סקר
ממתי אתה בדף היומי?






 

Steinsaltz

is it not logical that a wedding canopy, which completes the marriage, since it entirely removes a young woman from her father’s authority, can effect acquisition for betrothal on its own? The Gemara rejects this claim: What is unique about money is that it can effect acquisition in many contexts, as one can redeem with it consecrated property and second tithe. This is not so with regard to a wedding canopy, which is ineffective in effecting any acquisition other than marriage. Therefore, in the case of betrothal, money can effect betrothal while a wedding canopy cannot. The Gemara counters: The halakha of sexual intercourse proves otherwise, as this act serves to effect acquisition of a woman despite the fact that it is not a valid mode of acquisition in any other case.

The Gemara counters: What is unique about sexual intercourse is that it effects acquisition of a yevama, whereas a yavam does not acquire her via a wedding canopy. The Gemara answers: Money proves otherwise, as money cannot be used to acquire a yevama, and yet it is a valid mode for acquiring a woman. And the derivation has reverted to its starting point: The aspect of this mode, money, is not like the aspect of that mode, intercourse, and the aspect of that mode, intercourse, is not like the aspect of this mode, money. Their common denominator is that they generally effect acquisition, and they effect acquisition here, with regard to betrothal. Likewise, I will bring the mode of a wedding canopy, which generally effects acquisition, rendering a woman as married, and therefore it should also effect acquisition here.

The Gemara rejects this: What about the fact that the common denominator of money and intercourse is that their benefit, i.e., pleasure, is great? The Gemara says: The case of a document proves otherwise, as no great pleasure is derived from receiving a document, and yet it can be used to acquire a woman. The Gemara answers: What is unique about a document is that it can release a Jewish woman from her husband in the form of a bill of divorce. The Gemara answers: Money and intercourse prove otherwise, as they do not release a woman and yet they are valid modes of acquisition for betrothal.

And once again, the derivation has reverted to its starting point: The aspect of this mode is not like the aspect of that mode, and the aspect of that mode is not like the aspect of this mode. Their common denominator is that they generally effect acquisition and they effect acquisition here, with regard to betrothal. Likewise, I will bring the mode of a wedding canopy, which generally effects acquisition, and therefore it should also effect acquisition here.

The Gemara again rejects this claim: What about the fact that the common denominator of all three modes of acquisition is that they are effective in certain situations against her will? A bill of divorce, sexual intercourse in the case of a yevama, and money with regard to a Hebrew maidservant all effect acquisition of a woman against her will. Therefore, the mode of a wedding canopy cannot be derived from these methods, as a wedding canopy is effective only when the woman enters it willingly. And in response to this claim Rav Huna would answer: In any event, with regard to marriage, we have not found a case in which a woman can be acquired through money against her will. Consequently, it is possible to learn from the modes of money, a document, and intercourse that a wedding canopy likewise effects betrothal.

Rava said: There are two refutations of this matter, i.e., it is possible to refute Rav Huna’s opinion in two ways. One opinion is that we learned in the mishna that a woman can be acquired through three modes of acquisition, and we did not learn that there are four modes. This indicates that there are no other ways to acquire a woman apart from the three listed in the mishna.

And furthermore, Rava disagrees with the main point of the proof, which was based on the fact that a wedding canopy completes a marriage: Doesn’t entering a wedding canopy complete a marriage only by means of an act of betrothal, which precedes the wedding canopy? And can one derive that entering a wedding canopy effects acquisition without betrothal from the case of entering a wedding canopy that effects acquisition by means of betrothal? Consequently, entering a wedding canopy alone cannot effect a betrothal.

Abaye said to Rava in response to his two claims: With regard to that which you said, that we learned in the mishna three modes and we did not learn that there are four modes, this is no proof, as the tanna teaches only a matter that is explicitly written in the Torah, and does not teach a matter that is not explicitly written in the Torah, such as a wedding canopy.

And with regard to that which you said: Doesn’t entering a wedding canopy complete a marriage only by means of an act of betrothal, this is also what Rav Huna is saying, i.e., Rav Huna incorporates this claim into his reasoning: If money, which does not complete a marriage after money, i.e., after a woman has been betrothed through money an additional monetary gift cannot render her a fully married woman, effects acquisition of the woman in the form of betrothal, is it not logical that entering a wedding canopy, which is more powerful than money in that it completes a marriage after money, should effect acquisition and be used to perform betrothal by itself?

§ After discussing the sources for the modes of acquisition listed in the mishna, the Gemara analyzes these halakhot in greater detail. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:1): How is betrothal performed through money? If a man gave a woman money or an item worth money, and he said to her: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to me, or: You are to me as a wife, then she is betrothed. But if she is the one who gave the money to him, and she said: I am hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to you, or: I am hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to you, or: I am hereby to you as a wife, then she is not betrothed.

Rav Pappa objects to this: This baraita contains an internal contradiction. The first part of the baraita states: If a man gave a woman money and said to her: You are hereby betrothed to me, from which it may be inferred that the reason the woman is betrothed is that he gave her money and he said the appropriate formula. This leads to the conclusion that if he gave her money and she said the formula, she is not betrothed. Now say the latter clause of the baraita: But if she is the one who gave the money to him, and she said: I am hereby betrothed to you, then it is not a valid betrothal. Rav Pappa infers: The reason that it is not a valid betrothal is that she gave money to him and she said the appropriate formula, from which it may be inferred that if he gave money to her and she said the appropriate formula, then this is a valid betrothal.

The Gemara explains: The first clause of the baraita is exact, and therefore it is correct to infer that which was not explicitly stated from this ruling. By contrast, the latter clause of the baraita was cited for no reason, i.e., it was simply formulated in the opposite manner of the first clause, and the baraita is not exact in the wording of this case. Therefore, one should not analyze this clause too carefully and infer halakhot from it. The Gemara asks: And would the baraita teach in the latter clause a matter that contradicts the first clause?

Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation in favor of the following. This is what the baraita is saying: If he gave the money and he said the formula, it is obvious that it is a valid betrothal. If he gave the money and she said the formula, it is considered as though she gave the money and she said the formula, and therefore it is not a valid betrothal. And if you wish, say a different explanation of the baraita: If he gave the money and he said the formula, she is betrothed. If she gave the money and she said the formula, she is not betrothed at all. If he gave the money and she said the formula, the ruling is uncertain, and by rabbinic law we are concerned that this might actually be a betrothal.

The Gemara continues to discuss the language of betrothal. Shmuel says: With regard to betrothal, if he gave her money or an item worth money, and said to her: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet], or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset], or: You are hereby as a wife, then she is betrothed. If he said: I am hereby your man, or: I am hereby your husband, or: I am hereby your betrothed, then there is no room for concern here. In these cases there is no possibility that it might be a valid betrothal, as betrothal is effective only if its formulation defines the relationship in terms of the woman’s connection to the man, not the reverse.

And similarly, with regard to divorce, if a husband gave his wife a bill of divorce and said to her: You are hereby sent away, or: You are hereby divorced, or: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, then she is divorced. If he said: I am not your man, or: I am not your husband, or: I am not your betrothed, then there is no room for concern, as a bill of divorce is effective only if its formulation defines the relationship in terms of the woman’s connection to the man, not the reverse.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Is this to say that Shmuel holds that ambiguous intimations, i.e., incomplete expressions that can be understood only from their context, are considered like unambiguous intimations? In the cases listed by Shmuel, the woman is betrothed despite the fact that the man did not say: You are hereby betrothed to me, but merely: You are hereby betrothed. The statement itself does not include the detail that the speaker intends to betroth her to himself, and yet Shmuel maintains that the betrothal is valid.

Rav Pappa asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nazir 2a) that one who says: I shall be, is a nazirite? And we discussed this ruling: But perhaps he meant to say: I will be in a fast? And Shmuel said that this mishna is referring to a particular set of circumstances, that he said: I shall be, when a nazirite was passing before him. In that context it is clear the individual meant that he too will be a nazirite. Rav Pappa analyzes this statement: The reason that he is a nazirite is only due to the fact that a nazirite passes before him. But if this were not the case, no, his statement would not be considered a naziriteship vow. This indicates that according to Shmuel, ambiguous intimations are not considered like unambiguous intimations.

The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? Shmuel is referring to a case where he said the formulation and added the phrase: To me. For example, he said to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me. The Gemara asks: If so, what is Shmuel teaching us? If the man stated the full formula it is obvious that she is betrothed, as he used the standard expression of betrothal. The Gemara answers: These

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
אדם סלומון
© כל הזכויות שמורות לפורטל הדף היומי | אודות | צור קשר | הוספת תכנים | רשימת תפוצה | הקדשה | תרומות | תנאי שימוש באתר | מפת האתר