But according to that second version of the dispute, in which you said that Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree whether the drawing of the lots is indispensable according to Rabbi Yehuda, but according to Rabbi Neḥemya it certainly is indispensable, then granted, according to the one, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that the drawing of the lots is not indispensable, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

However, according to the one, i.e., Rabbi Yannai, who said that both according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya the drawing of the lots is indispensable, then in accordance with whose opinion could this baraita be taught? It would appear that, according to Rabbi Yannai, the baraita does not reflect anyone’s opinion. Perforce, the baraita cannot be referring to drawing the lots, and one must emend and teach the baraita as saying that it is a mitzva to place the lots on the goats.

Come and hear another challenge to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion, as presented in the second version of the dispute, which maintains that both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya hold that drawing of the lots is indispensable. A baraita teaches: It is a mitzva for the High Priest to draw the lots and to confess upon the goat to be sent to Azazel. If he did not draw the lots or did not confess, the service is still valid. This baraita also appears to say that the drawing of the lots is not indispensable, in contradiction to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion. And if you say: So too, the baraita should be emended to say it is a mitzva to place the lots on the goats, this is problematic. How will you then say, i.e., explain, the latter clause of that baraita, which teaches: Rabbi Shimon says: If he does not draw the lots, it is valid. If he does not confess, it is invalid?

The Gemara clarifies the challenge from the latter clause: In this baraita, what is the meaning of: He did not draw the lots? If we say it means he did not place the lots on the goats, then by inference Rabbi Shimon holds that while the placing is not indispensable, the drawing of the lots is indispensable. But this is incorrect, since wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If, following the designation of the goats, one of them died, a new goat is brought to be the counterpart of the surviving goat and is designated without drawing lots; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. It would therefore appear that the baraita should not be understood as referring to the mitzva to place the lots, but as referring to the drawing of the lots themselves. Therefore, the challenge to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion remains.

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yannai’s opinion can still be defended by claiming that Rabbi Shimon did not know precisely what the Sages were saying, i.e., whether they were referring to the drawing or the placing of the lots. Therefore, in his response to them, this is what he is saying: If when you say: Drawing of the lots, you are saying that the actual drawing of the lots is not indispensable, as I also hold, then I disagree with you only with regard to one halakha, namely with regard to the indispensability of the confession. But if, when you say: Drawing of the lots, you are saying only that the placing of the lots is not indispensable, but you assume that the drawing of the lots is indispensable, then I disagree with you with regard to two halakhot, i.e., with regard to the indispensability of both the drawing of the lots and of the confession.

Come and hear another challenge to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion that all agree that the drawing of the lots is indispensable, from a baraita: Various services are performed with the bull and the goat and their blood. These services must be performed in a specific sequence, often alternating between the bull and the goat. If one service is neglected and a later service is advanced to be before it, the halakha is as follows: Failure to perform a service of the bull that was to precede a service of the goat disqualifies the service of the goat, if it was performed without that service of the bull preceding it.

However, failure to perform a service of the goat that was to precede a service of the bull does not disqualify the service of the bull; rather, it is valid after the fact. This last rule applies to the applications of blood performed inside the Holy of Holies.

The Gemara explains the challenge from the baraita: Granted, failure to perform the service of the bull disqualifies the service of the goat that is advanced ahead of it. This can be understood to mean that if he advanced the service of the goat ahead of the service of the bull, it is considered as though he has not performed anything at all. Once the service of the bull has been performed, the service of the goat must be repeated. However, the rule in the baraita that failure to perform a service of the goat does not disqualify the service of the bull that was advanced ahead of it. To what case is it referring?

If we say that that the baraita means that if one advanced the applications of the blood of the bull in the Sanctuary made toward the curtain ahead of the applications of the blood of the goat inside the Holy of Holies, then the baraita should not rule that it is valid. The term “statute” (Leviticus 16:29) is written concerning the applications of the blood of the goat inside the Holy of Holies, which implies that their performance is indispensable to any subsequent services.

Rather, is it not that the baraita must be referring to a case in which one advanced the applications of the blood of the bull inside the Holy of Holies ahead of the drawing of the lots? If so, from the fact that the sequencing of drawing the lots is not indispensable, one may infer that the drawing of the lots itself is also not indispensable. This would then refute Rabbi Yannai’s opinion.

The Gemara questions whether this is the only possible interpretation of the baraita: No, the baraita could be referring to a case in which one advanced the applications of the blood of the bull upon the altar ahead of the applications of the blood of the goat in the Sanctuary made toward the curtain. And as such, ruling in the baraita that this is valid after the fact is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Matters that are performed in the white garments outside of the Holy of Holies are not indispensable. Therefore, the applications of the bull’s blood upon the altar cannot disqualify a different service.

The Gemara rejects this as a possible interpretation of the baraita: But didn’t the conclusion of the baraita teach that the rule applies to the applications of blood performed inside the Holy of Holies? If so, the baraita cannot be referring to application of blood made upon the altar.

Rather, the baraita must understood in the way suggested by the Gemara previously, which implies that the drawing of the lots is not indispensable. However, this is not necessarily a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yannai. One could say: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: The drawing of the lots is not indispensable. Rabbi Yannai claimed only that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya agreed that it is indispensable.

And if you wish, say: Actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yannai’s opinion may still be defended: Granted, the baraita teaches that the sequencing of the drawing of the lots is not indispensable; however it may still be true that the drawing itself is nevertheless indispensable. This contradicts what was suggested previously, that one may infer from the indispensability of the sequencing to the indispensability of the drawing itself.

And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon follow their lines of reasoning, as it was taught in a baraita: