The Gemara now formulates the proof: Who is the author of anonymous halakhic statements made in the Sifra? Rabbi Yehuda. And this baraita from the Sifra teaches: The lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the lottery is indispensable. This refutation of the opinion of the one who says that the lottery is not indispensable, i.e., Rabbi Yannai, according to the second version of his dispute, is indeed a conclusive refutation.

§ The Gemara addresses a similar case of designating offerings: Rav Ḥisda said: Nests, a pair of birds of which one bird must be sacrificed as a sin-offering and the other as a burnt-offering become designated for the specific type of offering only at one of two distinct points: Either upon the owner’s taking of them, when he initially purchases and consecrates them for his offering, or upon the priest’s actual performance of the sacrificial rite upon them.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: What is the reason of Rav Ḥisda? As it is written in one verse: “And she shall take two turtledoves or two young pigeons, the one for a burnt-offering and the other for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 12:8). In another verse, it is also written: “And the priest shall offer them, the one for a sin-offering and the other for a burnt-offering” (Leviticus 15:15). The verses mention only the possibility of designating the offering either upon taking them or upon the performance of the sacrificial rite.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling from the baraita cited above: The verse states, with regard to the goat of Yom Kippur: “And Aaron shall…offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:9). This indicates that the lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering.

A verse is needed to teach this halakha, as I might have come to the opposite conclusion: Is there not an a fortiori inference: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not consecrate the animals with a specific designation, nevertheless verbally designating the animals with the required status does consecrate them, so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does consecrate the animals, is it not logically right that verbally designating the animals with the required status should consecrate them?

To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “He shall make it a sin-offering” to indicate that the lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering.

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling: But here, in the case of designating the goats, the baraita is focusing on the moment at which the lottery is held, which is neither the time of taking the goats nor the time of performing the sacrificial rite. Yet the baraita teaches that were it not for a verse that teaches otherwise, it would be possible to permanently establish the animals’ designation through a verbal designation at that time. This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling.

The Gemara rejects the challenge: Rava said: The baraita does not contradict Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. This is what the baraita is saying: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not consecrate the animals with a specific designation, even if it is held at the time of taking the animals or at the time of performing the sacrificial rite, nevertheless verbally designating the animals with the required status does consecrate them if that is done at the time of taking the animals or at the time of performing the sacrificial rite; so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does consecrate the animals, although it is held neither at the time of taking the animals nor at the time of performing the sacrificial rite, is it not logically right that verbally designating the animals with the required status should consecrate them, if it is done at the time of taking the animals or at the time of performing the sacrificial rite?

To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “He shall make it a sin-offering” to indicate that the lottery makes it a sin-offering, but verbally designating the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not make it a sin-offering. Rava has thereby explained the reasoning of the baraita in accordance with Rav Ḥisda’s ruling.

Come and hear another challenge to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling: One who inadvertently enters the Temple while ritually impure is required to bring a sliding-scale offering to achieve atonement. This offering is unique in that the specific offering one is required to bring depends upon his financial situation. With regard to this offering, a baraita teaches about the case of a poor person who ritually impurified the Temple, i.e., entered the Temple while ritually impure; and he set aside money for his nests, his bird pair, as he is required, as a poor person, to bring one bird as a sin-offering and one bird as a burnt-offering for atonement; and then he became wealthy, and he is consequently required to bring an animal sin-offering; and afterward, unaware of the halakha that he is no longer required to bring a bird pair, he separates his money into two portions and said that these coins are for his sin-offering and those coins are for his burnt-offering.

Then, in such a case, he adds more money and brings his obligation of an animal sin-offering from the money set aside for his sin-offering, but he may not add more money and bring his obligation of an animal offering from the money set aside for his burnt-offering.

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav Ḥisda’s ruling: But here, in the case of designating the money, the baraita is focusing on a moment which is neither the time of taking the money nor the time of performing the sacrificial rite with the birds. And yet the baraita teaches that through a verbal designation one can permanently establish the status of the money, as is apparent from the fact that the money set aside for the burnt-offering may not be used toward the sin-offering. This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling.

Rav Sheshet said: But how can you understand the baraita that way? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that Rabbi Hoshaya said: A wealthy person who ritually impurifies the Temple and brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring does not fulfill his obligation. Since he does not and cannot fulfill his obligation with that offering, how can that designation permanently establish the status of the money?

Rather, what have you to say in order for the baraita to make sense? That he had already said his designation of the money while in his impoverished state. Here also, in order for the baraita not to contradict Rav Ḥisda’s ruling, it may be explained in a similar vein, that he had already said at the time of taking and setting aside his money, which monies were for his sin-offering and which were for his burnt-offering.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Ḥaga, who said that Rabbi Yoshiya said that a wealthy person who brings the offering that a poor person is required to bring does fulfill his obligation,