one stones her at the entrance to her father’s house, as though to say: See what you have brought up. If witnesses came to testify about her when she was in her father’s house, i.e., when she was betrothed, and testified that she committed adultery in her father’s house, one stones her at the entrance to the gate of the city. If she went astray and sinned when she was a young woman and subsequently reached majority, i.e., she became a grown woman, she is sentenced to strangulation, which is the punishment for a grown woman who committed adultery.

The Gemara asks with regard to this halakha: Is that to say that in any case where her body has changed after her sin, the manner in which she is put to death changes as well? The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: If there is a betrothed young woman who allegedly committed adultery, and after she reached majority she married and her husband defamed her, accusing her of having committed adultery during the period of betrothal, he is not flogged and does not give the one hundred sela if she is proven innocent, as these punishments are limited to one who defames a young woman (Deuteronomy 22:19). However, if she is guilty, she and her conspiring witnesses are brought early in the morning to the place of stoning. This proves that although her body changed between the time of the sin and the time of her punishment, she is stoned nevertheless.

The Gemara digresses to analyze the last clause of this baraita: Can it enter your mind to say that both she and her conspiring witnesses, i.e., witnesses who falsely testified that she committed adultery, are executed? If the witnesses who testified against her were telling the truth and she sinned, only she is liable to be stoned, and if the court discovers that they were false, conspiring witnesses, then they are stoned and she is exempt. Rather, the text of the baraita should be emended so that it reads: Either she or her conspiring witnesses are brought early in the morning to the place of stoning.

In answer to the contradiction, Rava said: A defamer, you said? A defamer is different as it is a novel halakha. Certain aspects of this case do not apply to other halakhot as, generally, if a woman who entered the wedding canopy and did not yet have intercourse with her husband subsequently committed adultery, she is executed by strangulation, which is the punishment for a married woman who committed adultery. However, in the case of a defamer, if the woman is guilty she is executed by stoning, despite the fact that if she would commit the sin in her current state, as a married woman, she would be executed via strangulation. This proves that in the case of defamation, the method of execution is determined by the time when the sin was committed, although her status has since changed.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: Perhaps when the Merciful One introduced the novelty of the halakha of a defamer, it was applied only to a case where her body has not changed and she is still a young woman. However, in a case where her body has changed and she has become a grown woman, the Merciful One did not introduce the novelty of this halakha, and she is liable to strangulation just as she would be liable to strangulation if she had committed the sin as a grown woman.

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This question of whether the method of her execution changes or does not change if her body has changed is a dispute between tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna (Horayot 10a), with regard to the special offering of a High Priest or a king who sinned unwittingly (see Leviticus 4:3–12, 22–26): If they sinned before they were appointed, and they were subsequently appointed, and they became aware of their transgression only after their appointment, they are like commoners. They must bring a female sheep or goat, like any ordinary individual who sinned, rather than the bull brought by a High Priest who has sinned or the male goat brought by a king who has sinned.

Rabbi Shimon says: If their sin became known to them before they were appointed, even if they did not bring their offering before they were appointed, they are liable to bring the offering of a commoner. However, if their sin became known to them after they were appointed, they are entirely exempt from bringing an offering as their change in status necessitates a corresponding change in their offering, and therefore their first obligation is entirely nullified. This shows that according to Rabbi Shimon, a change in status retroactively affects one’s liability for a transgression he committed in his previous status. A similar halakha should apply in the case of a betrothed young woman who committed adultery and reached majority before her sin became known.