GEMARA: With regard to the issue of whether one brings a provisional guilt offering for an uncertain misuse of consecrated property, the Sages taught in a baraita: Immediately following the passage in the Torah discussing a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property the Torah introduces the halakhot of a provisional guilt offering by stating: “And if anyone sin” (Leviticus 5:17). The term “and” serves to render one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis deem him exempt in such a case.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this following method of halakhic derivation: That Rabbi Akiva holds that when the Torah connects two topics with the term “and” one learns the halakhot of the earlier passage from those in the later passage. Consequently, it can be derived that one who is uncertain about whether he misused consecrated property must bring a provisional guilt offering. And the Rabbis hold that one does not learn the halakhot in the earlier passage from those of the later passage.

Rav Pappa said: In fact, everyone agrees that one learns the halakhot of the earlier passage from those of the later passage, as if one does not say so, you will not find a source for the requirement that a young bull brought as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north section of the Temple courtyard. This is derived from the fact that the Torah states the halakhot of a young bull brought as a burnt offering (Leviticus 1:3–9) and then states: “And if his offering is of the flock, from the sheep or from the goats, as a burnt offering, an unblemished male he shall present it, and he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward” (Leviticus 1:10–11).

Rather, here, in the case of one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property, this is the reason that the Rabbis deem him exempt from bringing a provisional guilt offering: It is because they derive the details of the halakha with regard to the provisional guilt offering written in the verse: “And if anyone sin, and perform one of all the commandments of the Lord that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 5:17), by means of a verbal analogy from the verse stated with regard to a sin offering: “And if any one of the common people sin through error, in his performance of any of the commandments of the Lord that may not be performed” (Leviticus 4:27).

The verbal analogy indicates that just as there, the sin offering is brought only for an act that renders one liable to be punished with karet for its intentional violation and liable to bring a sin offering for its unwitting violation, and to bring a provisional guilt offering for its uncertain violation, so too, for every transgression for which one is liable to be punished with karet for its intentional violation and one is liable to bring a sin offering for its unwitting violation, one is also liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for its uncertain violation.

This verbal analogy serves to exclude misuse of consecrated property from the transgressions for which one would bring a provisional guilt offering in a case of uncertainty, as one is not liable to receive karet for its intentional violation. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who intentionally misused a consecrated item, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that he is liable to the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven. And the Rabbis say: He has violated a standard prohibition, and is flogged. Everyone agrees that he is not liable to receive karet.

The Gemara comments: And with regard to the verbal analogy cited above as the source of the opinion of the Rabbis, Rabbi Akiva holds the following: When we derive the halakhot of provisional guilt offerings based upon the term “the commandments of” used in that context (Leviticus 5:17) and the identical expression “the commandments of” stated with regard to a sin offering brought for the consumption of forbidden fat (Leviticus 4:27), i.e., a standard sin offering, it is for this purpose that we derive it: Just as there, the verse is referring to a fixed sin offering, so too here, with regard to the provisional guilt offering, one brings it only for the uncertain transgression of a sin for which one would be liable to bring a fixed offering.

This serves to exclude transgressions for which one brings a sliding-scale sin offering, i.e., the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, taking a false oath of testimony, and violating an oath (see Leviticus 5:1–13). Since one who unwittingly violated these prohibitions brings an animal, bird, or meal offering depending on his financial status, if he is uncertain whether he violated one of these prohibitions he does not bring a provisional guilt offering.

And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Akiva and hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter. Once a verbal analogy is accepted, the two cases are treated as entirely similar, which in this case means that the provisional guilt offering is brought only for a sin punishable by karet for its intentional violation. The Gemara asks: Should one conclude by inference that Rabbi Akiva holds that there is a verbal analogy for half of a matter? There is no record of any tanna maintaining this opinion. Rather, everyone agrees that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter.

Rather, this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as the verse states with regard to the provisional guilt offering: “And if anyone sin” (Leviticus 5:17). The term “and” in the form of the letter vav, adds to the previous matter. When a sentence begins with the conjunction vav, it is a continuation of the previous discussion, and therefore the halakhot of the earlier passage, in this case misuse of consecrated property, are learned from the later passage. Consequently, one brings a provisional guilt offering even for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

And the Rabbis maintain that it is the halakhot of the later passage that are derived from the earlier passage. Consequently, the ram brought for a provisional guilt offering must be worth at least two silver shekels, just like the ram brought as a guilt offering in a case where one is certain that he misused consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:15).

And how would Rabbi Akiva respond to this opinion? He holds that there is no juxtaposition for half of a matter. Consequently, one must also derive the halakhot of the earlier passage from the later passage, and one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Should one conclude by inference that the Rabbis hold that there is a juxtaposition for half of a matter? But this is difficult, because we maintain as a principle that there is no juxtaposition for half of a matter.

Rather, everyone agrees that there is no juxtaposition for half of a matter. And here, this is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, as they derive from the verbal analogy of the expression “the commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:17) stated with regard to the provisional guilt offering and the identical expression “the commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:27) stated with regard to the sin offering that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property. One does not derive the halakhot of the earlier passage based upon the later passage, as this aspect of the comparison has been explicitly excluded from the comparison of these two passages based upon their juxtaposition.

And Rabbi Akiva derives the halakha that the provisional guilt offering must be worth at least two silver shekels from the verse: “This is the law of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:1). This teaches that there is one law for all of the guilt offerings, and therefore each guilt offering must be worth at least two silver shekels. Since it is not necessary for him to derive this halakha from the juxtaposition of the passages concerning misuse of consecrated property and the provisional guilt offering, and the verbal analogy cannot entirely negate the comparison indicated by this juxtaposition, Rabbi Akiva derives from the juxtaposition that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

And the Rabbis would reply that even though it is written: “This is the law of the guilt offering,” nevertheless it was necessary for the verse to write: “And if anyone sin,” in which the letter vav adds to the previous matter and indicates that the halakhot of the later passage are learned from the earlier passage. This teaches that a provisional guilt offering must be worth at least two silver shekels.

And if you would say that this could be derived from the verse: “This is the law of the guilt offering,” that is impossible, as I would say: When I say that there is one law for all of the guilt offerings, that statement applies only to other definite guilt offerings. In other words, just as the guilt offering for definite misuse of consecrated property must be worth at least two silver shekels, the same applies to all definite guilt offerings.

But with regard to the provisional guilt offering, since it comes for an uncertain violation, e.g., in a case where one is uncertain whether he ate forbidden fat, one might say that the offering one brings for its uncertain violation should not be more stringent than the offering one brings for its definite violation: Just as for its definite violation one may bring a sin offering worth even one-sixth [danka] of a dinar, so too, for its uncertain violation one may bring a guilt offering worth even one-sixth of a dinar. It is for this reason that the Merciful One wrote: “And if anyone sin,” in which the letter vav adds to the previous matter. By contrast, since Rabbi Akiva does not derive the requirement for a provisional guilt offering to be worth at least two silver shekels from this verse, he derives from it that one brings a provisional guilt offering in a case of uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who expounds the verse: “This is the law of the guilt offering,” as Rabbi Akiva derives from here that a provisional guilt offering must be worth at least two silver shekels. But according to the one who does not expound the verse: “This is the law of the guilt offering,” what is there to say? From where does he derive that all guilt offerings must have the same minimum value? The Gemara answers that he derives it from a verbal analogy between the term “your valuation” stated with regard to other guilt offerings (see Leviticus 5:18, 5:25), and the identical term “your valuation” (Leviticus 5:15) from the case of a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, which the verse indicates must be worth at least two silver shekels.

The Gemara asks: What is the source of this halakha with regard to the guilt offering for engaging in intercourse with an espoused maidservant, about which the term “your valuation” is not written in the Torah? The Gemara answers: We derive it from a verbal analogy between the word “ram” (Leviticus 5:15) in the verse about a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property and the word “ram” (Leviticus 19:21) in a verse concerning the espoused maidservant.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva concedes that one does not bring payment for his misuse of consecrated property until it becomes known to him that he is guilty of misuse, as then he brings a definite guilt offering with his payment. Rabbi Tarfon said: One brings payment for misuse and its additional payment of one-fifth, and a guilt offering worth two sela, and says: If it is certain that I misused consecrated property, this is payment for my misuse and this is my definite guilt offering. And if it is uncertain whether I misused consecrated property, the money is a contribution to the Temple fund for the purchase of communal offerings and the guilt offering is provisional.

The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Tarfon, what is this individual saying? How can he say: If it is uncertain, when he clearly is uncertain about whether he misused consecrated property? Rava said that one should teach the mishna as follows: If its uncertainty persists forever, this offering should be a provisional guilt offering, whereas if it becomes known that I misused consecrated property, this should be a regular guilt offering. This is an effective stipulation, as the offering one brings in a case where it is known to him that he misused consecrated property is from the same species as the offering he brings in a case where it is unknown to him whether he misused consecrated property.

The Gemara objects: Ultimately, even according to Rabbi Tarfon one cannot necessarily avoid bringing two guilt offerings. Since at the time when he brought his first offering he was uncertain whether he had misused consecrated property, when it becomes known to him that he misused consecrated property he is required to bring a definite guilt offering.

In response to this question Rava said: From the statement of both of the tanna’im, i.e., Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva, it can be learned that a definite guilt offering does not require knowledge that the individual definitely sinned ab initio. Consequently, as long as it eventually becomes known that he sinned, he has fulfilled his obligation to bring a definite guilt offering.

MISHNA: Apropos the previous case in which one brings the same type of animal when liability is certain as when liability is uncertain, this mishna teaches: With regard to a woman who brought a bird sin offering in a case of uncertainty whether she miscarried a fetus that would have rendered her liable to bring a sin offering or whether what she expelled would not render her liable to bring an offering, in which case this sin offering may not be eaten by priests, the halakha is as follows: If before the nape of the neck of the bird was pinched it became known to her that she certainly gave birth, i.e., miscarried, in a manner that obligates her to bring a sin offering, she should render the offering a definite sin offering, as from the same type of animal that she brings a sin offering for a case where it is known to her that she miscarried, she brings a sin offering for a case where it is unknown to her.

The mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering. If one had a piece of non-sacred meat and a piece of sacrificial meat, and he ate one of them and does not know which of them he ate, he is exempt from the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, in accordance with his opinion in the previous mishna that one brings a provisional guilt offering even in a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse. If he then ate the second piece, he brings a definite guilt offering, as it is certain that he ate the sacrificial meat.

If one person ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second piece, this first person brings a provisional guilt offering and that second person brings a provisional guilt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one definite guilt offering as partners, and they stipulate that the one who ate the non-sacred meat grants his share of the animal to the one who ate the sacrificial meat, and the guilt offering is sacrificed on his behalf. Rabbi Yosei says: