However, if his wife miscarried he is not a nazirite, since his wife did not give birth to a live child. Rabbi Shimon says: Since it is possible that the fetus was viable, in which case his vow of naziriteship takes effect, he should say the following: If this fetus was viable in terms of its development but died due to other causes, I am hereby an obligatory nazirite in fulfillment of my vow; and if it was not viable, I am hereby a voluntary nazirite. He then proceeds to observe naziriteship.

If, subsequent to this, his wife gave birth again, he is a nazirite, since the unattributed opinion in the mishna holds that the condition of his vow has now been fulfilled. Rabbi Shimon says, following his earlier ruling: He must now accept upon himself an additional naziriteship and he should say: If the first fetus was viable then my naziriteship for the first child was obligatory, and this naziriteship is voluntary; and if the first child was not viable, then the naziriteship for the first one was voluntary and this naziriteship is obligatory.

GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that one who vowed to be a nazirite when a son is born to him is a nazirite when his son is born, the Gemara asks: What is the purpose of stating this ruling? Of course he is a nazirite. The Gemara answers: This halakha is stated due to the latter clause of that mishna, which states that if a daughter, a tumtum, or a hermaphrodite are born to him, he is not a nazirite. The Gemara questions this, too: Isn’t that obvious, since he specified a son? The Gemara answers: It is necessary lest you say he did not literally mean a son, but rather he meant to say: When I will be built up by means of any child, including the types listed. The mishna therefore teaches us that this is not the case.

The mishna also taught: And if he said: When I have a child, then even if he has a daughter, a tumtum, or a hermaphrodite, his vow takes effect. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is the case? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state this lest you say that we require a child of the kind that is considered significant by people, and he meant to exclude these other types of children when he vowed. The mishna therefore teaches us that this is not so.

§ The mishna taught that if his wife miscarried he is not a nazirite, even though it may have been a viable child. The Gemara clarifies: According to whose opinion is this taught? The Gemara answers: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to a heap of wheat. Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one vows to be a nazirite if a heap contains a certain amount of wheat and it is unclear whether or not his condition was fulfilled, the halakha is ruled leniently, and he is not a nazirite.

The mishna further taught that Rabbi Shimon says that the individual should say: If this fetus was viable in terms of its development but died due to other causes, I am hereby an obligatory nazirite in fulfillment of my vow; and if it was not viable, I am hereby a voluntary nazirite. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Abba inquired of Rav Huna: If one said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and his wife miscarried, and he separated an offering for his naziriteship but did not sacrifice it, and his wife gave birth again to a son, what is the halakha with regard to the offering he separated?

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Abba pose his question? If he asked it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what dilemma is he raising? Didn’t Rabbi Shimon say: In a case of uncertainty with regard to naziriteship, the ruling is to be stringent? Here too, since the fetus might have been viable, he was required to separate the offerings after she miscarried, and he may not use those offerings for the naziriteship brought about by the later birth. Rather, one should say that the question was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in a case of uncertainty with regard to naziriteship, the ruling is to be lenient. The question is as follows: What is the halakha in such a situation? Are the offerings already considered consecrated and need not be consecrated again, or are they not consecrated and therefore he must consecrate them a second time?

The Gemara asks: What difference is there? In any case, he is certainly obligated to observe naziriteship now, and he must separate the offerings. The Gemara answers: The question is referring to the issue of its shearing and its labor. If they are considered consecrated from the initial consecration, it is prohibited to shear their wool and use them for labor, like any other consecrated animal. But if they are not yet consecrated, it is permitted to use them. No answer was found for this question, and the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ With regard to one who accepted naziriteship upon himself that would begin upon the birth of his son, the Sage ben Reḥumi inquired of Abaye: If one said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and another heard him and said: And it is incumbent upon me, what is the halakha with regard to the second person? Is the implication of his statement a concurrence to the statement of the first one, which would mean that he too accepts naziriteship upon himself when the first has a son, or is the implication of his statement meant to be understood about himself, i.e., that he has vowed to be a nazirite when he has a son of his own?

The Gemara develops the question further: Even if you say that the phrase: And it is incumbent upon me, has the implication of meaning that it is to be understood about himself, what is the halakha if one said: I am hereby a nazirite when I will have a son, and another heard him and said: And I? What is the meaning of the second person’s statement? Is it to be understood that here too, he is speaking of himself, meaning: I shall be a nazirite when I will have a son of my own, or perhaps this is what he is saying: I love you as you love yourself; I would be as happy as you at the birth of your son, and I too will be a nazirite when you have a son. Ben Reḥumi continues: If you say that anything he says to another in front of him