

CHAVRUTA

SHABBAT – DAF AYIN HEH

Translated by: *Rabbi Dov Grant*
Edited by: *R. Shmuel Globus*

Yes, tearing was involved in the building of the *Mishkan* (Tabernacle). **For so** it would be that **a curtain on which had fallen a worm** that then ate a hole in it – **they would tear it**. In order to avoid creases when sewing, they would tear above and below the hole. **And then they would sew it**.

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Rav Zutra bar Tuvia said over in the name of Rav three statements on separate subjects that he had heard from Rav at the same time.

- A) **One who stretches tight a thread** that has slackened, **in a stitch** joining two parts of a garment **on Shabbat**. **He is liable for a sin offering**, since this is the way of sewing a garment.
- B) **And one who learns even one teaching** of Torah **from a magosh** (a heretic devoted to idol worship). **He is liable for the death penalty**, since the *magosh* is likely to draw him to idolatry.
- C) **And one who knows how to calculate the seasons and constellations** is praiseworthy. This is someone who knows how to calculate the seasons by way of the constellations. Thus he can determine if it will be a rainy year or a sunny year, and so on. **But if he does not calculate – it is forbidden to speak about him** i.e. to speak in his praise. The reason for this will be explained, shortly.

Whenever *megoshta* is mentioned in the Gemara, what does it mean?

Rav and Shmuel disagree about this.

One says: A sorcerer.

And one says: A blasphemer. This is a heretic devoted to, and incites others to, idol worship. He frequently blasphemes the Name of Hashem.

It can be proved that Rav was the one **that said** that *megoshta* is a **blasphemer** of Hashem's Name.

For we learnt above that **Rav Zutra bar Tuviah said in the name of Rav: One who learns one teaching from a magosh is liable for death.**

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Because if you think that a *magosh* is a **sorcerer** – why would it be forbidden to learn sorcery from him? **Note that it is stated** regarding a sorcerer (Devarim¹ 18:9): **“Do not learn to do** as the abominations of those nations (e.g. sorcery)” And this is interpreted to mean “do not learn” sorcery, in order “to do” it. **But you can learn it** in order **to understand and teach**. In order that you will be able to recognize who is a sorcerer, i.e. someone pretending to be a prophet who makes a sign or wonder.

Thus **it is proved** by elimination that the one that holds *magosh* is a blasphemer is Rav. And Rav says that it is forbidden to learn anything from him. Since he is steeped in idolatry, all his speech is saturated with foreign influences. Therefore, one must avoid him, in order not to be drawn into idolatry.

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Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said in the name of **Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi** who **said in the name of Bar Kappara**, the following. **Anyone who knows how to calculate the seasons and constellations, but he does not calculate them** is not praiseworthy. **About him the verse states** (Isaiah 5:12): **“And the work of Hashem they do not perceive, and the deed of His hands they have not seen”**.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: From where do we know **that it is a mitzvah for a man to calculate the seasons and constellations?** **For it is stated:** (Devarim 4:6): **“And you shall guard and do. For this is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations”**.

The Gemara explains. **What is this “wisdom and understanding”** that is **“in the eyes of the nations”**?

You have to say that this is the calculation of the seasons and constellations. Everyone recognizes this as wisdom, for the outcome of the calculations – the prediction of a rainy or sunny year, for example – can be proved to be true.

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It was taught in our Mishnah: **Trapping a deer, etc.**

Our Sages taught in a Baraita: **One who traps a *chilazon* fish and presses it until the blood exudes.** The blood was used for making the blue dye needed for the dyed threads of the tzitzit. **He is only liable** for **one sin offering**, for the *melachah*² of trapping.

Rabbi Yehudah says: He is **liable** for **two sin offerings**.

¹ Deuteronomy

² Forbidden work

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For Rabbi Yehudah used to say: Pressing until the blood exudes is included in the category of Threshing. For extracting blood from a fish is similar to separating the grain from its husk.

They the Sages said to him: Pressing until the blood exudes is not included in the category of Threshing.

Rava said: What is the reason of the Rabbis (i.e. the Sages)? They hold the view that threshing is only applicable regarding things that grow from the ground.

