the witnesses who testified that he is unfit and the judges who testified that he is fit are two witnesses and two witnesses who contradict them, and in that case, the allegation of theft is not completely eliminated. If it was a challenge based on an allegation of flawed lineage, e.g., he is a Canaanite slave and therefore unfit to serve as a judge, that is a mere revealing of a matter that will ultimately be revealed in any case and does not require actual testimony. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest preventing the judges from asserting his fitness after they signed. The Gemara concludes: Actually, I will say to you that it was a challenge based on an allegation of theft, and these judges say: We know about him that he repented and is now fit to serve as a judge. In that case, their testimony does not contradict the original testimony that he was guilty of theft.

§ Rabbi Zeira said: This matter, I heard from Rabbi Abba, and if it was not for Rabbi Abba of Akko, I would have forgotten it. With regard to a case of three judges who convened as a tribunal to ratify a document, and one of them died before signing the ratification, the surviving judges must emend the standard formula of the ratification and write: We were convened in a session of three judges, and one of the judges is no longer alive. In that way it is clear that although only two judges signed, the document was ratified by three judges.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And if the judges wrote in the ratification: This document was produced before us, the court; they no longer need to add that they were three judges, as, when unmodified, the term court connotes a tribunal of three judges. The Gemara asks: And perhaps it was an impudent court, and that is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Two judges who convened a tribunal and judged, their verdict is a binding verdict; however, because they contravened the rabbinic ordinance mandating that a court be comprised of three judges, they are called an impudent court. Therefore, writing: Before us, the court, does not rule out the possibility that the document was ratified by fewer than three judges.

The Gemara answers: It is clear that the document was ratified by the requisite three judges, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, which presumably conforms to rabbinic protocol. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the Rabbis of the court of Rav Ashi hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel and they convened an impudent court, whose ruling is binding. The Gemara answers: It is clear, as it is written in the ratification: Before us, the court of our teacher Rav Ashi, and our teacher Rav Ashi said to us how to ratify the document.

MISHNA: With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorcée, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband.

GEMARA: Rav Asi said: From where in the Torah is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, derived? It is derived as it is stated: “I gave my daughter to this man [la’ish hazeh] as a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her off “to the man [la’ish]” without revealing his identity, he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then says “this [hazeh],” thereby identifying the man to whom he married her off, he renders her permitted to her husband.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need to derive this from the verse? It is based on logic: He rendered her forbidden and he rendered her permitted. Rather, where this verse is necessary, is in order to derive the halakha that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: From where in the Torah is it derived that a father is deemed credible to render his daughter forbidden? It is derived as it is stated: “I gave my daughter to the man [la’ish]” (Deuteronomy 22:16). The Gemara asks: Why do I need the subsequent term “this [hazeh]”?

The Gemara explains: The verse is necessary to derive the halakha that Rabbi Yona taught; as Rabbi Yona taught in a baraita that in the verse: “I gave my daughter to this man,” written in the context of a husband slandering his wife, “this” is written to infer: The halakhot in this passage apply to a man who slanders his wife and not to the yavam, in the case of levirate marriage.

§ The Sages taught with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is deemed credible. The Gemara asks: But didn’t she render herself an entity of prohibition? When she said that she was married she rendered herself forbidden to all men. How then can she abrogate the prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is referring to a case where she provided a rationale [amatla] for her initial statement and explained why she said that she was a married woman. That was also taught in a baraita with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is not deemed credible. And if she provided a rationale for her initial statement, she is deemed credible.

And there was also an incident involving an important woman who was outstanding in beauty, and many men were clamoring to betroth her. And she said to them: I am already betrothed. Sometime later she arose and betrothed herself to a man. The Sages said to her: What did you see that led you to do so? She said to them: Initially, when unscrupulous people approached me seeking to marry me, I said: I am betrothed. Now that scrupulous people approached me, I arose and betrothed myself to one of them. And the Gemara notes: This halakha was raised by Rav Aḥa Sar HaBira before the Sages in Usha, the seat of the Sanhedrin, and the Sages said: If she provided a rationale for her statement, she is deemed credible.

Shmuel raised a dilemma before Rav: If a woman said to her husband: I am ritually impure as I am menstruating, and then said: I am pure, what is the halakha? Is she permitted based on her latter statement, or did she render herself an entity of prohibition with her first statement and therefore remains forbidden? Rav said to him: Even in that case, if she provided a