

CHAVRUTA

SHABBAT — DAF KUF MEM DALED

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The Sages conclude stating their challenge to Rabbi Akiva: But why **should the milk of an animal be impure** if it came out the animal **without** the owner's **desire**?

The Gemara explains why animal liquids impart impurity less readily: Unlike humans, the law concerning animals is **that blood that comes out of its body is pure** (i.e. it cannot prepare food to receive impurity¹) because it not considered as “blood of corpses.”² Therefore, just as animal blood is regarded less of a liquid than human blood, so animal milk is regarded as less of a liquid, and it is only susceptible to impurity if it came out with the owner's desire.

He (Rabbi Akiva) **said to them** in reply: Even though animal blood is inferior to human blood regarding impurity, animal milk nevertheless becomes susceptible to impurity without the owner's desire, **because I am stricter regarding milk than regarding blood.**

Why am I stricter? Because we see that milk becomes susceptible to impurity easier. **Because someone who milks** an animal **for** the animal's **health**, to prevent it being bloated with milk, that milk is susceptible to becoming **impure**.

But **if someone bleeds** an animal **for its healing**, that blood is **pure** and not susceptible to impurity.

Therefore, because milk is stricter, unlike blood it becomes susceptible even without the owner's desire.

¹ Food is not susceptible to becoming impure until it becomes wet from certain liquids. Because human blood is considered a liquid for this purpose it is called “impure,” and because animal blood is not considered liquid for this purpose it is called “pure.”

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They (the Sages) **said to him** (Rabbi Akiva): The law concerning **baskets of olives and grapes can prove** that liquid that comes out without one's desire is not the same as liquid that comes out with one's desire.

Because liquids that come out of them (olives and grapes) **with the desire** of the owners **are** susceptible to being **impure**, and make food susceptible to impurity. But liquids that come from them **not with** the owner's **desire are pure**, that is, they are not susceptible to impurity.

Now the Gemara ties this in to the original subject and makes the point originally raised: that according to this Baraita, unspecified³ juice of berries and pomegranates is susceptible to impurity. This will contradict what Rabbi Yehudah said in the previous *daf*:

Can we not say that “**with desire**” in the Baraita means **that he** (the owner) **is pleased with it** (the juice), and “**not with desire**” means **unspecified**, that the owner never intimated whether he wanted these grapes for their juice or not and we don't know if he is pleased or not.

The Gemara concludes its contradiction: **Now, if olives and grapes that are** generally **used to squeeze** for their juice, we nevertheless say that if the juice came out “**not with desire**” but unspecified, **it is nothing** and the juice is not considered a liquid and not susceptible to impurity.

How much more so berries and pomegranates that are generally **not used to squeeze** for their juice but are eaten, that if one brings them in to one's house unspecified, the juice that comes from them will not be considered a liquid.

² See previous *daf*.

³ Juice that comes out with no particular intent on the part of the owner. He doesn't want the juice and he doesn't not want the juice.

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This contradicts the Baraita on the previous *daf* where Rabbi Yehudah says that the unspecified juice that comes out from berries and pomegranates is indeed a liquid because we assume the owner is pleased.⁴

The Gemara answers: **No!** You are learning the Baraita here incorrectly. Actually, “**with desire**” deals **with** a case that he brought the olives and grapes in **unspecified**, for no particular purpose, and this concords with Rabbi Yehudah on the previous *daf*.

And “**not with desire**” means that **he** (the owner) explicitly **revealed his thoughts, that he said: “It does not please me”** if juice comes out of them.⁵

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The Gemara gives a second answer to the contradiction: **And if you wish, I will say another answer:**

⁴ Rashi at this point discusses two questions: First, how do we know that this baraita is according to Rabbi Yehudah, and secondly, why does the Gemara have to infer the rule of berries etc. from this baraita in order to ask a contradiction. The explicit statement of the baraita about grapes and olives contradicts Rabbi Yehudah even more, because in the previous *daf* Rabbi Yehuda says that even if one brought olives etc. in for food their juice has the status of a liquid and is susceptible to impurity?

⁵ This also answers the second contradiction mentioned in footnote 4. If someone explicitly says he does not want the olives’ and grapes’ juice, it is even more effective in preventing the juice from getting the status of a liquid than bringing them into the house to use as food.

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We can even understand the second Baraita as we understood it originally, that “without desire” means unspecified, and there is still no contradiction. Because **baskets of olives and grapes are different**. For the baskets have holes and any juice that comes out falls to the ground. Therefore, **because the juice stands to go to waste, the owner certainly considers it ownerless** if it comes out. Therefore he is definitely not pleased if any juice comes out.

And when Rabbi Yehudah said in the earlier Baraita that the juice of unspecified berries and pomegranates is susceptible to impurity, he is speaking of a case where they are in a vessel without holes and the juice can be used afterwards.

The Gemara said in the previous *daf* that 1) Rabbi Yehudah agrees to the Sages concerning olives and grapes, and 2) the Sages agree to Rabbi Yehudah concerning other fruit (except for berries and pomegranates). At the end of the last *daf* the Gemara proved point #1. Now the Gemara asks:

We find in the previous Baraita that as you said, **Rabbi Yehudah agrees with the Rabbis concerning olives and grapes.**

But **from where** do we see that **the Rabbis agree to Rabbi Yehudah concerning other fruit?**

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Ammud Bet

The Gemara answers: **Because it was taught in a Baraita:** On Shabbat **one may squeeze out *paga'in* and *perishin* and *uzradin*** (kinds of fruits that are not generally juiced) to drink their juice. This is not considered separating, a derivative of the work of Threshing, because it is not normal to squeeze these fruits.

But not pomegranates, because it is usual to juice them. **And** we see that this is usual because **people of the house of Menashya bar Menachem used to squeeze pomegranates on weekdays.**

Thus we see that it is permitted to squeeze other kinds of fruits on Shabbat.

The Gemara objects to the proof: **And from where** do you know **that** this Baraita is according to **the Rabbis? Perhaps it is like Rabbi Yehudah** and the Rabbis forbid other fruit.

The Gemara answers: **And let it** (the Baraita) **even be like Rabbi Yehudah**, it is still obvious that the Rabbis would agree to it.

For I will **say that you have heard concerning Rabbi Yehudah** that he allows one to use juice **that came out** by itself. But that it is **completely permitted** to go and squeeze out juice, **who heard him** allow such a thing?

But what can you say to explain it? **Because** these fruits **are not usually squeezed**, it is **completely permitted**. And concerning permitting one to juice fruit, we never heard of an argument between Rabbi Yehudah and the Rabbis.

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Therefore, **you could even say** that the Baraita is like the **Rabbis**, since it is reasonable to say as follows: **because they** (these fruits) **are not usually juiced**, one can squeeze them **even in the first place**.

The Gemara concludes: Therefore, you can **hear from this** that this Baraita **is also like the Rabbis**. **Hear from this** a conclusive proof.

The above Baraita stated: “But not pomegranates” because it is usual to juice them. **And** we see that this is usual because people **of the house of Menashya bar Menachem used to squeeze** pomegranates on weekdays.

Said Rav Nachman: Halachah is like the practice **of the house of Menashya bar Menachem**, that because it is usual to juice pomegranates during the week, one may not juice them on Shabbat.

Said Rava to Rav Nachman: But is Menashya ben Menachem a Tanna, that you say Halachah is like him? He didn't say any halachah but was merely brought as an example!

And if you say that this is what Rav Nachman meant: **Halachah is like this Tanna who holds like that** practice **of the house of Menashya ben Menachem**. That too is problematic, for the following reason:

Just because he holds like Menashya ben Menachem, is that a reason to say **Halachah is like him? Is the house of Menashya ben Menachem the majority of the world**, that their practice to juice pomegranates means that it common to juice pomegranates?

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The Gemara answers: **Yes!** And we find elsewhere too that if a few people do something, it is regarded as a common enough of a practice to be considered as normal behavior in Halachah.

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Introduction: It is not only forbidden to plant other agricultural species in one's vineyard, but also, if they grew by themselves one must pull them out. And if one does not and they continue growing there, one is forbidden to benefit from them.

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Because it is taught in a Mishnah: If someone maintains thorns in a vineyard, Rabbi Eliezer says: He made them forbidden and one may not gain benefit from them.

And the Sages say: He (Rabbi Eliezer) only forbids something of the kind that people maintain, and people do not generally maintain thorns, but pull them out.

And said Rabbi Chanina: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer that he forbids the thorns, as originally maintained? **Because in Arabia they maintain thorns of the fields for their camels.** Therefore, because it is usual to maintain them in one place, the thorns are forbidden everywhere.

Similarly, because the house of Menashya juiced pomegranates, it is considered a normal enough of a practice to be taken into account.

The Gemara rejects this proof: **What is the comparison? Arabia** is a whole **country**, whereas **here**, Menashya is only one person. Thus **his view is nullified** by the view of **every other person.**

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Therefore the Gemara explains the logic another way: **Rather, the reason is like** what **Rav Chisda** said.

Because Rav Chisda said: If someone squeezes spinach and puts them (their liquid) **in a mikveh⁶**, it (the liquid) **disqualifies the mikveh by changing the appearance** of the water.

But how can this be? **They** (spinach) **are not usually squeezed**, and therefore their juice is not Halachically considered a liquid. And only liquids can disqualify a *mikveh* by changing the appearance of its water.

But what can you say to resolve this difficulty? **Because he gave importance** to the spinach juice by squeezing it out, **it** therefore **becomes** considered **a liquid** and disqualifies the *mikveh*.

And here too, because he (Menashya) squeezed the pomegranates, **he gave them importance and they become** considered **a liquid**.

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Rav Nachman explains the above Baraita as follows:⁷ On Shabbat “one may squeeze out *paga'in* and *perishin* and *uzradin*” to improve them for eating, but not in order to drink their juice. “But not pomegranates.” These, one may not squeeze even to improve them for eating, because the people “of the house of Menashya bar Menachem used to squeeze” pomegranates to drink their juice. Therefore we are concerned that if people squeeze pomegranates to improve them for eating, they may end up squeezing them for their juice.

⁶ Purifying pool

⁷ This new explanation is required to explain how the action of one person (Ben Menashya) affects other people.

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Rav Pappa rejects the above answer that is based on Rav Chisda:

Rav Pappa said: The spinach juice disqualifies the *mikveh* not because it is a liquid, but because it is a thing that one may not use to make a *mikveh* from, in the first place. And anything that one may not make from it a *mikveh* in the first place, it invalidates a *mikveh* by changing its (the water's) appearance.

The Gemara just had a disagreement whether something has to be considered a liquid in order to invalidate a *mikveh* by changing its appearance (first view), or whether it is enough that the substance that changes the *mikveh's* appearance is something that may not be used to make a *mikveh* in the first place (second view - Rav Pappa).

The Gemara now brings the same disagreement in connection with another Mishnah.

It was taught in the Mishnah there: If wine, or vinegar of olive sap, fell into it (a *mikveh*), and changed its (the *mikveh's*) appearance, the *mikveh* is invalid. Initially, the Gemara understands this in accordance with view #1 above, that only things considered liquids invalidate a *mikveh* by changing the appearance of its water.

Therefore the Gemara asks: **Who is the Tanna who holds that olive sap⁸ is considered a liquid?**

There are three kinds of olive sap. 1) That which emerges as soon as one puts the olives in the press in preparation to pressing them, which is clear as water. 2) The sap that emerges after the olives have been pressed together in the press for a few days, before

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one has started pressing them. 3) The sap that emerges from the mass of olives after the oil has been squeezed from the olives.

Said Abaye: It is Rabbi Yaakov. Because it was taught in a Baraita: Rabbi Yaakov says: Olive sap is considered like a liquid.

And what is the reason they said: olive sap that comes out at the beginning (stage 1) is not considered a liquid **and is pure** and not susceptible to impurity? **Because he** (the owner) **does not want its existence**, and we saw earlier that undesired liquids are not considered liquids.

Rabbi Shimon says: Olive sap is not like a liquid.

And according to him, **why did they say: sap that comes from the *ikul*** (a box with a bottom like a sieve in which the squeezed-out olives were kept) **of the olive press** (stage 3 sap) **is impure** (susceptible to impurity)? **Because it is impossible for it** (this sap) **to not have drops of oil** mixed in it.

The Gemara inquires: **What is the difference between them** (Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Shimon)? Rabbi Yaakov and Rabbi Shimon seem to agree that stage 1 is not a liquid, and they both seem to agree that stage three is a liquid.

The Gemara answers: **There is between them** the status of olive sap **that comes after** being **crowded** together for a few days in the press before they are pressed (stage 2).

Rabbi Yaakov considers this as liquid because he only *excluded* stage 1, and Rabbi Shimon does not, because he only *included* stage 3.

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⁸ The Gemara assumes that the just mentioned Mishnah is talking about the second kind of olive sap listed

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Rava now learns the Mishnah in accordance with the second view in the previous section of Gemara:

Rava says: You can even learn the Mishnah in accordance with Rabbi Shimon who says that olive sap (stage 2) is not considered a liquid. **Because it is something that one may not make a *mikveh* from,** and things that one may not make the *mikveh* from, **invalidate the *mikveh* by changing its appearance.**

The Gemara now says that one is allowed to squeeze out fruit juice on Shabbat, if it is squeezed directly onto food.

Said Rav Yehudah said Shmuel: A person may squeeze a bunch of grapes into a **dish** of food because this shows that he does not want the juice as a liquid, but as flavor for the food. This is not considered separating the edible part, i.e. the juice, from waste, i.e. the pulp, because the normal way separating is done is when one separates a *liquid* from food. But here it is as if one is separating food from food—since the juice immediately becomes part of the dish.

But one may not squeeze grapes **into a bowl** that has no food in it, because sometimes a person is interested in having liquid in a bowl. Therefore he cannot claim that squeezing it into the bowl gives it the status of food.

Said Rav Chisda: From the words of our teacher (Shmuel), we learn that a person can milk a goat into a pot of food, but not into a bowl without food.

We see that he (Shmuel) holds that any liquid that comes into food, is considered food.

in the next paragraph, because the third kind of sap is less common.

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Rami bar Chama contradicted this, from the following source: A *zav*⁹ **who milked a goat, the milk is impure**, because a *zav* imparts impurity to things merely by moving them (*heiset*).

And if you say that liquid that came into food is regarded as food, then if the *zav* milked the goat into a pot of food, the milk would be regarded as solid food, not liquid. And then it should not be impure, because solid food is not susceptible to impurity unless it previously got wet from liquid. Thus the Gemara asks, rhetorically: **With what did it (the milk) become susceptible** to impurity?

The Gemara answers: The answer is as **Rabbi Yochanan** said:

A Mishnah states that if milk falls from a *nidah*¹⁰ into the inside of an oven, it imparts impurity to the oven by touching it. This is problematic, because her milk is meant for feeding a baby and is therefore considered like food and not liquid. If so, what liquid touched her milk to make it susceptible to impurity?

And Rabbi Yochanan answers: It becomes susceptible **by touching the first drop smeared on the nipple**, which is regarded as liquid because the baby does not drink it.

And here too, when the person milked a goat into a pot of food, the milk became susceptible after touching **the first drop smeared on the nipple** of the goat.

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The Gemara poses another contradiction to the principle that liquid squeezed into food is considered as food and not liquid.

⁹ A man with impurity due to a seminal-like emission.

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Ravina posed a contradiction, from a Baraita: **Someone impure from a corpse** (*tamei meit*) **who squeezed olives and grapes** that had the volume **like** an **exact** volume of an **egg**, the juice that comes from them is **pure**.

The case is that the person did not touch the juice itself but only the olives or grapes. As soon as the first drop began to emerge, the fruit no longer had an egg volume, and therefore it could not impart impurity to the juice coming out of it.¹¹

¹⁰ Woman with the impurity of menstruation.

¹¹ Because only food of at least an egg-volume can impart impurity to other food and drink.