sustenance in exchange for her earnings, and the silver ma’a coin that he must give her in exchange for the surplus that she continues to make beyond her quota. And since he does not give her a silver ma’a the surplus is hers, unless some of it is left after her death, in which case the husband inherits it. Rav Adda bar Ahava maintains that they established sustenance in exchange for the surplus, and a silver ma’a in exchange for her earnings. And since he provides her with sustenance, the surplus is his, and therefore the sanctity takes effect on it immediately when she produces the surplus.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, holds that they established something common in exchange for something common. Consequently, they established sustenance, which is common, in exchange for earnings, which are also common. And one Sage, Rav Adda bar Ahava, holds that they established something with a fixed amount in exchange for something with a fixed amount. Consequently, since a silver ma’a is a fixed amount and the quota of a woman’s earnings is also fixed, they established one in exchange for the other.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s opinion from a baraita: They established sustenance in exchange for her earnings. Apparently, sustenance is not in exchange for the surplus. The Gemara answers by emending the text of the baraita: Say: They established sustenance in exchange for the surplus of her earnings.

The Gemara attempts another proof from a mishna (64b): Come and hear: If he does not give her a silver ma’a for her needs, her earnings belong to her. This indicates that the earnings were established in exchange for the silver ma’a, as Rav Adda bar Ahava contended. The Gemara rejects this by emending the text of the mishna: Say: The surplus of her earnings belongs to her. The Gemara challenges the emendation: But it is taught in the continuation of this mishna: What is the fixed amount that she must earn for him? She must spin the weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee. This clause implies that the mishna is not discussing the surplus but rather the quota of her required earnings.

The Gemara answers: This is what it is saying: How much is the required amount of her earnings, so that one can know how much of what she produces constitutes the surplus, and to this the mishna replied: The weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee.

§ Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler. A husband may not consecrate his wife’s earnings at all, as they have not yet come into being.

The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If a woman said: What I make to feed you, i.e., what I earn for you, is forbidden like an offering [konam], the husband does not need to nullify this vow. She has a prior obligation to work for him, and therefore the konam cannot take effect on something that does not belong to her. Rabbi Akiva says: Even so, the husband should nullify the vow, lest she produce more earnings than is appropriate for him, and the konam will then take effect on the surplus amount. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: He should nullify the vow for a different reason, lest he divorce her. Since she rendered her earnings forbidden to him, she will be prohibited from remarrying him after her divorce, as it would then be impossible for him to avoid benefiting from his wife’s earnings.

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that the wife can render her future earnings prohibited to her husband before these earnings have come into being, with the prohibition to go into effect after she divorces. This would imply that Shmuel holds that it is possible to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, contrary to what Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler said. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, he was referring only to the surplus.

The Gemara asks: If so, let him say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus, or alternatively, he should say that the halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna, or alternatively, he should simply say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who is concerned about the surplus amount.

Rather, explain it differently, as Rav Yosef said: Did you speak about konamot to prove your contention that one can consecrate objects that have not yet come into the world? Konamot are different, as they have a special status, since a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself. If one says to another: Your produce is konam to me, it is prohibited for him to eat that produce, although it does not belong to him and the prohibition will apply to it only when it reaches his domain. This indicates that a konam has unique power that enables a person to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, which according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler is an exception to the principle. Consequently, Shmuel’s ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to konamot is not relevant to his opinion on the issue of a wife’s earnings.

Abaye said to him: This analogy cannot serve as a proof. Granted, a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself, but this is possible because a person can prohibit his own produce to another. In both cases there is at least one aspect of the prohibition that is in his domain, either when he forbids another’s produce to himself, or when he forbids produce in his own possession to others. However, one cannot prohibit an object that has not yet come into the world to another, since a person cannot prohibit another’s produce to another. Just as he cannot make a konam and render prohibited to another person produce that is not in his possession, he also cannot render prohibited to another person produce that has not yet come into the world. If so, how can a woman render her earnings prohibited to her husband by a konam if those earnings have not yet come into the world?

Rather, the Gemara rejects that explanation and instead explains as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The mishna does not refer to a case where she said: My earnings are konam to you, but rather to one when she says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and this konam can take effect because the hands do exist in the world.

The Gemara asks: When she says this in such terms does it become consecrated? She is subjugated to her husband with regard to her earnings, so how can she consecrate that which is not hers? The Gemara answers: She says that the consecration will take effect when she will get divorced from her husband.

The Gemara asks: Is there anything one would do that if done at present, the consecration could not take effect and in the future the consecration could take effect? Rabbi Elai said: Why not? If one told another: This field that I am selling to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you, doesn’t that field become consecrated when he buys it back? It appears that one can cause an item to become consecrated in the future although at present he cannot consecrate it.

Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a field, since the field that he is selling belongs to him at the time of the sale, it is in his power to consecrate it now. Therefore, he can effect sanctity on it at a later point as well. But here, it is not in her power to divorce herself. Consequently, the analogy is invalid. Rather, this is comparable only to a different case, when one says to another: This field that I already sold to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you. In that case the field is not consecrated, as, when he said this the field was not in his possession, and one cannot consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world.

Rav Pappa objects to this: Is Rav Yirmeya’s analogy comparable? There, the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, and therefore the seller cannot consecrate them. Here, her body is in her possession, as she owns her hands. Rather, this is comparable only to a case where one says to another: