who chews on barley of teruma that has not been ground or baked pays the principal and not an extra fifth. The reason is that it states “eats” (Leviticus 22:14), which excludes one who harms himself. Consuming raw barley is considered self-harm, not eating.

Rav Sheizvi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of a non-priest who swallowed plums of teruma whole and vomited them out, whereupon another person ate them, the first one pays the principal plus a fifth. When the first one benefited from the plums, he acquired them and must therefore pay for them, and the second one must pay their worth to the first one. Since they are only fit for fuel after the first one vomited them out, the second person is considered to have damaged their value as fuel. Therefore, he pays only the price of wood, i.e., fuel, to the first person.

§ It was taught in the mishna that food and drink do not combine. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this? Rav Ḥisda said: This halakha is taught as a dispute, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general principle: Any item that is identical to another item in its type of ritual impurity, e.g., impurity that lasts only until evening, and its measure for impurity, e.g., an olive-bulk, combines with the other item to reach one measure to render other items impure. Therefore, two half olive-bulk pieces of two corpses or of two animal carcasses, or two half lentil-bulk pieces from two creeping animals all combine to render other items impure.

However, if one item is identical to another in its ritual impurity but not its measure, e.g., half a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal and half an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, which both impart impurity until nightfall; or if its measure is identical but not its type of ritual impurity, e.g., half an olive-bulk from a corpse, which imparts impurity for seven days, and half an olive-bulk from an animal carcass, which imparts impurity until nightfall; and all the more so, when neither its ritual impurity nor its measure are identical, then the items do not combine. Here, too, although both eating and drinking are prohibited on their own, they do not combine because they do not have the same measure that imparts impurity.

Rav Naḥman said: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, until now we have heard the Rabbis say there that items with different measures combine only with respect to ritual impurity. Since the phenomenon of ritual impurity is one concept, different types combine. But here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the measure that determines liability is set due to settling the mind, and this combination of eating and drinking together does not settle the mind.

And similarly, Reish Lakish said: This question of whether food and drink combine to reach a measure that determines liability on Yom Kippur is taught as a dispute. The approach brought in the mishna that states that they do not combine is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general principle with regard to whether items with different types of impurity and measures combine, as Rav Ḥisda explained above. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, until now we have heard the Rabbis say there that items with different measures combine only with regard to ritual impurity. But here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the measure that determines liability is set due to settling the mind, and this combination of eating and drinking together does not settle the mind.

MISHNA: If one ate and drank unwittingly within one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot that it is Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. However, if he ate and performed labor unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as by doing so he violated two separate prohibitions. If he ate foods that are not fit for eating, or drank liquids that are not fit for drinking, or drank fish brine or the briny liquid in which fish are pickled, he is exempt, as that is not the typical manner of eating or drinking.

GEMARA: Reish Lakish said: Why is there no warning stated about affliction; why did the Torah not state explicitly that it is prohibited to eat and drink on Yom Kippur? It is because it was not possible to write it that way. The Gemara explains: How could the Merciful One write it? Let the Merciful One write: One shall not eat on Yom Kippur. The term eat prohibits eating the amount of an olive-bulk, whereas on Yom Kippur the actual prohibited measure is a large date-bulk. Let the Merciful One write: Do not be afflicted. That indicates the opposite of affliction, and would mean: Get up and eat. Therefore, it is written: “For whatsoever soul it be that shall not be afflicted on that same day, he shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 23:29).

Rav Hoshaya strongly objects to this: Let the Merciful One write it in this manner: Guard yourself lest you not be afflicted. The Gemara answers: If so, there would be too many negative mitzvot, as the following are all expressions of prohibition: Guard, lest, and not. One would then say that there are three prohibitions against eating.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye strongly objects to this: Let the Merciful One write: Guard yourself in the mitzva of affliction. The Gemara rejects this: If so, there is a principle: If the words guard yourself are written about a prohibition, it is considered to be a prohibition; if the words guard yourself are written about a positive mitzva, it is considered to be a positive mitzva. Had the Torah written it that way, one would understand that there is a positive mitzva of affliction, but there is no element of prohibition. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: Let the Merciful One write: Do not stray from afflicting yourself, which would imply a negative mitzva. The Gemara says: Indeed, this is difficult. The Gemara concedes that it could have been written in this manner.

