the incident of Beit Ḥoron, where an individual had vowed to prohibit his father from deriving benefit from him, and then in order to allow his father to come to the celebration of his son’s wedding, he gave all of his property to someone else as a gift. The recipient of the property was concerned that the vow would be transgressed by the father, so he consecrated the son’s property and declared that if he was not empowered to do so, then the original transfer of property as a gift would not be valid. Consequently, in the present case, the Sages are unconcerned by the artifice performed, while Rabbi Yosei is concerned with such artifice and therefore prohibits it.

§ It was taught in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara is puzzled by Rabbi Yehuda’s statement with regard to an Israelite: This is the same as the opinion of the first tanna. Abaye said: Concerning an Israelite, Rabbi Yehuda in fact does not disagree with the first tanna, but he comes to teach us that the halakha is different for the wife of a priest. Rava said: The practical difference between them is a full thirty-day month and a deficient month with twenty-nine days: The first tanna requires exactly thirty days, while Rabbi Yehuda requires one month, whether it is a full month or a deficient one.

Rav said: With regard to the thirty-day time frame, where the Sages established that a husband supports his wife through a trustee, they taught this only with regard to a case where he specifies a limited time during which the vow will be in effect. But if he vows without specification of an end point, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even if he vowed without specification, he should not divorce her immediately, as perhaps he will discover an opening enabling the dissolution of his vow.

The Gemara asks: But they have already disagreed about this issue one time with regard to a similar situation, as we learned in a mishna (61b): With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from engaging in marital relations with him, Beit Shammai say: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two weeks, he may maintain her as a wife, and Beit Hillel say the limit is one week. And with regard to this dispute, Rav said: The dispute is in a case where he specifies, but in the case of an unspecified vow, he must divorce her immediately and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And Shmuel said: Even in the case of an unspecified vow he also should not divorce her immediately, as perhaps he will discover an opening enabling the dissolution of his vow. If so, why does this dispute need to be repeated?

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state it twice, as, if it was stated only in that case, i.e., that of a vow rendering it prohibited for her to engage in sexual intercourse with him, then one may have said that in that case Rav says he must divorce her immediately, because it is impossible to compensate for the vow through a trustee. But in this case, where the vow rendered it prohibited for her to benefit from his property, for which it is possible to compensate through a trustee, we would say that he concedes to Shmuel that he should not divorce her immediately. And conversely, if it were stated in this case, i.e., that of a vow concerning sustenance, then one may have said in this case that Shmuel says he should not divorce her because it is possible to compensate for the vow through a trustee, but in that case, where he vows to prohibit her from engaging in marital relations with him, one would say he concedes to Rav that he must divorce her immediately. Therefore, it is necessary to record the dispute twice.

We learned in the continuation of the mishna: One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Granted that according to Rav, there is no contradiction between the two clauses of the mishna. It can be said that here it is referring to an unspecified vow, so he must divorce her immediately, and there, in the first clause, it is referring to a case where he specifies a time limit. But according to Shmuel, it is difficult.

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where she vowed to prohibit herself from tasting the produce, and he ratified it for her and did not dissolve the vow. Since she made the vow, she certainly will not search for a way to dissolve it. Therefore, he must divorce her immediately. And Rabbi Meir, who is presumed to be the author of an unattributed opinion in a mishna, holds that when he ratifies her vow, he is putting his finger between her teeth, causing her to bite him, i.e., he is causing the vow to be in effect. If so, it is his responsibility, and he therefore must give her the payment of her marriage contract when he divorces her.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Meir hold that in this case he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he is causing the vow to be in effect? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: A woman who vowed, prohibiting herself from benefiting from items that are prohibited to a nazirite, and her husband heard and did not nullify it, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: She already put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Therefore, if the husband wishes to nullify this vow, he may nullify it. And if he said: I do not want a vowing wife, she can be divorced without the payment of the marriage contract.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar say: By deciding not to nullify the vow, he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he is causing the vow to be in effect, and therefore if the husband wishes to nullify the vow, he may nullify it. And if he said: I do not want a vowing wife, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: He is putting his finger between her teeth. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar say: She put her finger between her own teeth.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that she put her finger between her own teeth? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, and Rabbi Yosei says: For poor women, when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract? According to the final explanation given by Shmuel, the mishna is referring to a case where the wife vowed and the husband ratified it, indicating that Rabbi Yosei also agrees that it is the husband’s responsibility, and therefore he must give her the payment of her marriage contract.

The Gemara answers: Say that the text of the baraita should read as follows: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei say: He is putting his finger between her teeth; Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar say: She put her finger between her own teeth. This way, there is no contradiction between statements attributed to either Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara asks further: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that she put her finger between her own teeth? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: For an Israelite, if the vow is in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if the vow is in effect for two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of the marriage contract? According to the explanation that the mishna is referring to a case where she vowed and he ratified it, it would appear that Rabbi Yehuda also agrees that he is putting his finger between her teeth.

The Gemara answers: Say the text of the dispute should read as follows: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei say he is putting his finger between her teeth, and Rabbi Elazar says she put her finger between her own teeth. And if you say the opinions of the tanna’im listed in the baraita are taught in pairs, and therefore it cannot be that three of them share the same opinion, say: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar say she put her finger between her own teeth, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei say he is putting his finger between her teeth. And this particular unattributed opinion is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Since the mishna has been explained as a case where the wife vowed and her husband ratified it, the Gemara asks about a different issue: And does Rabbi Yosei hold, for poor women, that when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow he must divorce her? This means that apparently, a husband can nullify a wife’s vow not to adorn herself. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different mishna (Nedarim 79a): These are the cases of a wife’s vow that the husband may nullify: Cases of vows that involve affliction, such as when the woman says: If I bathe, I forbid myself to benefit from it; or if she says: If I do not bathe, i.e., she vows not to bathe at all; or she vows: If I adorn myself; or vows: If I do not adorn myself, all of which cause her to suffer. Rabbi Yosei said: These are not vows of affliction, which the husband may nullify, but rather, these, i.e., the following, are vows of affliction: Such as when she vows that I will not eat meat, or that I will not drink wine, or even that I will not adorn myself