זבחים מו ע"א

בשני חילולין הכתוב מדבר, אחד פסול נותר, ואחד פסול טומאה.

א שנינו במשנה: חוץ מן הדם שאין חייבים עליו משום טומאה ומשום נותר. ושואלים: מנא הני מילי [מנין הדברים הללו]? ולצורך זה מביאים תחילה דיון אחר, ששאלו: מה טעם אין דין מעילה בדם? אמר עולא, אמר קרא [הכתוב] בענין דם: "ואני נתתיו לכם על המזבח לכפר" (ויקרא יז, יא), ו"לכם" בא לומר: שלכם יהא, ואין בו דין מעילה.

דבי [החכם מבית מדרשו] של ר' ישמעאל תנא [שנה], אמר קרא [הכתוב]: "לכפר" (ויקרא יז, יא), להדגיש: לכפרה נתתיו ולא למעילה.

ר' יוחנן אמר, אמר קרא [הכתוב]: "כי הדם הוא בנפש יכפר" (ויקרא יז, יא), והמלה "הוא" יש בה הדגשה, לומר: הריהו נשאר כפי שהוא — הוא דינו לפני כפרה (זריקת הדם על המזבח) כלאחר כפרה: מה אחר כפרה אין בו מעילה, שכבר ניתן ממנו לגבוה, ונעשתה מצוותו, אף לפני כפרה אין בו מעילה.

ומקשים: אימא [אמור] להיפך, לאחר כפרה יהיה דינו כלפני כפרה, מה לפני כפרה יש בו מעילה, אף לאחר כפרה יש בו מעילה! ומשיבים: דבר זה אי אפשר לומר, כי אין לך דבר שנעשית מצותו ומועלין בו.

ותוהים: ולא? וכי אין דבר כזה? והרי תרומת הדשן תרומה מדשן הקרבנות שנשרפו, שמצוה להניחה במקום מסויים אצל המזבח, והיא אסורה בהנאה ומועלים בה!

ומשיבים: אין מקום ללמוד משם לכל דין אחר, משום דהוי [שהריהם] תרומת הדשן ובגדי כהונה של כהן גדול ביום הכיפורים, שצריך לגונזם, ואסור להשתמש בהם לאחר שעבד בהם, שני כתובין הבאין כאחד, שבשניהם נאמר בתורה דין זה, וכל שני כתובים הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין לשאר דברים.

ושואלים: הניחא לרבנן דאמרי [זה נוח לשיטת חכמים שאומרים] שהכתוב "ופשט את בגדי הבד אשר לבש בבואו אל הקודש והניחם שם" (ויקרא טז, כג) — מלמד שטעונין בגדי הכהונה גניזה, ולכן מועלים בהם.

אלא לר' דוסא שאמר: מותרות הן לכהן הדיוט (שהרי הם בגדי לבן, כבגדי כהן הדיוט), ומה שנאמר "והניחם שם" בא לומר ובלבד שלא ישתמש בהן כהן גדול ליום הכפורים אחר, ולשיטתו לא נאמרה בהם מעילה, ואם כן, אין כאן שני כתובים הבאים כאחד — מאי איכא למימר [מה יש לומר]? מדוע, לדעת ר' יוחנן, לא נלמד מתרומת הדשן שיש מעילה בדם לאחר שנעשית מצוותו?

ומשיבים: משום דהוי [שהריהם] תרומת הדשן ועגלה ערופה שמועלים בה לאחר עריפתה, שני כתובין הבאין כאחד בענין זה, וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין.

ומקשים: הניחא למאן דאמר [זה נוח לדעת מי שאומר] שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין, אלא למאן דאמר [לדעת מי שאומר] מלמדין, מאי איכא למימר [מה יש לומר]?

ומשיבים: תרי מיעוטי כתיבי [שני מיעוטים כתובים] בענין זה, הכא כתיב [כאן, בעגלה, נאמר]: "העגלה הערופה" (דברים כא, ו), להדגיש שדין זה הוא רק במקרה זה, והתם כתיב [ושם, בתרומת הדשן, נאמר]: "ושמו" (ויקרא ו, ג) רק אותו בלבד, ולא אחר כיוצא בו.

עד כאן הדיון בדברי ר' יוחנן, ומעתה יש לשאול: ותלתא קראי [ושלושה מקראות] בדם, שדייקו מהם שאין בו מעילה, למה לי?

אחד למעוטי [למעט] ממעילה, אחד למעט מדין נותר, ואחד למעט מדין טומאה, ללמד שכולם אינם שייכים בדם.

ומעירים: אבל פיגול שאינו שייך בדם לא צריך קרא [מקרא מיותר], דתנן [ששנינו במשנה] לעיל: כל שיש לו מתירין, בין לאדם בין למזבח — חייבין עליו משום פיגול, ודם גופיה [עצמו] מתיר הוא, ואין לו מתיר, ולכן אין בו פיגול.

ב במשנה הובאה מחלוקת בענין דין טומאה בקדשים שאינם נאכלים. ומביאים בענין זה מה שאמר ר' יוחנן: שלשה כריתות שנאמרו בשלמים למי שאוכלם בטומאה (ויקרא ז, כ. ז, כא. כב, ג), למה?

The verse is speaking here of two profanations; one is the disqualification of notar and one is the disqualification of ritual impurity. This teaches that like impurity, notar applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.

§ The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the halakha of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. Ulla says: The verse states with regard to blood: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). “To you” indicates that it shall be yours; it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: “To make atonement,” teaching that God is saying: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: “For it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term “it is” teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: But if the term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.

The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the matter of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the halakha that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment.

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who says that these priestly vestments are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, provided that a High Priest does not use them on Yom Kippur in a different year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore what is there to say? In his opinion, the halakha of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?

The Gemara responds: It is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say?

The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this halakha applies to them alone. Here, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: “Whose neck was broken” (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this halakha, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: “And he shall put it” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this halakha applies to “it,” and nothing else.

The Gemara asks: And why do I need these three verses stated with regard to blood, from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, from the verse: “I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).

The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves to exclude the blood from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood from the prohibition of notar. If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming notar. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. And the last phrase serves to exclude it from the prohibition of ritual impurity. If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.

But no verse is required to exclude this blood from the halakha of piggul, because this is already derived from another source, as we learned in the mishna (43a): With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The permitting factor itself is not subject to piggul. And consequently, piggul does not apply to blood itself, as it renders the offering permitted for human consumption or for the altar.

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why do I need three mentions of karet with regard to one who eats peace offerings in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from his people” (Leviticus 7:20); “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21); and: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:3).