be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Isn’t this requirement already stated earlier: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? Rather, the phrase “it shall not be baked with leaven” serves to teach a different halakha. Since the prohibition concerning leaven is first stated in general terms: Shall not be made with leaven, without specification, one might have thought that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven will be liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of his actions, i.e., kneading, shaping, and baking the dough. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” which teaches that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven is liable separately for baking it, and for each stage of its preparation.

The baraita explains this derivation: Baking leaven was included in the general prohibition incorporating all of the stages involved in preparing the meal offering. Why did it emerge from the generalization to be mentioned explicitly? It emerged in order to compare the other stages to it: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single, i.e., separately defined, action, and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself if the dough is leaven, so too, I will include the other stages of the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading it and shaping it, and conclude that one is liable separately for each of these actions if the dough is leavened.

And the same applies to any single action involved in the preparation of a meal offering. This statement serves to include the act of smoothing the surface of the dough with water. The reason this act is included is that although it is not a significant stage in the preparation of the dough, it is a single, independent action, and therefore one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself. This baraita demonstrates that one cannot derive the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened from the verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” as this verse is the source of a different halakha. If so, from where is that prohibition derived?

The Gemara answers: The verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is required for the principle stated earlier. We say that the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened is derived from the subsequent phrase: “I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). The remainder is the portion of the meal offering eaten by the priests.

The Gemara challenges: But once it has been determined that the term “their portion” teaches the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, one can say this entire section of the verse comes only for this purpose, which would mean that there is no source for the halakha that one is liable separately for each stage of the preparation of a meal offering with leaven.

The Gemara answers: One cannot say that this teaches only the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, as if so, let the verse write: Their portion shall not be baked with leaven. What is meant by the fact that the verse stated it in a different order: “Shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion”? This indicates that one should learn from this two halakhot, i.e., that there is a prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering and that one is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each stage of preparation performed with leavened dough.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But one can say that the act of baking is different, as the Merciful One specified it in the Torah, and therefore one should be liable to receive one set of lashes for baking the dough. As for the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading, shaping, and smoothing, which are not explicitly stated in the verse, let him be liable to receive one set of lashes for all of them. The Gemara answers that this cannot be the halakha, because baking is something that was included in a generalization but emerged from the generalization in order to teach a halakha. According to a hermeneutic principle, a case of this kind did not emerge to teach a halakha only about itself, but rather it emerged to teach a halakha about the entire generalization, in this case, about all the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering.

The Gemara further challenges: But one can say that the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven, is a generalization, as it does not mention any specific acts, and the phrase: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is a detail, as it specifies one particular stage of the preparation; and there is another standard hermeneutic principle: When there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. In this case, that would mean that baking, yes, is included in this prohibition, but other matters, e.g., kneading and shaping, are not included.

Rabbi Aptoriki said: That hermeneutic principle is not relevant here, because this is a case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, as the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven (Leviticus 2:11), is far from the expression: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). And for any instance of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection, and some say that this objection is unattributed [kedi]: And is it correct that in the case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a halakha from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a goat brought by a king as a sin offering: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? On the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This sin offering of a king must consequently also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.

The baraita asks: And do you learn this halakha from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before God; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why does the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The baraita answers: It is to fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if he did not slaughter it in the north of the Temple courtyard, he has disqualified it even after the fact.

The baraita asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The baraita answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), and this established a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require slaughter in the north. Therefore, the additional verse stated with regard to the sin offering of a king teaches that if he did not slaughter it in the north it is disqualified.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The reason that all sin offerings must be slaughtered in the north is that the Merciful One wrote: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” from which it can be inferred that if not for this verse I would say that only this sin offering, the male goat brought by a king, requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north. What is the reason for this? After all, the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered,” appears to be referring to all types of sin offerings.

Isn’t it because this verse is a generalization and a detail, as the verse first generalizes about all sin offerings, and then the verse concerning the sin offering of a king: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering,” is a detail, as it is referring to a specific sin offering? And even though the verse concerning sin offerings and the verse concerning the sin offering of a king are distanced from one another, nevertheless we would derive a halakha from them by means of the principle of a generalization and a detail. This appears to disprove the explanation of Rabbi Aptoriki.

Rav Ashi objects to this claim raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava: Is this a generalization and a detail? It is in fact a detail and a generalization, as the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:24), appears in the Torah earlier than the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered the sin offering shall be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). A hermeneutic principle states that in this case the generalization adds to the detail, and includes all matters.

Rather, the reason that if not for the specific textual derivation we would have thought that only a sin offering brought by a king requires slaughter in the north is that the word “it,” which is an exclusion, is difficult for the tanna of the baraita, as it is unclear what this term serves to exclude. And this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps the verse is teaching that only this sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north, as the Merciful One writes “it,” which is an exclusion. Therefore, the additional verse: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” teaches that this halakha applies to all burnt offerings.

The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives it from the phrase: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” to exclude what does the term “it” serve? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case that emerges from the following discussion, summarized by the mnemonic: Nahshon; and slaughter; bird; on Passover.

The Gemara explains the first suggestion: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north, but the goat offered by Nahshon, prince of the tribe of Judah, was not slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (see Numbers, chapter 7). The sin offerings brought at this time were unique because they were not brought to atone for any sin. The term “it” teaches that even though they had some characteristics of a sin offering, the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.

The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement to be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that there was no requirement of slaughter in the north for the goats brought as sin offerings by Nahshon and the other princes.

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal itself applies to the goats offered by Nahshon and the other princes? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: