This one may carry to the base of the former partition, and that one may likewise carry to the base of the partition, as he maintains that since it was permitted at the beginning of Shabbat, it remains permitted until the conclusion of Shabbat.

The Gemara comments: And this ruling of Rav was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference; i.e., it was inferred by his students from another one of his teachings. As once Rav and Shmuel were sitting in a certain courtyard on Shabbat, and the wall between the two courtyards fell. Shmuel said to the people around him: Take a cloak and suspend it on the remnant of the partition.

Rav turned his face away, displaying his displeasure with Shmuel’s opinion, as Rav maintained it was prohibited to carry a cloak in this courtyard. Shmuel said to them in a humorous vein: If Abba, Rav, is particular, take his belt and tie it to the cloak, to secure it to the partition.

The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, why was it necessary to suspend the cloak? He himself said: If a wall between two courtyards collapsed on Shabbat, this one may carry to the base of the former partition, and that one may likewise carry to the base of the partition.

The Gemara answers: Shmuel did not do so to render it permitted to carry in the courtyard. He did so merely for the purpose of privacy, as he did not want the residents of the other courtyard to see into his own courtyard.

The Gemara asks: And Rav, if he maintains that in this case carrying is prohibited, he should have said so to him explicitly. The Gemara answers: It was Shmuel’s place. Rav did not want to disagree with his colleague in his jurisdiction, as he accepted the opinion of the local authority.

The Gemara asks: If so, if he accepted the jurisdiction of the local rabbinic authority, why did he turn his face away? The Gemara answers: He acted in this manner so that people would not say that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and that he retracted his opinion with regard to this halakha.

MISHNA: With regard to a courtyard that was breached into the public domain, and the breach was more than ten cubits wide, so that it cannot be considered an entrance, one who carries an object from inside the courtyard into the private domain, or from the private domain into it, is liable, as it ceases to be a private domain and is subsumed into the public domain. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Rabbis disagree and say: One who carries from inside the courtyard into the public domain, or from the public domain into it, is exempt, because its legal status is like that of a karmelit. Although it ceases to be a private domain, it does not become a full-fledged public domain.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer, due to the fact that the courtyard was breached into the public domain, does it become the public domain? The Gemara answers: Yes, as in this regard the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer conforms to his standard line of reasoning.

As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: In a situation where the multitudes selected a path for themselves in a field, or between fields, the path that they selected, they selected, and they retain the right to traverse this path even if the place belongs to an individual. Here too, as the partition of the courtyard was breached to the extent that the public can enter, its status is that of a public domain.

The Gemara expresses surprise at this opinion: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav said: And this applies only if they had misplaced a path in that field. Generally speaking, the public does not have the right to establish a path wherever it chooses. The baraita is referring to a case where a public path used to run through that field, but it fell into disuse, and no one remembers its precise course. In this case the public may once again select a path through the field.

And if you say: Here too, the mishna is dealing with a case where the public misplaced a path in that courtyard. They do not remember the exact position of the partition that once separated the courtyard and the public domain. The public claims that the residents of the courtyard appropriated that part of their domain. It is only this area that Rabbi Eliezer says is considered a public domain. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say: The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis is with regard to the entire courtyard to [ad] the place of the fallen partition, not only the small section that might have been a public path.

The Gemara rejects this argument: Say that Rabbi Ḥanina stated that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree over [al] the place of the partition, i.e., the dispute does not concern the entire courtyard, but only the former location of the partition, where a public path might once have passed.

And if you wish, say instead that the mishna is dealing with a case where the location of the original partition is known, and the tanna’im disagree with regard to the legal status of the sides of a public domain. As Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the sides of a public domain are considered like a public domain, i.e., the areas adjacent to the public domain are subsumed into the public domain. The same applies to the place of the partition that once separated the courtyard and the public domain but was breached. And the Rabbis maintain that the sides of a public domain are not considered like a public domain.

The Gemara asks: If so, let them disagree with regard to the sides of a public domain in general; why did they disagree about this particular case? The Gemara answers: Had they disagreed with regard to the sides of a public domain in general, we would have said: When do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer? This dispute applies only where there are stakes alongside the houses, which interfere with the use of the sides of the public domain. However, where there are no such stakes, say that they concede to him that the sides of a public domain are considered like a public domain. By formulating the dispute with regard to a courtyard that was breached into the public domain, the mishna is teaching us that they disagree in all cases.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t Rabbi Eliezer say with regard to a courtyard that was breached into the public domain, that one who carries an object from inside the courtyard into the private domain is liable? Apparently, he is liable if he carries an article into the private domain from anywhere in the courtyard, not only from the area adjacent to the public domain, as the entire courtyard is considered a public domain.

The Gemara answers: As the Rabbis said: From inside the courtyard, Rabbi Eliezer also said: From inside the courtyard. No conclusion can be inferred from his use of the term, as he was referring only to the section adjacent to the public domain.

The Gemara asks: But, if that is the case, the statement of the Rabbis is difficult. Rabbi Eliezer said that the legal status of the sides of the public domain is like that of a public domain, and they replied to him by referring to: From inside the entire courtyard? They appear to be addressing two different cases.

The Gemara answers: This is what the Rabbis are saying to Rabbi Eliezer: Don’t you concede to us with regard to a case where he carried an object from inside the courtyard to the public domain, or from the public domain to the courtyard, that he is exempt, because the courtyard is considered like a karmelit? The sides of the public domain are no different, and should have the status of a karmelit as well.

And how does Rabbi Eliezer counter this argument? There, the public does not tread on the courtyard; here, the public treads on the edge of the courtyard adjacent to the public domain, and therefore its status is that of a public domain in every sense.

MISHNA: With regard to a courtyard that was breached on Shabbat into a public domain from two of its sides, and likewise with regard to a house that was breached from two of its sides, and likewise with regard to an alleyway whose cross beams or side posts were removed on Shabbat, the residents of that domain are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, but are prohibited from doing so in the future. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei says: This cannot be the halakha, as if they are permitted to carry there on that Shabbat, they are likewise permitted to do so in the future, and if they are prohibited from carrying there in the future, they are also prohibited from carrying there on that Shabbat.

GEMARA: The Gemara poses a question: With what case are we dealing? If you say the mishna is referring to a case where the breach was up to ten cubits wide, in what way is a breach on only one side different? It is due to the fact that we say: It is an entrance rather than a breach, and carrying is therefore permitted. If so, if it was breached on two sides as well, say: It is an entrance, and there are entrances on two sides of the courtyard. Rather, the mishna is certainly dealing with a breach that is greater than ten cubits. If so, it should be prohibited to carry even if the courtyard was breached on only one side, as a breach that size negates all the partitions.

Rav said: Actually, the mishna is dealing with a breach that is no wider than ten cubits,