The baraita continues to discuss the modes of betrothal: And from where is it derived that a woman can be acquired even by means of a document? The Gemara answers: This is a logical derivation, made by an a fortiori inference: And if money, which does not release a woman from her husband, nevertheless can bring her into a husband’s domain by betrothal, is it not logical that a document, which releases a woman from her husband in the form of a bill of divorce, can bring her into a husband’s domain by betrothal?

The Gemara refutes this claim: What is unique about money is that it can effect acquisition in many contexts, as one can redeem with it consecrated property and second tithe. Will you say that the same also applies to a document, with which one cannot redeem consecrated property and second tithe? The proof that one may redeem consecrated property only by means of money is that it is written: “And he will give the money and it will be assured to him” (see Leviticus 27:19). Consequently, this halakha cannot be derived by logical reasoning.

Therefore, the verse states: “And she leaves his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). This verse juxtaposes becoming, i.e., betrothal, to leaving, i.e., divorce. Just as leaving is performed through a document, i.e., a bill of divorce, so too, becoming can be performed through a document. The Gemara asks: And let one also juxtapose leaving to becoming, in the opposite direction: Just as becoming is performed through money, so too, leaving can be effected through money.

Abaye says: If so, people will say: Money brings in and money releases; if so, can an advocate [saneigor] become a prosecutor [kateigor]? It is improper for the same mode that draws man and woman together to be used for the termination of their relationship. The Gemara asks: If so, then with regard to a document too, they will say: A document brings in and a document releases; if so, can a prosecutor become an advocate?

The Gemara answers: The words of this betrothal document are discrete, i.e., distinct, and the words of this divorce document are discrete, i.e., the two documents differ in content. The Gemara asks: Here too, this money is discrete and this money is discrete, as one coin is for the betrothal and a different coin is used for the divorce. The Gemara answers: In any event, the coin itself is one, i.e., there is no noticeable difference between the coin used for betrothal and one that would be used for divorce. The same cannot be said with regard to documents, as particular texts serve specific purposes, and the same document could not be used for both betrothal and divorce.

Rava said: The halakha that a woman cannot be divorced by means of money is derived from a different source. The verse states: “And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). This indicates that a woman is divorced only through writing and she is not divorced through money. The Gemara asks: But as this point is not stated explicitly and is inferred from the verse, one can instead say the following interpretation: She is divorced through writing, and she is not betrothed through writing. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. It is written: “And she leaves and becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which juxtaposes betrothal to divorce, indicating that betrothal can be effected with a document.

The Gemara asks: And what did you see that you interpreted the verses in this manner? One can say the reverse, that the juxtaposition between betrothal and divorce teaches that in both cases money is effective, while the verse: “And he writes her,” means that she can be divorced but not betrothed through writing. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that when the verse is referring to divorce it excludes a different mode of divorce. Would a verse be referring to divorce and exclude a mode of betrothal?

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where does he derive that a woman cannot be divorced through money? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “A scroll of severance,” which teaches: A scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband, and nothing else severs her from him.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, what do they do with this verse: “A scroll of severance”? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They require it for the halakha that a document of divorce must be a matter that entirely severs him from her. The text of the bill of divorce must completely terminate the relationship between them.

This is as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Gittin 5:12) that if a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this requirement that a bill of divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife? The Gemara answers that he derives it from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.

§ The Gemara asks: It has been shown that one mode of betrothal cannot be derived from another mode of betrothal, as explained in the baraita, but why not let one be derived from the other two methods? The Gemara answers: This is not possible, as, which method will be derived from the others? If you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be betrothed through a document, and one can derive this mode of acquisition from these modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse and money, this claim can be refuted. What is unique about these other modes is that their benefit is great, relative to a document, as a woman experiences no enjoyment upon receiving a document.

And if you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be acquired through sexual intercourse, and one can derive this mode from these modes of acquisition, i.e., money and a document, this too is not possible, as, what is unique about these modes of betrothal is that their acquisition is great. In other words, these modes of acquisition apply in many other situations. Therefore, one cannot derive the unusual acquisition of sexual intercourse from these methods.

If you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be acquired through money, and one can derive this mode from these other modes of acquisition, this is also not possible, as what is unique about these is that they apply against her will. A yavam acquires a yevama through intercourse even against her will, while a document releases a woman from marriage without her consent in the case of a bill of divorce.

And if you would say that money also applies against her will, in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, whose father can sell her to a master without her consent, enabling one to therefore derive from the other two modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse and a document, that a woman can be acquired through money, this opinion can be refuted as well: In any event, with regard to marriage, we do not find a case in which a woman can be acquired through money against her will. Consequently, none of these modes of acquisition can be derived from any of the others.

§ Rav Huna says: The ceremony of the wedding canopy effects acquisition of the woman, as is derived through an a fortiori inference: If money, which does not enable the wife to partake of teruma, as the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest may not yet partake of teruma, effects acquisition of a woman for betrothal, is it not logical that a wedding canopy, which enables her to partake of teruma, as once a woman has entered the wedding canopy it is permitted for her to partake of teruma due to her husband the priest, should also effect acquisition of a woman by her husband?

The Gemara asks: And does betrothal money not enable a woman to partake of teruma? But didn’t Ulla say: By Torah law the daughter of a non-priest who is betrothed to a priest may partake of teruma immediately upon her betrothal, as it is stated: “But if a priest buy any soul, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), and this woman is considered the acquisition of his money.

And what is the reason that the Sages said that she may not partake of teruma? It is a rabbinic decree lest they pour her a cup of teruma wine in her father’s house, where she is staying before her marriage, and she give to her brothers and sisters to drink, as it is prohibited for them to partake of teruma. If so, by Torah law a woman may partake of teruma once she has been betrothed with money. Consequently, the above a fortiori inference that entering a wedding canopy can effect betrothal is invalid.

Rather, the Gemara emends Rav Huna’s statement and says that he refutes the opinion that entering a wedding canopy does not effect betrothal as follows: If money, which does not complete the acquisition of a woman, as a young woman remains under her father’s authority with regard to certain issues, nevertheless effects acquisition of her for the stage of betrothal,