toy ovens with which girls play, whose minimum measure with regard to ritual impurity is also one handbreadth? As it is taught in a mishna (Kelim 5:1): A clay oven in its original, unbroken, state is susceptible to ritual impurity if it is four handbreadths tall. And with regard to an oven that became impure and was subsequently broken, if its remains include a piece four handbreadths tall, that piece remains impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a large oven, made for regular use; but with regard to a small oven made for girls to play with, in its original state, any size is sufficient for it to be susceptible to contract impurity. Once its construction is completed, if the oven then becomes impure and is subsequently broken, if its remains include a piece that contains the majority of the oven, that piece remains impure.

The Gemara explains: And how small is the size defined by the mishna as any size? Rabbi Yannai says: One handbreadth, as people fashion toy ovens for girls one handbreadth high. This is another example of an item that has a minimum measure of one handbreadth, in addition to the five items listed by Rabbi Oshaya. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not speaking of matters that are subject to dispute, such as the minimum measure of an oven.

The Gemara adds: Now that you have arrived at this answer, the fact that Rabbi Oshaya does not mention a stone protruding from an oven can be explained in the same manner, since this halakha is also subject to a dispute. As the latter clause of that mishna (Kelim 5:2) teaches that Rabbi Yehuda said: When the Sages said that a stone protruding from an oven is considered a handle if it protrudes one handbreadth, they said so only with regard to a stone that protrudes from the oven and toward the wall. If the stone protrudes more than that, it is not considered a handle, as it is likely to be removed so that the oven can be moved closer to the wall. But if the stone protrudes toward the airspace of the house, it is considered an oven handle even if it protrudes more than one handbreadth.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t there the frame of the Table in the Temple, which is one handbreadth wide, as stated in the Torah (Exodus 25:25)? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not dealing with matters that are written in the Torah. The Gemara further asks: But isn’t there the Ark Cover, which is one handbreadth thick, and its measure is not written explicitly in the Torah? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not dealing with consecrated items.

The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the halakha of a cross beam, which is placed over the entrance to an alleyway in order to permit carrying items in the alleyway on Shabbat, and the halakha is that it is enough for a cross beam to be one handbreadth wide? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not dealing with matters of rabbinic law. Rather, he is speaking only of matters that are written in the Torah but whose measure is not explicit in the Torah.

§ Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta sat before Rav Kahana, and he sat and said that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: For all of the first three days after a woman gives birth, if she discharges afterbirth, we attribute the afterbirth to the offspring. There is no concern that this afterbirth indicates the miscarriage of another offspring. From this point forward, once three days have passed since the birth, if the woman discharges an afterbirth, we are concerned that there might have been another offspring in the afterbirth, and the halakhot of a woman who discharged an offspring apply to her.

Rav Kahana said to Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel: And did Rav say this? But didn’t Rav say that an offspring does not remain in the womb at all after another offspring was born? Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel was silent. Rav Kahana said to him: Perhaps there is no contradiction between Rav’s two statements, as here, where he indicates that a second offspring can emerge even three days after the first, the reference is to a case where the first offspring is a non-viable newborn, whereas there, in the statement that a second offspring does not remain in the womb after the first offspring was born, he is referring to a case where the first offspring is a viable offspring.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel said to him: Are you the one who says this explanation of Rav’s halakha of your own accord? Indeed, Rav said this explicitly: If a woman discharged a non-viable newborn and subsequently discharged an afterbirth, for all of the first three days we attribute the afterbirth to the offspring. From this point forward, if she discharged an afterbirth we are concerned that it contained another offspring. If she gave birth to a viable offspring and subsequently discharged an afterbirth, even from now until ten days after the birth we are not concerned that the afterbirth contained another offspring.

The Gemara relates: Shmuel, Rav’s students, and Rav Yehuda were sitting together. Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of D’vil, was passing by and walking toward them, i.e., he was walking in their direction, and he was hurrying and coming along. Shmuel said to his company: A man is coming toward us whom one can knock down with a straw of wheat, and he falls and stays down. In other words, he cannot refute even a minor challenge to his opinions.

In the meantime, Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya, arrived. Shmuel said to him: What did Rav say with regard to an afterbirth? Rav Yosef said to him that this is what Rav said: One attributes an afterbirth only to a viable item, i.e., a viable offspring. Shmuel subsequently asked all of Rav’s students who were present whether Rav actually said this, and they said to him that Rav indeed said so. Shmuel then looked at Rav Yehuda harshly, as Rav Yehuda was also a student of Rav, but he had not transmitted this halakha to Shmuel after Rav’s death.

§ Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: In the case of a woman who discharges an item in the form of a crow and there is also an afterbirth, what is the halakha? Is the afterbirth attributed to the discharged item, or is there concern that the afterbirth might have contained another offspring? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: One attributes an afterbirth only to an item whose species has an afterbirth. Since crows do not have an afterbirth, the afterbirth cannot be associated with that discharged item.

Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul then asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If the afterbirth is tied to the item that has the form of a crow, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: You asked about a matter that does not exist. Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul raised an objection to this response from a baraita: With regard to a woman who discharges a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, and she discharges an afterbirth with them, in an instance when the afterbirth is tied to them we are not concerned about the possibility of another offspring. If the afterbirth is not tied to them, we are concerned that the afterbirth contained another offspring. And I impose upon them