

CHAVRUTA

SHABBAT – DAF AYIN CHET

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[Is it not this issue that they dispute? That Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds the view that the minimum amount of oil that one is liable for transferring from domain to domain on Shabbat is merely enough to anoint a small limb of a day-old infant.

And Rabbi Natan holds the view that enough oil is required to anoint either a small limb of an adult, or a large limb of a day-old infant. But oil to anoint a small limb of a day-old infant is not sufficient to be liable!] (Explanation #1)

The Gemara rejects this approach: **No!**

The disagreement in the Baraita can be explained differently:

That everyone agrees that taking out enough oil to anoint **the small limb of a day-old infant** does **not** make one liable, **and that** former statement **of Rabbi Yanai is not** agreed to by anyone in this Baraita.

And here in this Baraita, **this is what they are disagreeing** about:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds the view that a small limb of an adult and a large limb of a day-old infant are the same measure, and either can be used to estimate how much oil makes one liable.

But **Rabbi Natan holds the view: The small limb of an adult – yes!** We estimate according to how much oil one needs to anoint it. **But a large limb of a day-old infant – no!** It is a different measure and we do not measure according to it. (Explanation #2)

What happened with it? In conclusion, shall we understand the Baraita like explanation #1 or #2?

Come and hear a proof that we follow explanation #1.

Because it was taught in a Baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Oil – enough to anoint the smallest limb of a day-old infant. And this is how we understood Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's opinion in explanation #1.

We learnt in the Mishnah: **Water – enough to dissolve kilor** (an eye-medicine) **in it.**

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Said Abaye: Indeed, it is true that **everything that has a common function and a non-common function, the Sages go after the common function** to determine the minimum amount that one is liable for, regarding transferring it from domain to domain on Shabbat.

And this rule applies even **for being lenient**. Examples will follow.

And **when** one function of a substance is **common, and** another function is also **common, the Sages go after that one which is common to be** on the **strict** side. In other words, one is liable for the smaller measure of the two.

Therefore **wine**, that **its use for drinking is common, and its use for healing is not common,**¹ **the Sages go after its amount that is used for drinking, which is common, to be lenient.**²

Similarly with **milk: Its use for eating is common, and its use for healing is not common.**³ Therefore **the Sages go after its larger amount that is used for eating, to be lenient.**

But **honey** is different: Because **its use for eating is common and its use for healing is also common,**⁴ therefore **the Sages go after its smaller amount that is used for healing, to be strict.**

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Abaye poses a difficulty, based on the above rule: **But** according to this, our Mishnah's statement concerning **water** is problematic: **Indeed, its use for drinking is common,**⁵ and **its use for healing is not common.**⁶

If so, **what is the reason the Sages go after its use for healing to be strict**, and make one liable for taking out a smaller measure?

The Gemara answers: **Said Abaye: The Mishnah was taught in the Galilee**, where the people were poor and never used any liquid to dissolve *kilor* except water. So for them, it was common to use the small quantity of water for healing.

Rava said: Even if you say that the Mishnah is dealing **with other places**, it can be understood **in accordance with that statement of Shmuel.**

¹ For example, to dissolve eye medicine in it.

² Because the minimal amount of wine a person drinks is more than the amount used to dissolve eye medicine. This results in a leniency: One can bring out enough wine to be used for eye medicine, without being liable a sin offering for this.

³ To dissolve eye medicine.

⁴ Because it is the only substance fitting to make the cure of *katit*.

⁵ Because water is most commonly used to slake the thirst, while wine is only drunk during meals.

⁶ Because *kilor* can be mixed with any liquid.

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For Shmuel said: All liquids that one dissolves the *kilor* in, they indeed **heal**. **But they leave a residue** on the eye that eventually causes blindness. **Except for water, which heals and does not leave a residue.** Therefore people commonly use water for this healing.

We learnt in the Mishnah: **And other liquids**, one needs to take out a *revi'it*⁷ **to be liable.**

The Sages taught in a Baraita: **Blood and all kinds of liquids**, to be liable one must take out a *revi'it*.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: There is **blood** of a certain animal that one is liable for even if one takes out only **enough to anoint one eye**. **Because one anoints** with this type of blood **for** an eye disease called *barkit*.

And what is it? What blood is used for this? **The blood of a wild chicken.**

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: There is another kind of **blood**, too, that one is liable for if one takes out enough **to anoint one eye**. **Because one anoints** with this type of blood **for** a **cataract**.

And what is it? What blood is used for this? **The blood of a bat.**

And your sign to remember which blood to use for which disease is:

The blood of the bat that lives **inside** a cave, **for** the cataract that is **inside** the eye.

The blood of the wild chicken that lives **outside**, **for** the *barkit* that protrudes **outside** the eye.

The Baraita continues: **In what case are we speaking** when we say that one needs to take out a specific amount of blood to be liable? **When one takes out** to the public domain under normal circumstances.

But if one specially **stores away** even the tiniest amount of blood for some special use and then takes it out, one is **liable** for even the **tiniest amount**.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai disagrees with the views previously expressed, that bat blood and wild chicken blood have a smaller minimum amount.

⁷ *revi'it*: 86.4 gm or 2.9 fl. oz.

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He says: **When do we say this**, that one is liable for smaller quantities? **In** a case when one specially **stored away** the bat's blood or wild chicken blood to heal with. **But if one took it out** under normal circumstances, **one is only liable with** carrying out a *revi'it*.

And the Sages agree to Rabbi Shimon in a case of **taking out waste water to the public domain, that their amount** to be liable is a *revi'it*, because this is the amount needed for their normal function of kneading clay.⁸

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The master i.e. the Tanna of the Baraita **said** above: **In what case are we speaking** when we say that one needs to take out a specific amount of blood to be liable? **When one takes out** to the public domain under normal circumstances.

But if one specially **stores away** even the tiniest amount of blood for some special use, one will be **liable** even for the **tiniest amount**.

The Gemara poses a difficulty: **But one who stores away, is he not also one who takes out?** Surely, he will not be liable for merely storing it. He will be liable only when he takes it out. Yet the Baraita omitted any mention of his taking it out.

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: **Said Abaye: Here with what are we dealing? With an apprentice whose master said to him: Go and clear me a place for a meal! And he went and cleared him** a place, and carried something into the public domain in the process.

Then the rule is as follows: **A thing that is** of an amount **important to everyone, he is liable for carrying it**. But **a thing that is** of an amount **not important to everyone—if his master had specially stored it away, he** (the apprentice) **is liable for carrying it**.⁹ **And if he** (the master) **had not specially stored it away, he** (the apprentice) **is not liable**. Thus the Baraita omitted mention of his taking it out, since the one who stored it is not the one who took it out to the public domain.

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The master said in the previous Baraita: **the Sages agree to Rabbi Shimon in** a case of **taking out waste water to the public domain, that their amount** to be liable is a *revi'it*.

The Gemara inquires: **Waste water – for what is it fitting?**

⁸ And to be liable for less, one would have to specially put it away for that special purpose where less is needed.

⁹ The Gemara is explaining the Baraita according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar who said before (76a) that if one person specially puts away something, anyone else who takes it out is also liable.

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The Gemara explains: **Said Rabbi Yirmiyah: To knead clay with it.**

The Gemara poses a difficulty: **But it was taught in a Baraita: Clay – enough to make with it the mouth of an earthenware furnace** used by gold refiners, which is the smallest of furnaces. They insert the bellows into the mouth. Yet, to produce such clay requires less than a *revi'it* of water. So why isn't one liable if one takes out this smaller measure of water?

The Gemara answers: **It is not difficult.**

This small amount of clay used for the mouth of the furnace is referring to **when it is already mixed** with water.

But **this** case where one requires a *revi'it* of water is **when it** (the clay) **is not mixed. Because a person does not exert himself to mix clay** of such a small amount **to make the mouth of a furnace.** He rather prepares more clay for other things as well, and that larger amount of clay requires a *revi'it*.

Mishnah:

If **someone takes out rope**, the amount to be liable to bring a sin-offering is - **sufficient to make from it a handle of a basket.**

If someone takes out a **reed cord**, the amount to be liable is - **enough to make a hanger¹⁰ for a sieve or basket sieve.**

Rabbi Yehudah says: Enough to take with it the measure of **a shoe for a child.¹¹**

Paper, enough to write on it a toll man's receipt (see footnote).¹²

And if someone takes out a toll man's receipt he is liable.¹³

Ammud Bet

¹⁰ A loop to hang them on.

¹¹ To show it to a cobbler. This measure is smaller than a patch of a sieve.

¹² If someone paid a bridge toll in advance (or was freed from paying it), he was given a receipt that consisted of a piece of paper with two larger than usual letters written on it e.g.: A B.

¹³ See Tosafot *d"h Hamotzi* (78b) who explains what this ostensibly superfluous sentence adds.

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Erased paper that cannot be written on - **enough to wrap on** the mouth of a **small container of perfume** as a cover. This is larger than a toll man's receipt.

Leather - enough to make the container of **an amulet** (*Bartenura*).

Parchment - enough to write on it the smallest passage in the tefillin, which is the first of the four passages, that of *Shema Yisrael*.¹⁴

Ink - enough to write two letters.¹⁵

Kechol (a cosmetic used to color the skin round the eyes) - **enough to paint one eye.**

Glue used to trap birds - **enough to put on the end of the *shafshaf*** - a small plank on top of a pole, that hunters smear with glue to trap birds.

Pitch and sulfur - enough to make a small hole in it. Mercury is kept in a container sealed shut with pitch or sulfur. A small hole is pierced in the pitch or sulfur in order to pour out the mercury when it is needed.

Wax - enough to put on, and seal, the opening of the small hole that is pierced in the pitch or sulfur.

Clay (made from crushed brick) - **enough to make the opening of a furnace of gold refiners** where the bellows is inserted.

Rabbi Yehudah says: Enough to make the *pitput* – the clay base of the furnace.

Bran - enough to put at the mouth of a furnace of gold refiners. When charcoal was not available, they refined the gold by burning bran.

Lime - enough to smear the smallest of girls in order to remove premature pubic hair.

Rabbi Yehudah says: Enough to make a *kilkul* – to smooth the hair at the temples of the head.

Rabbi Nechemiah says: To smear *undufi* – to smear just below the temples (of a woman) to remove the fine hair growing there.

¹⁴ Because parchment is expensive it is not used for a toll man's receipt and one is only liable if one takes out this bigger quantity.

¹⁵ Two letters are sometimes useful, for example, to write matching letters on two implements or two planks to show that they are meant to be together.

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Gemara

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Regarding **rope, one should also be liable** if one took out the smaller amount mentioned in connection with reed cord, which is - **enough to make a hanger for a sieve or basket sieve**. Why does one need to take out the larger amount to make a handle for a basket?

The Gemara resolves the difficulty: **Since it** (rope) **chafes a wooden implement, people do not make** a hanger for a sieve etc. out of a rope.

The Sages taught: Palm leaves – enough to make the handle of a basket, an ‘Egyptian’ basket that is made of palm leaves.

Palm fiber (the mat-like fiber that grows on the trunk), **others** (i.e. Rabbi Meir) **say – enough to put on the mouth of a small funnel to filter the wine**.

Grease – to grease the oven floor under a small wafer cake.

And how much is the **measure** of this cake? **Like** the volume of a *sela* coin.

The Gemara asks: **But it was taught in another Baraita: Like** the volume of a **dried fig?**

The Gemara answers: **This and that are the same amount**.

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The Baraita continues: **Soft things** (like feathers and cotton wool) – **enough to make a small ball**.

And how much is its measure, of the ball? Like the volume of a **nut**.

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We learnt in the Mishnah: **Paper, enough to write on it a toll man’s receipt**.

It was taught in a Baraita: **How much paper is a toll man’s receipt?** The size big enough to write **two** larger than normal **letters** (e.g. AB) **of the toll man’s receipt**.

And they pose a contradiction to this from another Baraita which stated: **If someone takes out blank paper – if it has enough size to write two letters, he is liable. And if not, he is exempt**. The Gemara assumes that the “letters” here are normal sized letters.

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The Gemara resolves the contradiction: **Said Rav Sheshet: What are the two letters in the last Baraita? Two larger than normal letters of a toll man's receipt**, and not normal letters as we thought.

Rava says: This is what that last Baraita means: The paper must be large enough to write **two of our** normal sized letters. **And** why does our Mishnah require paper that is large enough for two extra-sized toll-man letters? Because after writing two normal sized letters, one still needs a bit more **place to hold** the paper, **which** means that a paper big enough for two normal letters including a margin **is** the same size as **a toll man's receipt** with its bigger letters, but without a margin.

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There **is a Baraita** that **contradicts** Rava:

The Baraita says as follows: **If someone takes out erased paper or the document of a paid debt, if its margin has enough space to write two letters, or if the whole of it** (the paper or document) **is enough to wrap on the mouth of a small container of perfume, he is liable. And if not, he is exempt.**

This is alright for Rav Sheshet who said, to explain the earlier Baraita: **what are two letters? Two letters of a toll man's receipt.** If we say this, it is **fine**. Because here, too, one can explain that the margin has enough for those bigger letters.

But according to Rava who says there **that** a normal piece of paper needs place for **two normal letters of ours, and also a place to hold it, and that makes it** the same size as **a toll man's receipt**, this Baraita is difficult. **Because here**, too, he will learn that the margin of the papers require room for two letters and a bit extra to hold it. But here, **one does not need a place to hold it**. For there is plenty of room to hold the erased paper or paid-up document.

The Gemara concludes: This second Baraita is indeed **difficult** to Rava.

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The Sages taught in a Baraita: **If someone takes out a toll man's receipt before he showed it to the toll man, he is liable. After he showed it to the toll man and does not need it any more, he is exempt.**

Rabbi Yehudah says: **Even after he shows it to the toll man, he is liable because he still needs it.**

What is the difference of opinion **between them?** Why should the person still need the receipt afterwards?

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Said Abaye: There is a difference of opinion **between them** over whether people generally keep such receipts to show to **runners** of the **toll man** - people sent to run after those who have already crossed the bridge, to see if they paid.

Rabbi Yehudah maintains that people keep their receipts because of these runners, whereas the first Tanna maintains that if necessary, people can always return to the toll man even without the receipt, and he will vouch that they paid.

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Rava says a different explanation of the argument between the first Tanna and Rabbi Yehudah: The argument **between them concerns a head toll man and a minor toll man**. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that after a person shows the receipt to the head toll man (who is not at the bridge), he still needs to show the receipt to the minor toll man who is manning the bridge. And the first Tanna maintains that the head toll man gives the traveler a password to repeat to the minor toll man at the bridge, so he no longer needs the receipt.

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Rav Ashi says a third explanation of the argument: The argument **between them is even concerning one toll man**. **Because** Rabbi Yehudah maintains **that he** (the traveler) **needs it** (the receipt) **to show to a second toll man** at another bridge.

Because he shows him the paid receipt and **says to him: See that I am a ‘toll men’s man’**, who does not cheat them, so that the second one will trust him and not accuse him of cheating.

The Sages taught: If someone (a creditor) **takes out a promissory note** into the public domain on Shabbat –

So long as he (the debtor) **has not paid him**, he is **liable** because he needs the note.

After he paid him, he is **exempt** because he (the creditor) no longer needs it.

Rabbi Yehudah says: Even after he (the debtor) **paid it**, the creditor is still **liable**, **because he still needs it** to wrap round the mouth of a container.

The Gemara inquires: **What is** the disagreement **between them**, the first Tanna and Rabbi Yehudah?

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Said Rav Yosef: The disagreement that **is between them**, is **whether** it is **forbidden to keep a paid** promissory **document**.

The Sages hold the view: It is **forbidden** for a creditor **to keep a paid** promissory **document** because he might mistakenly demand the debt a second time.¹⁶

And Rabbi Yehudah holds the view: It is **permitted** for a creditor **to keep a paid** promissory **document**. Therefore if the creditor takes it out he is liable, because he can use it to wrap around the mouth of a container.

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Abaye says a second explanation of the disagreement: **That everyone** agrees that it is **forbidden to keep a paid** promissory **document**.

And here, they (the Sages and Rabbi Yehudah) **are arguing concerning a** promissory **document that he** (the debtor) agrees that he **wrote** it, and it bears the signatures of valid witnesses. But the debtor claims that he already paid the debt.

And the disagreement is whether the creditor **has to confirm** the document's validity by proving that the witnesses' signatures aren't forged.

The first Tanna holds the view that in a case when **he** (the debtor) **admits about a document that he wrote it, he** (the creditor) still **has to confirm it** (the document), by proving that its witnesses aren't forged.¹⁷

And Rabbi Yehudah holds the view that in a case when **he** (the debtor) **admits about a document that he wrote it, he** (the creditor) **has does not have to confirm it** (the document) by proving that its witnesses aren't forged.¹⁸

And what does the Baraita mean when it says: **“Before he paid,”** and **“after he paid?”**

¹⁶ Sm”a Choshen Mishpat 266:57. This is based on the verse: “Do not let sin dwell in your tent.” And even the debtor is not allowed to keep it because he may lose it and it may get picked up by the creditor.

¹⁷ Otherwise, the debtor can argue, *migo*, because I could have denied that I borrowed the money, I have to right to claim that I paid you back.

¹⁸ Because the document is as good as two witnesses and no argument of the debtor is effective against it.