The Gemara discusses this further. **But let him also be liable for the taking of a life?** For he is killing the *chilazon* when he presses its blood out.

And the Gemara answers. **Rabbi Yochanan said:** The Baraita is dealing with a case where **he presses its blood out** after it is **dead**.

Rava said: You can **even say** that the Baraita is dealing with a case **where he pressed out its blood** while it was still **alive**. And nevertheless everyone agrees that he is not liable for taking of a life. For **he is** regarded as **lacking basic intention (*mit'asek*) as regards** the act of **taking a life**.

The expression *mit'asek* is not being used here in its primary meaning. Usually it means that he had no intention to perform the action he did; rather he intended to perform a different action. Here it is being used to convey the idea that he has no intention to kill the *chilazon*. Rather, he is involved in extracting its blood, and it is just an automatic consequence of that action that the *chilazon* dies.

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The Gemara asks: **But note that Abaye and Rava both said:** Rabbi Shimon said that an action which is done without intention for a forbidden result is permitted. However, even **Rabbi Shimon agrees regarding** the case of **“He is cutting off its head and will it not die?” – that it is forbidden**. Rashi in Succah 33b explains: This is the case where someone says: “I will cut off the head of this animal on Shabbat, and I do not want it to die”. Nevertheless, since it is a certainty that the animal will die, it is considered as if he had intended it to do so.

Here also, it is a certainty that the *chilazon* will die when he presses out its blood. So how can Rava say that this is permitted because it is a case of *mit'asek* i.e. lack of intention?

And the Gemara answers. The case **is different here** from the usual case of an act with an unintended but inevitable result. **For as long as there is still life in it**, the *chilazon*, **it is good for him (*nicha lei*)** i.e. it serves his purpose. He tries as best as he can to keep it alive while pressing its out blood, **in order that the dye should be as clear** as possible.

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Once the *chilazon* is dead, the blood starts to become murky. And one is not liable for an act that leads to an inevitable result, if that result is both unintended and undesired.

We learnt in the Mishnah: **Slaughtering³ it** the deer (is one of the forty-nine primary categories of forbidden work).

The Gemara discusses this. **One who slaughters – why is he liable?** Where do we see that slaughter was done in the Tabernacle? It cannot be that the skins of the Tabernacle were obtained specifically through slaughtering the needed animals. After all, the animals could have been put to death by any method – by strangling them, for instance.

The Gemara answers. **Rav said: Because of dyeing.** After slaughtering, the flesh around the area of the cut becomes dyed with blood. Dyeing is one of the primary categories of forbidden work that was done in the Tabernacle. (The Gemara will clarify why slaughter is mentioned on its own, rather than being subsumed under the category of Dyeing. For dyeing itself is already listed among the actions that are done with wool).

But Shmuel said: Because of taking a life. The Mishnah is not singling out slaughter as a special type of work on its own. Rather it is an example of any action that ends in killing the animal. And killing animals was an act that was done in the construction of the Tabernacle, in order to obtain their skins.

AMMUD BET

The Gemara discusses the view of Rav. Can it be that Rav holds that **for dyeing – yes**, he is liable, whereas **for taking a life – no**, he is not liable?! Surely killing is also a forbidden form of work on Shabbat, since this was how the skins of the Tabernacle were obtained!

The Gemara answers. Let us **say** that Rav meant: the slaughterer is liable *even for dyeing*. Thus, slaughtering unintentionally on Shabbat is liable for two sin offerings. (This also clarifies why slaughter is specified separately from dyeing in the Mishnah).

Rav said: I would like to elucidate that **matter of which I spoke**, i.e. explain why the slaughterer is liable also for dyeing.

³ This refers to the method of kosher slaughter, in which the neck of the animal is slit with a sharp knife.

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I would like to say i.e. add **in it a matter** i.e. an explanation. And this is in order **that subsequent generations should not come to ridicule me.**

The **dyeing** that takes place in the flesh after slaughtering – **in what** sense do I explain that it is **good for him** (*nicha lei*)? Only if it is good for the slaughterer is he liable. (For he cannot be held liable for an undesired and unintended result of his actions, as explained on Amud Alef regarding the case of the *chilazon*.)

It is **good** for him, in **that the flesh around the area of the cut becomes dyed with blood. So that** this will serve the purpose that **people will see it** and be able to determine from the redness that it has been freshly slaughtered. **And then they will come to buy from him.**

We learnt in the Mishnah: **And salting it** the hide **and tanning it** the hide (these are two of the primary categories of forbidden work).

The Gemara asks: **Salting is the same as tanning!** Since salting is part of the tanning process, why should it be considered as a separate *melachah*?

The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish both said: Take out one of them** from the list, because salting is indeed the same as tanning. **And bring in** its place the *melachah* of **scratching lines** on the tanned hide. This was done so that writing or cutting could be done in a straight line.

Rabbah bar Rav Huna said: One who salts meat is liable for tanning.

Rava said: There is no prohibition from the Torah of **tanning, in respect to food.** (*Tosafot* point out that it is, however, Rabbinically forbidden).

Rav Ashi said: And even Rabbah bar Rav Huna only said that one is liable in a case **when one needs** the salted meat **for going on the way.** For in such a case one will use a lot of salt in order to preserve the meat, similar to the salting process involved with tanning hides.

But if he is salting the meat **for home use – a person will not make his food** so salty that it will be **like wood!** Therefore he is not liable for this salting, as it does not resemble the salting of hides.

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We learnt in the Mishnah: **And smoothing it** the hide **and cutting it** the hide (these are two of the primary categories of forbidden work).

Rabbi Acha bar Chanina said: Someone who filed away the bottom of a window **between the pillars** of a colonnade **on Shabbat**. This he did in order that it will be more comfortable to lean on. **He is liable** for a sin offering **on account of** the *melachah* of **smoothing**.

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Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said: Three things were related to me by Rav Ashi in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

- A) **Someone who planes poles on Shabbat** to sharpen them, and is particular that they all have the same size, **is liable on account of “cutting”**.
- B) **Someone who smears cream on a bandage** (some say, smoothing the bandage itself) **on Shabbat, is liable on account of “smoothing”**.
- C) **Someone who smoothes on Shabbat the stone** that he has quarried from the ground **is liable on account of “a hammer blow”**. This is a generic term referring to the completion of any work.

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Rabbi Shimon ben Kisma said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish the following: **Anyone who makes a form** of ornamentation **on a** completed vessel is liable for a sin offering. **And similarly one who blows into a glass vessel** i.e. forms a vessel from melted glass by glassblowing. In both cases he **is liable on account of “a hammer blow”**.

Rabbi Yehudah said: Someone who takes out threads sticking out from the weave of **his garment is liable on account of “a hammer blow”**.

And these words of Rabbi Yehudah apply specifically **where he is particular about them** not to remain on the garment.

We learnt in the Mishnah: **And writing two letters**, and erasing in order to write two letters (these are two of the primary categories of forbidden work).

Our Sages taught in a Baraita: If **he wrote one big letter and there is in its place** enough space **to write two** normal size letters – he is **exempt** from bringing a sin

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offering. For in the Tabernacle they would write two letters – a letter on each of two boards, to match up the boards when constructing the Tabernacle.

However, if **he had erased one big letter, and there is in its place enough space to write two letters** – he is **liable**. For the purpose of the *melachah* of erasing is preparation to write two letters.

Rabbi Menachem the son of Rabbi Yose said: And this is a stringency regarding the *melachah* of erasing, which is more than regarding the *melachah* of writing. This seemingly obvious comment comes to show that he is the author of this Baraita, since the comment bears his name.

We learnt in the Mishnah: **Building, demolishing, extinguishing, kindling, and a final hammer blow** (these are all primary categories of forbidden work).

Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira both said the following: Someone who does **anything** i.e. any act **which is the completion of the work** – he is **liable on account of a final hammer blow**.

We learnt in the end of the Mishnah: **These are the primary categories of work.**

When the Mishnah says “**these**”, it is coming **to exclude** the view of **Rabbi Eliezer**. For **he obligates** a person to bring two sin offerings **for a *toldah***⁴ that was done **in the place of** i.e. together with an *av*⁵. How the word “these” excludes his view will now be explained.

The beginning of the Mishnah cites the *number* of forbidden forms of work. We learnt on *daf* 73b that this was in order to tell us the number of sin offerings that one is liable for. Now, let us say that one became liable for a sin offering for doing a primary form of work. Then he is not further liable if he did an action which is subsidiary to it, since it falls under the same category. Thus, the statement “*these* are the main categories” implies that he is liable for these alone, even when a subsidiary form of work is also done with it.

⁴ a secondary form of work falling under one of the primary categories

⁵ primary form of work

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We learnt in the Mishnah: Behold these are the primary categories of work – forty minus one.

The Gemara now clarifies why the Tanna needed to repeat the number of categories after it was already mentioned at the start of the Mishnah.

To exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah.

For it was taught in a Baraita: **Rabbi Yehudah adds** the category of **striking with a rod** on the warp threads, in order to straighten them. **And hitting** taut weft threads, in order that they should loosen, and mix well into the woven item.

They the Sages **said to him** to Rabbi Yehudah: **“Striking with a rod”?** **Note that this is in the category of “Making tight** the vertical threads of the loom”! (For both actions involve arranging the warp threads).

“Hitting taut weft threads” – **behold, this is in the category of “weaving”!** It is a constituent action, solely for weaving.

“Striking with a rod” and “hitting” are unlike winnowing, selecting and sifting. Even though these latter actions would appear to be constituent actions of preparing food (by separating the refuse from the food), nevertheless, they were listed as primary categories on *daf* 73b.

The reason why they are regarded as main categories is as follows: They are three distinctive actions that are done in three stages, one after the other, in three different situations of food mixed with refuse.

MISHNAH

And they stated another rule: Anything that is fitting i.e. anything that most people would consider important enough **to store away**, because it serves a useful purpose. **And they** most people would **store away** this thing in an amount **like that**. **And one** unintentionally **brought it out on Shabbat** from one domain to another. He is **liable a sin offering for it**, even if he was a rich person for whom the item is of little importance. (The amounts will be discussed shortly).

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And anything that is not fitting (important enough) **to store away. Or**, anything that is important but is of such a small quantity that **they would not store away** an amount **like that. And one** unintentionally **took it out on Shabbat** from one domain to another. **Only the one who stores it away is liable** a sin offering, since the item is of value to him. Everyone else would be exempt if they took out such an insignificant item. Since the action is of no consequence, it is not considered a *melachah*.

GEMARA

The Gemara explains: When the Mishnah states that **anything that is fitting to store away – what is this coming to exclude?** What kind of item is not fitting to store away?

Rav Pappa said: This comes **to exclude blood of a *niddah***⁶. This is something that people do not store away.

Mar Ukva said: It comes **to exclude *asheirah* trees**, i.e. trees which are objects of idolatrous worship.

The Gemara explains. **The one who said** that **the blood of a *niddah*** is not a stored item, would **certainly** hold that ***asheirah* trees** would not be stored. For it is forbidden to derive benefit from them. They are repulsive and one is obligated to destroy them.

But **the one who said** that ***asheirah* trees** are not stored, meant specifically them. **But** as regards **blood of a *niddah*** – **one could store it away for a cat** to eat.

And the other one (Rav Pappa) would respond: **Since it** the feeding of *niddah* blood to a cat **causes weakness** (since one who feeds human blood to a cat is thereby weakened), **one would not store it away.**

Rabbi Yose bar Chanina said: That which was stated in the Mishnah regarding the minimum size of items **is not according to the view of Rabbi Shimon.** For the Mishnah implies that a rich person would be liable for an amount that other people regard as significant, although to him, such an amount is insignificant.

⁶ Menstruating woman

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For if it would accord with **Rabbi Shimon, note that** there would be a contradiction. For **he** has already **said** (*daf* 76b): **They only stated** that **these measurements** obligate one to bring a sin offering, **for those who** would **store them away** in such a measure. Thus, according to Rabbi Shimon, a rich person would be obligated only for the greater amount that *he* would store away.

We learnt in the Mishnah. **And anything that is not fitting to store away...** only the one who stores it away is liable.