semen of a zav imparts impurity by carrying, this is not correct. In fact, it was necessary to teach this point, as it may enter your mind to say that since it is written in the verse: “If there be among you any man that is not clean because of something that happens to him by night” (Deuteronomy 23:11), this means that a seminal emission is ritually impure if it came from someone who had something happen to him, and this causes him to experience the emission, but the verse is excluding this zav, who did not have something happen to him to cause him to experience the emission, but rather another matter, i.e., his gonorrhea-like condition, caused him to experience the emission. Consequently, it teaches us that this is incorrect.

Abaye responded: In the verse “something that happens to him by night,” is it also written: But not another matter? This limiting clause is not written in the verse, and therefore the halakha that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by contact can be understood from the explicit verse in the Torah, and there is no need to derive it from an a fortiori inference. Therefore, the only function of the a fortiori inference is to teach the halakha that the semen of a zav imparts impurity by carrying. Applying the principle: It is sufficient, would refute the a fortiori inference completely, so there is no proof that the tanna would apply the principle in all circumstances.

Once the Gemara raised the issue, it clarifies: And who is the tanna about whom you heard that he said: Semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by carrying? It was not Rabbi Eliezer and not Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a baraita: Semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by contact but it does not impart ritual impurity by carrying; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: It also imparts ritual impurity by carrying, as it is impossible for semen to emerge without small drops of gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva] accompanying it.

Rabbi Yehoshua says there that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by carrying only because it is impossible for semen to emerge without small drops of ziva accompanying it. This indicates that if not for this reason, the semen would not impart ritual impurity by carrying, according to the opinions of both Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara explains: Rather, it must be that this tanna is the one who holds the opinion that the semen of a zav imparts ritual impurity by carrying, as we learned in a mishna listing the sources of ritual impurity (Kelim 1:3): Of a greater degree than the ritual impurities listed previously in the mishna, i.e., the impurity of a creeping animal, semen, and one who contracted ritual impurity from a corpse,