Because Rav Zevid is a great man, and due to his piety and humility he would not challenge the ruling, you twist the judgment against him? Didn’t Rav Kahana say: Rava raises a dilemma with regard to this issue and did not resolve it, so how did you rule that she may retain her worn clothes? The Gemara summarizes: Now that it was not stated and concluded this way or that way, if she seized an item of her possessions, we do not take it away from her, but if she did not seize it, we do not give it to her.

The Gemara adds another halakha with regard to a rebellious woman: And we delay her bill of divorce for twelve months of the year and do not give her a bill of divorce until then. And during those twelve months of the year she does not receive sustenance from her husband.

§ Rav Tuvi bar Kisna said that Shmuel said: The court writes a letter of rebellion about a betrothed woman who is rebelling against her husband. This letter is a court order to deduct value from the marriage contract. But it does not write a letter of rebellion about a widow awaiting her yavam who does not want to enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: It is the same to me if she is a betrothed woman or a married woman, and even if she is a menstruating woman, and even if she is ill, and even if she is a widow awaiting her yavam.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the contradiction can be resolved in the following way: Here, where there is no distinction between a betrothed woman and a widow awaiting her yavam, it refers to a case where he asked to marry her and she is refusing; there, where there is a distinction, the case is where she asked to marry him and he is refusing. As Rav Taḥalifa bar Avimi said that Shmuel said: If he asked, the court responds to his request and gives her the status of a rebellious woman, but if she asked, it does not respond to her request and does not add to her marriage contract.

The Gemara inquires: In what manner did you establish that which Shmuel said, that one writes a letter of rebellion about a betrothed woman but not about a widow awaiting her yavam? If it is a situation where she asked to marry him and he did not want, then why phrase this: The court writes a letter of rebellion about a betrothed woman, which indicates that the bill is written against her. It should have said instead: Write a letter of rebellion for a betrothed woman, meaning it is written on her behalf against her husband. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the text is imprecise. Teach the statement instead this way: For a betrothed woman.

The Gemara asks: What is different about a widow awaiting her yavam, for whom a letter of rebellion is not written against her husband? Because we say to her: Go away; you are not commanded to procreate. Therefore, although she cannot get married, he cannot be compelled to perform an act that the Torah does not specifically command him to perform. The Gemara challenges this answer: If this is the reasoning, then in the case of a betrothed woman, too, let us say to her: Go away; you are not commanded. Rather, the case where a letter of rebellion is issued must be referring to a woman who comes with a claim, saying: I want a staff in my hand and a hoe for burial, i.e., I want children who will support me in my old age and attend to my burial after my death. This claim is valid, and therefore the court issues a letter of rebellion against the husband.

The Gemara asks: So too here, if she is a widow awaiting her yavam who comes with a claim, why shouldn’t the court listen to her? Rather, the Gemara retracts the explanation that she asked him to marry her. Instead, say that both this and that are discussing situations where he asks her and she rebels, and the question from the baraita on Shmuel’s statement is not difficult. Here, the baraita that said that the court writes a letter of rebellion about a widow awaiting her yavam, is referring to a case where the yavam asked her to perform ḥalitza and she refused. There, Shmuel’s statement that the court does not write it, is referring to a case where he asked to consummate the levirate marriage, as Rabbi Pedat said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If the yavam asked her to perform ḥalitza and she refused, the court responds to him. If he asked to perform levirate marriage, the court does not respond to him.

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to the request to consummate the levirate marriage, that if a woman refuses the court does not write a letter of rebellion against her? Because we say to him: Go and marry another woman. He is not required to marry her specifically, if she does not agree to the marriage. Therefore, her refusal is not deemed rebellion. The Gemara challenges that answer: If so, with regard to a request to perform ḥalitza also, let us say to him: Go and marry another woman. The difference between the two cases is still not clear.

Rather, it must be that the reason is because he says: Since she is attached to me they will not give me another wife. As long as he has not performed ḥalitza, he may have a problem finding another wife, as a potential wife will be concerned that he has a woman attached to him and may eventually enter levirate marriage with him. This is a valid claim, and therefore the court writes a letter of rebellion against her if she refuses ḥalitza.

The Gemara asks: If so, here too, when she refuses a request to consummate the levirate marriage, he may say: Since she is attached to me they will not give me another. Why then doesn’t the court write a letter of rebellion in this case? Rather, one must say that this and that are both discussing a case where he asked to consummate the levirate marriage. And it is not difficult. Here, in the baraita, where the court writes a letter of rebellion, it is in accordance with the first mishna. There, in Shmuel’s statement, where it doesn’t write one, it is in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna.

As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 13a): The mitzva of levirate marriage precedes the mitzva of ḥalitza. This halakha originally applied when people would intend to perform the levirate marriage for the sake of the mitzva. At that time, it was customary to compel a woman to enter levirate marriage. If she refused, the court wrote a letter of rebellion about her. However, now that people do not intend to enter levirate marriage for the sake of the mitzva, but may have other intentions, the Sages said: The mitzva of ḥalitza precedes the mitzva of levirate marriage. Shmuel’s statement that the court does not write a letter of rebellion about a widow awaiting her yavam is in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna.

§ The mishna asks: Until when does he reduce her marriage contract? And in that context it states that, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the sums involved are calculated in terapa’ikin and not in dinars. The Gemara asks: What are terapa’ikin? Rav Sheshet said: An asteira, a small coin. And how much is an asteira? A half of a dinar. This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Three terapa’ikin, which are nine ma’as, a ma’a and a half for each day, multiplied by six for the six days of the week.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef said to Shmuel: What is different when she is the one rebelling against him, that we give him compensation for Shabbat, as her marriage contract is reduced by seven dinars a week, which is one dinar per day including Shabbat, and what is different for her that we do not give her compensation for Shabbat but rather only for six days? The Gemara explains: When it is she who is fined and her marriage contract is reduced, it does not appear to be Shabbat wages, money paid for services rendered on Shabbat, which is prohibited. Whereas when it is he who is fined and compelled to add additional money every day to her marriage contract,