The Gemara answers: It is not referring to the right of a second man that she already married, but rather to the right that is due to a suitor who wishes to become her second husband, meaning that the first husband cannot eliminate the right of a second man who wishes to marry her.

MISHNA: If one wrote a bill of divorce to divorce his wife, and reconsidered and did not give it to her, Beit Shammai say: Although merely writing the bill of divorce does not dissolve the marriage, by doing so he disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood. And Beit Hillel say: Even if he gave the bill of divorce to her conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled, and therefore the bill of divorce did not take effect, he did not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. A woman is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood only if the divorce takes effect.

GEMARA: Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashe from Devil, sent a query to Shmuel: Our teacher, instruct us. In the case of a priest about whom the following rumor circulated: So-and-so the priest wrote a bill of divorce to his wife, but she is still residing under his roof and attending to him; what is the halakha? Need one lend credence to this rumor?

Shmuel sent the following response to him: She must leave her husband; but the matter requires investigation before he is forced to divorce her. The Gemara asks: What is the investigation that is required? If we say that the investigation is whether we can abolish the rumor that circulated, or we cannot abolish it; that cannot be the question: But isn’t Neharde’a the place where Shmuel is the halakhic authority and the rulings there are in accordance with his opinion, and in Neharde’a they do not abolish a rumor? Rather, the required investigation is to determine whether people in that place refer to giving a bill of divorce as writing. If that is the case, the rumor would be that he gave her a bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: And if they refer to giving as writing, it proves nothing, as don’t they refer to writing itself as writing? Therefore, the fact that they refer to giving as writing does not mean that he gave the woman the bill of divorce. The same term would be employed even if he only wrote the bill of divorce.

The Gemara answers: Yes, as if it is discovered that they refer to giving as writing, then there is reason to suspect that perhaps they are saying in the rumor that he gave her the bill of divorce, and there is concern that she is actually divorced.

Apropos Shmuel’s statement that she must leave his home, the Gemara asks: She must leave? But doesn’t Rav Ashi say: We are not concerned for any rumor that circulates after marriage. According to Rav Ashi, if a rumor circulates that a woman was betrothed to a man, there is concern about the rumor, and she is not allowed to marry someone else until she receives a bill of divorce from her rumored betrothed. But if such a rumor circulates after she has married someone else, there is no concern about such a rumor, and she is not obligated to leave her husband. Here too, in the case of this woman who is suspected of being divorced, she is currently living with her husband. Therefore, perhaps we should not be concerned about such a rumor.

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of Shmuel’s directive: She must leave? This also means that she must leave the second husband. If her first husband dies, and she marries another priest, she must leave him due to the rumor that circulated that her first husband gave her a bill of divorce.

The Gemara challenges: If so, you cast aspersions on the children of the first husband. If the reason that she must leave the second husband is because she is assumed to be a divorcée, this means that she remained with her first husband while she was already divorced, and the children they had after the rumor circulated would be disqualified from the priesthood. The Gemara answers: Since we remove her only from the second husband, and we do not remove her from the first husband, they will come to explain the incident by saying as follows: The first husband divorced her proximate to his death, and the children from him are of unflawed lineage. Since he divorced her, she may not marry another priest. Because the assumption here is that the divorce took place proximate to the first husband’s death, there is no concern of aspersions being cast on the children from the first husband.

§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai: Come and see that the later generations are unlike the earlier generations, as the earlier generations were more conscientious about maintaining an unflawed lineage.

The Gemara explains: The earlier generations is referring to Beit Shammai. Beit Shammai were so careful about the sanctity of the priesthood that they said, as stated in the mishna, that the writing of a bill of divorce alone renders a priest’s wife forbidden to him. The later generations is referring to Rabbi Dosa, as it is taught in a mishna (Eduyyot 3:6): A priest’s wife who was taken captive may partake of teruma, and there is no concern that perhaps she was raped while in captivity and thereby became forbidden to her husband and disqualified from partaking of teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Dosa.

In explanation of this statement, Rabbi Dosa says: And what did this Arab do to her when he took her captive? Because he fondled her breasts he disqualified her from the priesthood? As long as it is not determined that her captors actually raped her, she is not prohibited from partaking of teruma. It is apparent from here that the later generations are more lenient than the early generations with regard to the sanctity of the priesthood.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai: Come and see that the later generations are unlike the earlier generations. The earlier generations would bring in their produce from the field by way of the main entranceway [teraksemon], in order to obligate the produce in tithes. By contrast, the later generations would bring in their produce by way of roofs and by way of enclosures, in order to exempt the produce from tithes.

The Gemara explains: As Rabbi Yannai says: Untithed produce does not become obligated in tithes until it sees the entrance of the house, through which people enter and exit, as it is stated in the declaration of the tithes: “I have put away the hallowed things out of my house” (Deuteronomy 26:13). As long as untithed produce is not taken into the house through the primary entrance of the house, it is permitted to eat it casually without tithing it. Consequently, they would take the produce in through another entrance in order to exempt it from tithes.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to this issue: Even entry into the courtyard establishes an obligation to tithe, as it is stated: “That they may eat within your gates, and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 26:12). This indicates that once the produce is brought into the courtyard, it is obligated in tithes.

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife, and afterward she spent the night with him at an inn [befundaki], Beit Shammai say: She does not require a second bill of divorce from him, and Beit Hillel say: She requires a second bill of divorce from him, since they may have engaged in sexual intercourse at the inn and thereby betrothed her once again.

When did they say this halakha? When she was divorced following the state of marriage. Beit Hillel concede that when she was divorced following the state of betrothal, she does not require a second bill of divorce from him, due to the fact that he is not accustomed to her. Therefore, there is no concern that they engaged in sexual intercourse, even though they spent the night together at the inn.

GEMARA: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is specifically in a case where they saw that she engaged in sexual intercourse,