§ With regard to the prohibitions against eating and labor, the Gemara says: And a tanna cites the prohibitions relating to affliction on Yom Kippur from here: It is stated: “And you shall afflict your souls, you shall do no manner of labor” (Numbers 29:7). The Gemara considers: One might have thought that performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor, added before Yom Kippur actually begins, is punishable by karet. Therefore, the verse states: “And whatsoever soul it be that does any manner of labor on that same day” (Leviticus 23:30), which teaches that performing labor on that very day is punishable by karet, but labor performed during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor is not punishable by karet.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor is not punishable by karet, but not afflicting oneself during the extension of the period of affliction is punishable by karet. Therefore, the verse states: “For whatsoever soul it be that shall not be afflicted on that same day, he shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 23:29), which teaches that not afflicting oneself on that very day is punishable by karet, but not afflicting oneself during the extension of the period of affliction is not punishable by karet.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that one who performs labor during the extension would not be included in the punishment of karet, but he would be warned against performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor with a prohibition incurring the punishment of lashes; therefore, the verse states: “And you shall do no manner of labor on that same day” (Leviticus 23:28). That teaches that he is warned not to perform labor on that very day, but he is not warned against performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor, and therefore he is not liable to receive lashes for doing so.

The baraita continues: One might have thought: He would not be warned with regard to performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor that it is a prohibition that incurs lashes; but he would be warned with regard to not being in a state of affliction during the extension of the period of affliction that it is a prohibition that incurs lashes. However, that is incorrect, and it is learned from a logical derivation that it is not so: Just as with regard to labor, whose prohibition is observed on both Shabbatot and Festivals, one is not warned about the extension added to the day, is it not logical that with regard to affliction, which is not observed on Shabbatot and Festivals, he should not be warned about or liable to receive lashes for the extension?

The baraita comments: But the warning about lashes during the very day itself we have not learned. From where is it derived? The Torah need not state the punishment of karet for performing labor, since one can learn it by logical derivation from the punishment of not being in a state of affliction, as follows: Just as the requirement of affliction, which is not observed on Shabbatot and Festivals, is punishable by karet on Yom Kippur, with regard to the prohibition of labor, which is observed on all Shabbatot and Festivals, is it not all the more so? If so, why is the punishment for labor stated explicitly? It is available to compare and learn a verbal analogy from it: A punishment with regard to affliction is stated, and a punishment with regard to labor is stated. Just as with regard to labor one is punished only if he was warned first with a negative mitzva, so too, with regard to affliction, one is punished only if he was warned.

The Gemara rejects this: This comparison can be refuted. How so? Whereas affliction has no permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, as the mitzva to afflict oneself applies to all the Jewish people, what can you say with regard to labor, which has permitted exceptions from its general prohibition? It is permitted to perform the Temple services on Yom Kippur, which include prohibited labors, e.g., slaughtering animals and offering incense. Consequently, there is no proof that the mitzva of affliction is more lenient than the prohibition of labor.

Rather, say as follows: The Torah need not say the punishment for not being in a state of affliction, since one can learn it from the punishment for performing labor through an a fortiori inference. How so? Just as labor, for which exceptions from the general prohibition are permitted, e.g., performing the Temple service on Yom Kippur, and yet labor is punishable by karet, with regard to not being in a state of affliction, which has no permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, is it not all the more so that one who does not afflict himself should be liable to receive karet? If so, why is it nevertheless stated? It is available to compare and learn a verbal analogy: Punishment is stated with regard to affliction, and punishment is stated with regard to labor. Just as for labor the Torah punished and warned, so too, for affliction the Torah punished and warned.

The Gemara rejects this: This comparison can be refuted, and one might say the opposite: Whereas the prohibition of labor is observed on Shabbatot and Festivals, can you say the same about affliction, which is not observed on Shabbatot and Festivals?

Ravina said: We did not properly understand the teaching of this baraita, as this tanna derived a verbal analogy from the words “on that same day” (Leviticus 23:29) stated with regard to affliction, and “on that same day” (Leviticus 23:28) stated with regard to labor. The Gemara comments: We must say that it is available, meaning that in both places, the phrase “on that same day” is unnecessary within its own context and comes only to teach this verbal analogy; as, if it were not available, it could be refuted, as we refuted it above.

The Gemara responds: No, it is certainly available, and we may learn from it, as five verses are written with regard to the prohibition of labor on Yom Kippur. One to teach a warning with regard to the prohibition of labor on the day of Yom Kippur itself; and one for a warning with regard to labor on the night of Yom Kippur; and one for the punishment of karet for performing labor on the day; and one for the punishment for performing labor at night; and one verse to be available to derive the requirement of affliction from the prohibition of labor, both during the day and night, using a verbal analogy.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught an alternative verbal analogy for the derivation: “Affliction” is stated here, with regard to Yom Kippur, and “affliction” is stated later, with regard to a man who rapes a woman: “Because he has afflicted his neighbor’s wife” (Deuteronomy 22:24). Just as there, in the case of rape, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning, so too here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said a different proof: Derive a verbal analogy from the words “Shabbat of solemn rest” (Leviticus 16:31) written with regard to Yom Kippur from the words “Shabbat of solemn rest” (Exodus 31:15, 32:5; Leviticus 23:3) written with regard to the weekly Shabbat, which commemorates the Shabbat of Creation. Just as there, in the case of Shabbat, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning, so too here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning.

Rav Pappa said: