According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, in the case of a Canaanite slave, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that a slave can appoint an agent to accept his bill of manumission from the hand of his master? Does one say that since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar derives the verbal analogy of “lah” and “lah” from a woman, which teaches that a slave can be freed with a document, therefore, a slave is also like a woman in that he too can appoint an agent?

Or perhaps, in the case of a woman, as she can accept her bill of divorce herself, she can also appoint an agent, whereas a slave is different, as he cannot accept his bill of manumission himself, and consequently he cannot appoint an agent either. After raising the dilemma, Rabba subsequently resolved it: Since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar derives the verbal analogy of “lah” and “lah” from a woman, a slave is also treated like a woman with regard to his ability to appoint an agent.

The Gemara comments: But consider that which Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says with regard to the service in the Temple: These priests are the agents of the Merciful One, i.e., they perform the Temple service as the emissaries of God. As if it enters your mind that they are our agents, is there anything that we cannot do but agents can do on our behalf? Since it is prohibited for non-priests to serve in the Temple, priests cannot be considered the agents of the Jewish people.

This statement leads to the following question: But is it not true that an agent can be appointed to perform a task that cannot be done by the one who sent him? But according to Rava’s conclusion there is the case of a slave, who is unable to accept his bill of manumission himself, and yet he can appoint an agent to receive it for him.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And that is not so. The difference between the cases is that an Israelite is not involved in the halakhot of offerings at all, as a non-priest is never permitted to sacrifice offerings. By contrast, a slave is somewhat involved in bills of manumission, as it is taught in a baraita: It seems that a slave can accept the bill of manumission of another slave from the hand of the master of that other slave. But he cannot accept a bill of manumission from the hand of his own master, who wishes to free another of his slaves. In this case there is no acquisition, as the document has not left the master’s property, as anything given to a slave is considered the property of his master. With regard to the issue at hand, since a slave can accept a bill of manumission, at least on behalf of another slave, the halakhot of these documents are relevant to him, and therefore he can appoint an agent to receive his bill of manumission.

§ The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Meir the slave can be freed by means of money given by others, while the Rabbis hold that he can be freed by means of money given by himself, provided that the money he gives belongs to others. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that they disagree with regard to this principle, and that Rabbi Meir maintains: There is no acquisition for a slave without his master, i.e., a slave has no personal property and therefore his master immediately owns whatever the slave acquires, which means a slave cannot receive his redemption money himself. And similarly there is no acquisition for a woman without her husband. And the Rabbis maintain: There is acquisition for a slave without his master, and there is acquisition for a woman without her husband.

Rabba said that Rav Sheshet said: Everyone agrees that there is no acquisition for a slave without his master, and there is no acquisition for a woman without her husband, and so, with what are we dealing here? This is a unique case in which another individual transferred one hundred dinars to a slave and said to him: I am giving this to you on the condition that your master has no rights to it.

The Gemara clarifies the two opinions according to this explanation. Rabbi Meir maintains that when this third party said to the Canaanite slave: Acquire the money, the slave acquires it and his master immediately acquires it. And when he said to him: On the condition that your master has no rights to it, he has said nothing to him, i.e., his condition is ineffective. And the Rabbis maintain that since he said to him: On the condition, his condition is effective and the master does not acquire the money. Therefore, the slave owns this money, with which he can redeem himself.

And Rabbi Elazar said: In a case like this, everyone agrees that the slave acquires the money, and his master automatically acquires that which was acquired by the slave. And with what are we dealing here, in the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir? This is referring to a case where another person transferred one hundred dinars to him and said to him: On the condition that you are emancipated with it.

The Gemara explains the dispute according to this interpretation. Rabbi Meir maintains that when he said to him: Acquire the money, the slave acquires it, and his master immediately acquires the one hundred dinars from him. And when he said to him: On the condition, he has said nothing to him. And the Rabbis maintain: He does not transfer the money to the slave himself, as he said to him only: On the condition that you are emancipated with it. In other words, he gave it to the slave only for him to hand over the money to his master for his emancipation. His condition is valid and the slave is emancipated.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and a second statement of Rabbi Meir, and it raises a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and a second statement of the Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita: