And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, would say: That term, “his ear,” comes for a verbal analogy. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that the piercing of a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl is performed on the right ear? It is stated: Ear, here, with regard to a Hebrew slave, and it is stated there, with regard to the ritual purification of a leper: “The right ear of he who is to be purified” (Leviticus 14:14). Just as there, with regard to a leper, it specifies the right ear explicitly, so too here, the piercing of a slave must be performed on the right ear.

The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, the first tanna, derive that this piercing can be performed only on the right ear? The Gemara answers: He would argue that if it is so that the word “ear” is stated only for the sake of the verbal analogy, let the verse say merely: Ear, and one would learn the halakha through a verbal analogy from the case of the leper’s ear. What is the reason that it states “his ear”? This serves to teach that one who sells himself may not be pierced.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, would answer: That formulation is necessary to teach that the mitzva of piercing applies to “his ear” but not her ear. He learns from the pronoun that piercing may be performed only on a male slave, not a maidservant. The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, the first tanna, derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “But if the slave shall say” (Exodus 21:5). This indicates that piercing applies to the slave but not to a maidservant.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, who does not derive this ruling in the same manner as the first tanna, requires this verse for a different halakha: A slave may declare that he wishes to be pierced provided that he says this when he is still a slave. After he has been emancipated, he can no longer say that he wishes to remain with his master.

The Gemara asks: And from where does the other Sage, the first tanna, learn this halakha? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the terms: Slave, and “the slave.” If the verse had stated only: Slave, one would have learned that a slave may say this only while still a slave. Since it is actually written “the slave,” this teaches the other halakha as well, that a slave may be pierced but a maidservant may not. The Gemara comments: And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, does not learn a halakha from this slight difference between: Slave, and “the slave.”

The Gemara clarifies additional details with regard to this dispute: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that one does not grant a severance gift to one who sells himself? With regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: “You shall give a severance gift to him” (Deuteronomy 15:14). “To him” means to one who is sold by the court, but not to one who sells himself.

The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, derive from that verse? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse to teach the following: “To him” means that one grants a severance gift only to the slave himself but not to his heirs. The Gemara asks: Why not give this gift to his heirs? After all, the Merciful One calls a Hebrew slave “a hired worker.” Just as payment for the labor of a hired worker is given to his heirs when he dies, so too this severance gift for his labor should be given to his heirs when he dies. Rather, this verse teaches “to him,” but not to the slave’s creditor. One to whom the slave owes money may not collect the slave’s severance gift as repayment of the debt.

The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to emphasize that a creditor has no rights to the severance gift? That is necessary due to the fact that we generally hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that in the case of one who lends one hundred dinars to another, and the other lends a similar sum to yet another, a third person, from where is it derived that the court appropriates the money from this one, the third person, and gives it to that one, the first creditor, without going through the second person, who owes money to the first and is owed that same amount by the third? The verse states: “And he shall give it to him whom he has wronged” (Numbers 5:7), which indicates that the loan should be repaid to the creditor to whom the money is ultimately owed.

Therefore, the term “to him” comes to exclude this possibility, as the severance gift is given to the slave and not to his creditor. And how does the other Sage, the first tanna, respond to this claim? He maintains that we generally do not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. Consequently, this exposition is unnecessary.

The Gemara continues to ask: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who says that if one sells himself his master does not provide him with a Canaanite maidservant? The Gemara answers: With regard to one sold by the court, the Merciful One excludes a certain case by the verse: “If his master give to him a wife” (Exodus 21:4). This serves to emphasize “to him” but not to one who sells himself. And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, explains: “To him” means even against his will.

And from where does the other Sage, the first tanna, derive that the slave must remain with this maidservant against his will? He derives it from the verse: “For double of the hire of a hired worker he has served you” (Deuteronomy 15:18). As it is taught in a baraita that this verse: “For double of the hire of a hired worker he has served you,” indicates that a hired worker works only during the day, whereas a Hebrew slave works both during the day and at night.

The Gemara clarifies: And can it enter your mind that a Hebrew slave actually works both during the day and at night? But isn’t it already stated: “Because he fares well with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), which teaches that he must be with you in food and with you in drink? All of the slave’s needs must be fulfilled, and his living conditions must be equal to those of the master himself. If so, he cannot be forced to work under unreasonable conditions. And Rabbi Yitzḥak says in explanation of this halakha: From here it is derived that his master may provide him with a Canaanite maidservant against his will to produce children for the master. This is the service he performs at night.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, would say that this is no proof, because if it is derived from there alone I would say: This matter applies only with his consent; but as for his master forcing him to live with a maidservant against his will, I would say no, he cannot do this. Therefore, the term “to him” teaches us that the master can even provide him with a Canaanite maidservant against his will.

§ According to the above explanation, both Rabbi Elazar and the first tanna accept the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker.” Rather, who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker”? It is this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita as follows with regard to the verse: “He shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year, then he shall go out from you, he and his children with him, and shall return to his own family and to the possession of his fathers he shall return” (Leviticus 25:40–41). Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: What is the verse speaking of when it states: “And shall return to his own family”? If it is speaking of one who sold himself and the Jubilee Year arrived during his six years of slavery, this is already stated: “He shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year, then he shall go out from you” (Leviticus 25:40).

If it is speaking of a pierced slave, it is already stated, as will be explained. It must be that the verse is speaking of nothing other than a man sold by the court two or three years before the Jubilee Year, and it teaches that the Jubilee Year releases him from slavery. The Gemara analyzes this opinion: And if it would enter your mind that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” why do I need this verse? Let him derive that a man sold by the court is released in the Jubilee Year by the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker,” from the case of one who sold himself.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this claim can be refuted: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov derives the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker” as well, and even so it was necessary for him to learn that halakha from a verse. The reason is that it might enter your mind to say that one who sells himself, who did not commit a transgression, is emancipated at the onset of the Jubilee Year even if six years have not passed, but with regard to one sold by the court, who did commit a transgression, as he was sold because he was unable to repay the value of his theft, one might say that we should penalize him and therefore he should not be emancipated in the Jubilee Year. Consequently, the verse teaches us that even this slave is emancipated in the Jubilee Year.

The Master said earlier, in the baraita: If it is speaking about a pierced slave, it is already stated. The Gemara asks: What is the verse that teaches that a pierced slave is released in the Jubilee Year? As it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “And you shall return, each man to his land, and you shall return, each man to his family” (Leviticus 25:10). What is the verse speaking of? If it is speaking of one who sells himself, it is already stated: “He shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year” (Leviticus 25:40).

If it is speaking of one who was sold by the court, it is already stated: “Then he shall go out from you, he and his children with him, and shall return to his own family” (Leviticus 25:41). It must be that the verse is speaking of nothing other than a slave who is pierced two or three years before the Jubilee Year, and that the Jubilee Year releases him. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the verse is specifically referring to a pierced slave? Rava bar Sheila said that the verse states “man.” What matter applies to a man and does not apply to a woman? You must say that this is piercing a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl.

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for the Torah to write that one sold by the court leaves in the Jubilee Year, and it was also necessary to write the same with regard to a pierced slave, as neither case can be derived from the other. The Gemara elaborates: As, if the Torah had informed us only about one who was sold by the court, one might say that the Jubilee Year releases him because his time had not come to be freed. But with regard to a pierced slave, whose time had come but he did not wish to be freed, one might say that we should penalize him and he should remain a permanent slave.

And conversely, if the Torah had informed us only about a pierced slave, one might say that the Jubilee Year releases him because he has served the master for six years, as required, but with regard to one who was sold by the court, who has not yet served his master for six years, one might say that he should not be freed in the Jubilee Year. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to state this halakha with regard to both cases.

And likewise, it was necessary for the Torah to write with regard to the release of a pierced slave in the Jubilee Year: “And you shall return, each man to his land” (Leviticus 25:10), and it was necessary to write as well: “And he shall serve him forever” (Exodus 21:6), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to until the Jubilee Year. As, if the Merciful One had written only “forever,” I would say that this actually means forever, i.e., for his entire life. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And you shall return.”

And if the Merciful One had written only “and you shall return,” I would say that this statement applies only where he did not serve six years after being pierced; but in a case where he did serve six years after he was pierced, one might argue as follows: His final stage, after he is pierced, should not be stricter than his initial stage, when he was first sold: Just as after his initial stage he serves only six years, so too in his final stage he serves only six years and no longer. Therefore, the verse teaches us “forever,” which means forever until the Jubilee Year, even if the Jubilee Year arrives many years later. In any case, with regard to the issue at hand there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker.”

Rather, who is the tanna who does not derive the verbal analogy between “hired worker” and “hired worker”? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: