

CHAVRUTA

SHABBAT – DAF KUF LAMED CHET

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Rather, said Abaye: it is a Rabbinic prohibition to suspend a strainer. The reason for the prohibition is, **so that he does not act in a manner similar to the way that he acts on a weekday** – when he regularly suspends a strainer to strain substantial amounts of wine at one time.

Abaye collected and classified **groups of laws** of **Baraitot**, according to the order of their liabilities, exemptions and allowances, **and taught** them as follows:

1) A *gud* - a leather bag that has straps to suspend it on stakes. Travelers use it to carry wine, and they stretch it out and suspend it on stakes so that the wind can blow under the wine and keep it chilled. And this is considered a temporary structure.

And a strainer – as was stated in the Mishnah.

A *kilah* – a canopy, spread above a bed and hanging down on its four sides. It was normal to remove it after using the bed, and therefore it is considered a temporary structure.

A *Galin chair* – a chair from a place called *Galin*. This type of chair has a number of sections that are assembled each time a person uses it. And the Sages were concerned that when he assembles it, he will join the pieces with force and thus do the Torah prohibition of *Makeh Bepatish*¹.

One should not do any of these acts, **and if he did** them he is **exempt** by Torah law **but forbidden** Rabbinically.

¹ Lit. "striking the final hammer blow". This category of work encompasses all types of making a utensil.

PEREK 20 – 138A

2) A person should not make permanent tents, and if he made them, he is obligated to bring a **sin-offering**.

3) **But** regarding a folding **bed** - whose sections are attached to one another, and when one wants to lie on it, all one needs to do is to set in place the feet that the bed stands on.

And a folding chair.

And a folding toilet seat, that has a hole and is used as a toilet.

It is completely permitted to spread all of these out on Shabbat

It was taught in the Mishnah: **and one may not pour into a suspended strainer on Shabbat.**

They, the scholars of the study hall, **posed an inquiry**: if he transgressed and **strained**, **what** is the Halachah?

Said Rav Kahana: if he **strained**, he is **liable** for transgressing a Torah prohibition and is obligated to bring a **sin-offering**.

Rav Sheishet challenged it, Rav Kahana's statement: **is there** (i.e. do we find) such a **case** i.e. such an extreme disagreement, where **the Rabbis hold one liable for a sin-offering**, and **Rabbi Eliezer permits it completely**?

Rav Yosef challenged it: **why** can we **not** have such an extreme disagreement?

Note that we have a case of one who carries out a '**city of gold**' (a golden ornament containing a representation of a city) to a public domain on Shabbat, **where Rabbi Meir holds one liable for a sin-offering**, but **Rabbi Eliezer permits it completely**.

PEREK 20 – 138A

And the Gemara explains: **what is it** i.e. what case is it?

As it is taught in a Baraita: **a woman may not go out** on Shabbat while **wearing a ‘city of gold’**. This is because it is heavy, and only worn to show one’s wealth, and so it is not considered jewelry but rather a burden.

And if she does go out wearing it, **she is liable** to bring **a sin-offering**, these are **the words of Rabbi Meir**.

And the Sages say: she may not go out even though it is considered to be jewelry. For the Sages were concerned that she will take it off and show it to her friends, and carry it four *amot*² in the public domain. **And if she goes out** wearing it, **she is exempt** by Torah law but liable Rabbinically.

Rabbi Eliezer says: a woman is completely permitted to go out wearing a ‘city of gold’, since only prominent women that wear them, and a prominent woman would not remove jewelry in public to display it.

Abaye said to him: do you think Rabbi Eliezer was directing his disagreement **towards Rabbi Meir, who says that she is liable** to bring **a sin-offering?**

Rabbi Eliezer **was directing** his disagreement **towards the Rabbis** (i.e. the Sages) **who said: exempt** by Torah law **but forbidden** Rabbinically. **And he said to them: it is completely permitted.**

Even though we have not found such an extreme disagreement between the Tannaim, nevertheless Rav Kahana’s view – that according to the Rabbis ,one who strains is liable to bring a sin-offering – has not been rejected.

² 1 ammah: 18.7 in., 48 cm

PEREK 20 – 138A

They, the scholars of the study hall, posed an inquiry: one who puts wine lees to strain on Shabbat in order to filter the wine, **for what** form of work **do we warn him?**

Said Rabbah: the forbidden work of straining is certainly a secondary³ form of the forbidden work of sifting. However, he is also liable **for** doing the forbidden work of **selecting**.

Rabbi Zeira said: he is only warned **for sifting**.

Said Rabbah: my view stands to reason - that straining is similar to selecting. For **just as the way of selecting** is that **one takes the food from the waste, so too here**, regarding the function of the strainer, it **takes the food and leaves the waste**.

Said Rabbi Zeira: my view stands to reason – that straining is more similar to sifting. For **just as the way of sifting** leaves **waste on top and food below, so too here**, regarding the function of the strainer, it leaves **the waste on top and the food below**. However one who selects, takes the grain and leaves the pebbles below.

Rami bar Yechezkel taught in a Baraita: **one should not make** a shelter from a **folded garment**; spreading it over four posts from above and making walls on the sides, for protection from the sun. **And if he made** it, he is **exempt** by Torah law **but** it is **forbidden** Rabbinically.

If there was a thread or rope wrapped around it in order that it should be easy to spread it out, and it was lying on the posts from before Shabbat, **it is completely**

³ Lit.—“offspring”.

PEREK 20 – 138A

permitted to spread it out on Shabbat. As the Sages considered the thread or rope on the garment to be like the start of a tent, and the spreading out to be merely adding a temporary tent, which is permitted.

Rav Kahana posed an inquiry to Rav: what is the law concerning spreading out a canopy on Shabbat?

He said to him: even setting up a bed, which is a case that could be viewed more leniently than that of a canopy, **is prohibited.**

Rav Kahana posed an inquiry: **what is the law concerning setting up a bed?**

He said to him: even spreading out a canopy is sometimes permitted, and certainly not every bed is prohibited.

He posed an inquiry: **what is the law concerning spreading out a canopy and setting up a bed?** Are their laws the same?

He said to him: there is a difference between them. **A canopy is prohibited and a bed is permitted.**

The Gemara explains the various, seemingly contradictory rulings: **And there is no difficulty.**

That which he said: ‘even a bed is prohibited’, is referring to a bed **similar to those of the Karmenai** which are regularly assembled and dismantled.

That which he said: ‘even a canopy is permitted’, is referring to the view of **Rami bar Yechezkel**, where a thread is wrapped around it.

PEREK 20 – 138A

That which he said: ‘**a canopy is prohibited and a bed is permitted**’, is referring to **our beds** and canopies, where there is no thread wrapped around the canopy, and the bed is not in sections.

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Said Rav Yosef: I have observed the canopies of Rav Huna, that in the evening they were spread out and in the morning they were thrown down to the ground, because they had a thread or rope attached. And just like Rav Huna permitted to dismantle them, so too he would have permitted to spread them out.

Rav said in the name of Rabbi Chiya: it is permitted to hang a curtain and permitted to dismantle it. This is because the prohibition of making a tent is only applicable to something that is positioned above, horizontally, like a roof is.

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And Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Chiya: since the Sages did not prohibit setting up a vertically positioned partition, one can say the following:

PEREK 20 – 138B

Ammud Bet

Regarding a *kilat chatanim* – a **bridal bed**⁴, that has no roof, but has a canopy sloping from above, from the middle of the bed towards the sides (hanging from a central pole) – **it is permitted to spread it, the canopy, on the pole, and permitted to dismantle it.**

Said Rav Sheishet son of Rav Idi: we only said that it is permitted, **where the roof above the bed is not a tefach** i.e. it is less than a *tefach* wide (the upper edges of the canopy are close to each other). **But if its roof is a tefach wide** – it is wide enough to constitute a tent, and **it is prohibited** to spread the canopy.

And even if its roof is not a tefach wide, we only said that it is permitted to spread the canopy over the bed, **where** the width between the two top sides of the canopy **is not a tefach, within the three tefachim** closest to the roof. I.e. at the point on the canopy at which the two sides spread out to a distance of a *tefach* width away from each other, the sides of the canopy are already a distance of three *tefachim* from the roof. Then it is permitted.

But if there is a tefach width between the edges of the canopy, and this space is **within** a distance of **three tefachim next to its roof, it is prohibited.** For the bed is considered to have a *tefach* wide roof, according to the principle of *lavud*. (This allows us to view the upper slope as if it were lowered to the place where there is a *tefach* gap between the two sides of the canopy.) And one can consider this to be a flat roof measuring the width of a *tefach*.

And we only said that hanging the canopy of the bridal bed is permitted, **if there is not a tefach** width, **beneath its canopy-slope.** I.e. each side would cover less than a *tefach*,

⁴ A bed that has two vertical poles attached to the middle of each end of the bed, and a third pole that extends across the top of the two vertical poles. A triangular canopy is formed, by spreading a canopy over the bed.

PEREK 20 – 138B

thus the total width of the bed under the canopy is less than two *tefachim*. The canopy would cover an extremely narrow area, and would be used for decoration purposes.

But if there is a *tefach* width beneath its slope, it is not considered to be a partition, but rather a tent. This is because there is a *tefach* space underneath. The halachah in such a case is that **a sloping tent is like a tent**.

And we only said that it is permitted, **when the canopy does not fall a *tefach* below the bed. But if the canopy does fall a *tefach* below the bed, it is prohibited**. And although there is no prohibition of making partitions, there is a prohibition of making a tent in this case. This is because the *tefach* overhanging is considered a partition, and the bed, a roof adjacent to it.

And said Rav Sheishet son of Rav Idi: regarding a **felt hat** that has a wide brim, **it is permitted** to wear it on Shabbat. And one should not be concerned that the brim is equivalent to making a tent.

And the Gemara posed a contradiction: And **was it not said** in a statement of Amoraim: **a felt hat – it is prohibited** to wear it on Shabbat!

And the Gemara answers: **it is not a difficulty**. **This** case, where it is prohibited to wear it – is where the brim is the size of a tent, which is a *tefach* wide. And **that** case, where it is permitted to wear it, is where the brim **is less than a *tefach***.

And the Gemara is surprised by this: according to that, regarding **one who pulls a garment a *tefach* over his head**, would **this also be** considered to be making a tent on Shabbat, and therefore **prohibited**?

PEREK 20 – 138B

And the Gemara retracts and says: **rather**, wearing clothing or hats is not considered to be making a tent. And the reason for the prohibition: perhaps the wind will blow the hat off in a public domain, and he will come to carry it four *amot* in a public domain.

Therefore, the contradiction concerning the wearing of a brimmed hat on Shabbat, **is not a difficulty**. **This** case, where it is permitted to wear it, is referring to a hat **that is fitted tightly** on his head, and there is no concern that the wind will blow it off. But **that** case, where it is prohibited to wear it, is referring to a hat that **is not fitted tightly**.

Rami bar Yechezkel sent a message to Rav Huna: Beloved one, tell us those wonderful words that you told us, in the name of Rav – two of which are regarding halachot of Shabbat, and one relating to the Torah.

He sent back the following to him:

1. Regarding **what is taught** in a Baraita, that **it is permitted to hang a leather bag** (placed on a post from which it generally hangs) **by its straps on Shabbat**. Since it is ready to be hung up from before Shabbat, it is considered to be adding a temporary tent, which is permitted.

Rav said on that Baraita: **this permit was only taught regarding** a case where **two people** spread it out, since they can not spread the bag out tightly. **But regarding one person** who can spread it out tightly – **it is prohibited**.

Said Abaye: And regarding a kilah - a canopy over a bed. It is **even prohibited for ten people** to spread it out, as it is wide **and it is impossible that it will not be tightened a little bit** when it is spread across the bed.

2. **What is the other** matter that I said in Rav's name regarding the halachot of Shabbat?

As it is taught in a Baraita: regarding **an oven that had one of its legs broken off** – it is permitted to move it. If **two** of its legs broke off, **it is prohibited** to move it, since it is not considered a utensil, as it can not stand on its remaining two legs.

PEREK 20 – 138B

Said Rav: even if one of its legs is broken off, it is **prohibited** to move it. This is not because of *muktzeh*, but rather because the Rabbis decreed lest one come to fix its leg by pushing it in with force when he come to reattach it. And then he would be liable for the forbidden work of Building.

3. And the matter relating to the **Torah**:

As Rav said: In the future, the Torah will be forgotten from the Jewish people. As it says (*Devarim*⁵ 28:59), “**Then Hashem will make your blows extraordinary**”. I.e. the Jewish people will undergo extraordinary punishment.

This word “extraordinary” — I do not know what it is referring to.

When it says (*Yeshayahu*⁶ 29:14), “**Therefore I will do extraordinary things among this people, exceedingly extraordinary**, for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish and the understanding of its sages will become concealed.”

Say, then, the word ‘extraordinary’ is referring to the **Torah** — that it will become forgotten from them. For that is their wisdom and understanding.

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The Rabbis taught in a Baraita: **when our Rabbis entered Kerem Beyavneh**, the location of the Sanhedrin after the destruction of the Second Temple, **they said: in the future, the Torah will become forgotten from the Jewish people.**

As it says (*Amos* 8:12), “**Behold days are coming, declares Hashem, that I will send a hunger into the land, not a hunger for bread and not a thirst for water, but to hear the words of Hashem.**”

PEREK 20 – 138B

And it is written (Amos 8:12), “**And they shall journey from sea to sea and from the north to the east, they shall wander to seek the word of Hashem, but shall not find it.**”

In these verses, it is written the phrase “word of Hashem”, implying one matter, and “words of Hashem”, implying many matters. This shows there are three types of matters that will be forgotten. And these are they:

1. **Word of Hashem - this is Halachah**, as it is written (*Devarim* 5:5), “to relate the word of Hashem to you.”
2. **Word of Hashem - this is the end** of exile, as it is written (*Ezra* 1:1), “In the first year of Cyrus king of Persia, upon the conclusion of Hashem’s prophecy by the mouth of Jeremiah.”
3. **Word of Hashem - this is prophecy**, as it is written (*Hoshea* 1:1), “The word of Hashem that came to Hoshea.”

And what is the meaning of the verse “**They shall wander to seek the word of Hashem**”, which implies that they will go around from place to place in one city?

They said: in the future, a woman will take a loaf of bread of *terumah*⁷, and go around the synagogues and houses of study, to find out if it is impure or pure. And no one will know the answer, even though it is a standard question.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: how can no one in the houses of study know **if it is pure or impure**, the written law is surely accessible to them. And **it is clearly written in it** that a loaf of bread contracts impurity, as it says (*Vayikra*⁸ 11:34), “Of any food that is eaten ... shall contract impurity.”

⁵ Deuteronomy

⁶ Isaiah

⁷ The first portion of the crop separated and given to a kohen.

⁸ Leviticus

PEREK 20 – 138B

And the Gemara answers: **rather**, she asked the question **to know if it** the loaf of bread that contracted impurity from an impure oven **is a first degree of impurity, or, whether it is a second degree of impurity. And no one knew** the answer.

First degree and second degree (*rishon* and *sheini*) are levels of secondary impurity. In other words, they describe how far removed the impurity is from the primary source. In a case where a dead creeping creature, such as a mouse, is the primary source of impurity, an oven that touched the mouse (from the oven's inside surface) contracts first degree impurity. And a loaf of bread that touched the oven has second degree impurity.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: **this is also** a clear halachah **in a Mishnah**. And it is inconceivable that a Mishnah would be forgotten.

As it was taught in a Mishnah: **a creeping creature that is found in an oven – bread that is inside** such an oven **contracts a second degree of impurity**. This is **because the oven** that contracted impurity **is a first degree** of impurity, and this renders the bread inside it a second degree of impurity.

And the Gemara answers: **they were in doubt** concerning the understanding of the law and its source. And they were unable to answer **that** question posed by Rav Ada, in the way that Rava answered it.

For Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: why does the bread in the oven only contract a second degree of impurity? Ovens are generally made of earthenware, and their law is that impurity is conveyed when the creeping creature is in its airspace, even when it is not touching it. And since this is so, **the oven should be seen as if it is filled with impurity. And the bread should be a first degree of impurity**, as if it had actually touched the creeping creature.

He Rava said to him: we do not say the oven should be seen as if it is filled with impurity. And this is proven from the law that the Baraita derives from the verse.

PEREK 20 – 138B

For it was taught in a Baraita: **I would have thought that all utensils** inside an earthenware vessel that has a creeping creature inside its airspace **should contract impurity in the airspace of the earthenware vessel.**

Therefore, **the verse says** (*Vayikra* 11:33-34), **“Whatever is within it shall contract impurity.... from all food that is eaten”**. This teaches us that only **food can contract impurity from the airspace of an earthenware utensil. And utensils cannot contract impurity in the airspace of an earthenware utensil.**

The Torah teaches us two laws:

1. An earthenware vessel contracts impurity via its airspace, and can convey impurity to other things via its airspace. But it is not considered to be filled with impurity, for if that were the case, why would a wooden or metal utensil found inside an earthenware utensil not contract impurity? For they can contract impurity even from their outside.
2. A utensil can only contract impurity from a primary source of impurity, such as a dead creeping creature, and not from a secondary source. Therefore, utensils found in impure earthenware vessels can not contract impurity. For the earthenware vessel is a secondary source, albeit of the first degree.

It was taught in a Baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai says: Heaven forbid that the Torah should be forgotten from the Jewish people. And even the oral Torah will not be forgotten, as it says (*Devarim* 31:21), **“For it shall not be forgotten from the mouth of its offspring.”**